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ABSTRACT 
 
Gaining access to land is a problem that confronts both Government and non state 
capitalist agents in Ghana. The study examined why the state lacks an effective 
institutional capacity with the political and technical competence to mediate conflict 
of interests in its domestic land polity for land acquisition. It was interesting to 
observe that even Governments faced problems of land acquisition within the 
sovereign boundaries of the state. The investigative searchlight was therefore put on 
the competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests among 
autonomous rational actors in two empirical cases of government land acquisition. 
 
From the perspective of the rational institutional political theory, the study discovered 
that the public land bureaucracy lack any formal obligations with traditional land 
owners and land tenants for these actors to collectively engage Government in a 
rational discourse of land acquisition. On the contrary, the public land bureaucracy 
has not shed off its post-colonial cloth as an institution of violence used by 
Governments to deconstruct rival traditional land institutions. The traditional land 
institutions however own about 80% of the country’s available land. Moreover, 
traditional land institutions continue to receive social legitimacy and among the 
general populace. Conversely, the power status of the public land bureaucracy have 
seen continued decline in line with its negative productive efficiency.   
 
Underlying the problems of government land acquisition is a constitutionally 
bifurcated state with divided sovereignty over its land and people; whose public land 
bureaucracy lacks the political competence to mediate conflict of interests among 
Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in discourses of land 
acquisition. The traditional state makers who laid the foundations of the state through 
war-making are in conflict over land ownership with the modern state makers who 
also inherited the state from colonial mercantilist powers. The emerging hypothesis 
from the study is that; a political institution with strong institutionalized obligatory 
relationships with relevant autonomous rational actors is more likely to competently 
mediate conflict of interests in a discursive object or issue, than a political institution 
that has weak or no institutionalized obligations with relevant autonomous rational 
actors within its institutionalized environment.  
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1.0 THE PROBLEM OF LAND ACQUISITION IN GHANA  
 
 
The success story of economic growth in the fast growing economies is often 
attributed to one kind of investment: a high level of domestic private fixed-capital 
formation in the form of equipment acquisition. Feng (2003:157) put it this way: 
“Investment has been found to be one of the most robust determinants for growth 
among all potential factors that may be conducive to economic development, with the 
fast growing economies of the world almost invariably experiencing a high level of 
investment share of GDP”. Inversely, the failure of countries in their quest for 
economic development has been linked to the ineffectiveness of their institutions to 
promote fixed capital investment (De Soto 2000). Succinctly put by Leftwich and Sen 
(2007:5), “a central characteristic (and common cause) of failed states and failing 
economies is the absence of both agreed and appropriate institutions to govern both 
political and economic interactions”. The institutional capacity of states is therefore 
very important for their economic and political development. 
 
Fixed capital investment depends on the effectiveness of property right institutions to 
deliver land to investors. A secure land ownership regime is the cornerstone of 
industrial capitalism and political stability. Without well functioning property right 
institutions, the capacity of the state to provide secure access to land is in jeopardy. 
The importance of land for a country’s economic development cannot be over stated 
here. In Latin America and Asia, countries such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Laos and Indonesia among many others embarked on 
land reform policies; to tackle the more deeply rooted structural problems of land 
acquisition and bring extralegal property into the legal property system so as to reap 
potential economic and political benefit (De Soto 2000, Holstein 1996).  
 
In recent times, Ghana has implemented structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 
the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), and the African Growth and 
Opportunities Act (AGOA) in a desperate attempt to promote economic development. 
However, the capability of the country to achieve economic development through 
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fixed capital investment is hampered by one big problem. Gaining access to available 
land in a timely, conflict-free, and cost efficient manner is a serious problem faced by 
investors (Berry 2001, Crook 2005, Kasanga 2000, Ray 1999). The problem of land 
acquisition has affected Ghana’s potential to fully reap the economic opportunities 
that are falling off the fast moving wheels of global capitalism.  
 
Many scholars, land administrators, local and foreign investors, and the media lay the 
problems on dysfunctional property rights institutions for land acquisition. The 
Financial Times of London in an editorial on Ghana’s ‘Golden Age of Business’ 
economic initiative commented that the initiative had failed to deliver the expected 
economic results as many had hoped due to serious institutional problems among 
which is land acquisition (The Financial Times, London, 31 October, 2005). The 
editorial commented that over 80% of the country’s land is owned by local 
community leaders called Chiefs and their traditional institutions that constitute a 
powerful and non transparent local political actors existing alongside the trappings of 
a modern democratic state. The editorial noted “since most land is vested in local 
chiefs, transactions are often messy and uncertain” (ibid). 
 
A Malaysian High Commissioner to Ghana lamented to his host that “several 
Malaysian investors were willing to establish plantations and to invest in the housing 
sector in Ghana, but were unable to do so due to problems with land acquisition” 
(Ghana News Agency, 27 January 2006).  The diplomat is reported to have said that 
land reforms in his country had given a higher commercial value to land previously 
controlled by tribal groups, and now making land accessible to foreign investors. The 
diplomat extended an invitation to Ghana to understudy Malaysia’s Land Reform 
Programme which began more than 40 years ago, in a bid to improve land acquisition 
in Ghana (ibid). The problem of land acquisition is so pervasive in the country that 
one cannot finish recounting them since each new day presents fresh cases.  
 
Lack of high quality staff, inadequate financial and material resources, bureaucratic 
opportunism and lack of inter-organizational coordination are some of the problems 
that have been identified as impacting on the competence of public land bureaucrats to 
facilitate access to land for investors (Antwi, 2001, Somevi, 2002, Kasanga and Kotey 
2001). It is true that no administrative system can function rationally without technical 
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and human resources. Are there enough empirical grounds to believe that given 
enough funds, personnel, and adequate logistics, the public land bureaucracy can 
guarantee timely, transparent, conflict free, and cost efficient access to land?  
 
 Another problem identified by scholars is a prevailing environment of legal pluralism 
that makes it difficult to resolve problems that relates to land ownership disputes 
(Berry 2001, Kasanga and Kotey 2001, Ray 1999). According to Ray (1999:126), 
“traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms can also involve recourse to the courts of 
the Ghanaian state…investors faced the prospects of their capital and initiative being 
tied up for years in legal disputes without producing any profit”. If legal pluralism is 
the key problem affecting land acquisition then, it means that the actual problems lie 
deeper within the character of the state rather than just a simple matter of legality.  
 
On the whole, there seem to be divergent opinions regarding the actual problems that 
account for the institutional failure of the state to facilitate access to land for investors 
to pursue economic investment. It is through the empirical analysis of some prominent 
cases of institutional failures behind land acquisition between prospective investors, 
land owners, and the intervening state institutional structures that the underlying 
institutional problems affecting access to land can be laid bare. For a country that is 
implementing almost every IMF/World Bank initiated economic reform policy 
instrument in an effort to develop, when direct capital investors find it difficult to gain 
access to land in a manner supportive of capital production, then it is a serious issue 
that warrants critical examination.  
 
But, private capital investors are not alone in the quagmire of land acquisition in 
Ghana. Government after government were also caught in the quagmire of land 
acquisition when the country attempted to construct an inland port to facilitate its 
international trade. With all its monopoly over legalized institutions of organized 
violence, governments faced difficulties in land acquisition. The failure of public land 
institutions of a state to effectively mediate land politics within the domestic polity 
brings into sharp focus questions about the sovereignty of the state over organized 
actors. From a Political Science perspective, this is interesting and a more serious 
dimension to the problem of land acquisition. The study would rather problematize 
and critically examine why government encounter problems in land acquisition.  
 3
1.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In 1981, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took over political power 
through a military coup. Under the PNDC military Government, Ghana implemented 
series of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The 
economic liberalization programmes focused on transforming the country into a 
manufacturing and value added processing hub through privatization of state owned 
enterprises, simplification of customs and exercise procedures, establishment of free 
trade and export processing zones, and infrastructural development to facilitate trade.  
Soon, the military government realized that the country’s heavy reliance on its two 
sea ports for trade was hindering Ghana’s economic development objectives. This was 
because the volume of goods passing through the sea ports was more than its capacity 
could contain, leading to long delays in the processing of trade. Moreover, the sea 
ports were far away from the hinterlands, and even more remote from the country’s 
northern land locked neighbouring countries (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali) that 
channel much of their international trade through Ghana’s coastal borders. 
Government decided to construct an inland port1 in Ashanti region - the middle belt of 
the country - to serve as a hub of free trade. 
The following were Government’s objectives for the inland port project2: 
• Ease congestion at the country two existing sea ports (Takoradi and Tema): 
• Create job opportunities for the unemployed youth living in and around the 
inland port; 
• Reduce the aggregate transport cost of international cargo to importers and 
exporters from the middle and northern parts of Ghana;  
• Facilitate the use of the Ghana Corridor by the landlocked countries of 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; and 
                                                 
1. The term “inland port” refers to an import-export processing centre located away from traditional 
coastal borders with the main vision to “facilitate and process international trade through strategic 
investment in multi-modal transportation assets and by promoting value-added services as goods move 
through the supply chain” (Harrison et al 2002:1). 
2 Official Report of the Parliamentary Debates on the inland port project. Fourth Series, Vol. 23. No. 7, 
pp. 395-396 
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• Enhance and facilitate customs examination, duty payment and cargo 
clearance and also to promote the establishment of export processing zones in 
the vicinity of the inland port. 
The project was evaluated as “economically viable and financially profitable”; and 
estimated to cost US$ 10.3 million. The construction of an inland port does not only 
require huge capital investment, but being a fixed capital investment, the foremost 
requirement is access to a suitable land. Obtaining access to these two crucial 
resources became a problem. In a Government report, the port project “run into 
difficulties as a result of lack of finance and the acquisition of a suitable land for the 
project”3. Therefore it remained on the drawing board. In 1992 the PNDC military 
government returned the country to multi-party democratic rule after its political 
party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), had won power. With enhanced 
political stability and modest economic achievement, Ghana’s economy became a 
beacon of hope for local and foreign investors.  
Around 1995, the NDC Government, through the Ministry of Roads and Transport 
mandated the Ghana Shippers Council (GSC) to reactivate the inland port project. The 
GSC identified suitable land in three communities with proximity to Kumasi- the 
capital of the Ashanti Region. The three communities, arranged in order of priority are 
Fumesua, Boankra and Ampabame. With financial capital secured and suitable land 
identified, all was now set for Government to acquire land in any of the three 
communities for the implementation of the project.  
Fortunately for the NDC Government, the state, through its public land institutions, 
had previously compulsorily acquired vast suitable land in Fumesua, much of which 
lay idle. However, between 1995 and 2000, Government could not gain access to the 
statutorily acquired land for this important private sector development project. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that Government used its monopoly over the state institutions 
of organized violence against local land owners and other property owners with 
conflict of interest.  The NDC Government failed to gain access to the land until it lost 
political power through universal adult suffrage to the main opposition political party- 
the New Patriotic Party (NPP). 
                                                 
3 ibid 
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The newly elected Government, with its immense support base in the Ashanti region, 
could also not renegotiate the acquisition of the land from local land owners. In 2001, 
the NPP Government was therefore compelled to relocate the sitting of the Project to 
the second priority area, that is, the Boankra local community. In Boankra, 
Government was met with fresh problems of land acquisition from local community 
leaders, other actors outside the community, and farmers. It was not until 2003 that 
Government was able to negotiate its way through the many problems of land 
acquisition, and gained access to the identified land for the take off of the project.  
It is within the above land politics that the study seeks to analyse the institutional 
capacity of the state for land acquisition; and, to find out how this capacity impacts on 
the competence of public land organizations to mediate conflict of interests among 
autonomous rational actors involved in the discursive process. It is interesting that 
government after government encountered problems of land acquisition within the 
geographical boundaries over which the state claims legal sovereignty. One therefore 
wonders kind of problems could render legal monopoly over the state institutions of 
organized violence so powerless and almost useless.  
The failure of governments, both military and civilian, to gain access to land through 
their unique monopoly over organized state institutions of violence raises serious 
questions over the character of the Ghanaian state, its domestic land politics, and the 
power status functions imposed on the public land bureaucracy. Perhaps, the power 
status functions imposed on the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of 
interests in government land acquisition are inadequate to secure collective 
agreement, support, and action for the process. Or worse, the political sovereignty of 
the state over organized local communities and other groups within the domestic 
polity is questionable. These issues shall be looked at within the confines of the study.  
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
  
The objective of the study is to critically analyze how the institutional capacity of the 
state for land acquisition impacts on the competence of the public land bureaucracy to 
mediate conflict of interests among autonomous rational actors to gain their collective 
agreement, support, and action for government land acquisition.  
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1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In furtherance of the above objective, the following questions are researched: 
 
1. What is the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy for land 
acquisition in Ghana?  
 
2. How does the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy impacts on 
the competence of bureaucrats to mediate conflict of interests among relevant 
autonomous rational actors in a discourse of government land acquisition? 
 
It is hoped that these two questions will help to empirically analyze the two cases of 
government land acquisition to unearth the institutional problems that affects the on 
competence of relevant officials to facilitate access to land for government.  
 
1.4 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
Before proceeding further, there is the need to define certain conceptual terms that 
will be used extensively in this study. The concepts are Land, Land Acquisition, 
Institution, and Traditional Authority. 
 
1.4.1 LAND  
 
Land is defined, basically, as the physical area of the earth that makes possible 
agricultural production, real estate development, infrastructural development, and 
domestic fixed capital investment. For clarity, other associated meanings of land such 
as air, water, and trees are excluded from the definition for the purpose of this study. 
The definition of land used in this study is therefore restricted to the physical 
immovable portion of the earth that is owned by an individual, family, corporate 
group, or the state as their property. Land ownership means that a person is 
recognized by other relevant autonomous actors with conflict of interest in the land as 
the legitimate and legal owner of that plot of land. The conflict of interest generated in 
land is necessitated by the fact that it is a scarce resource that has value and meaning 
to social forces or actors.  
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1.4.2 LAND ACQUISITION 
 
Land acquisition in this study thus refers to the situation whereby an agent gain access 
to a well defined portion of the physical land within a particular geographical area of 
the earth. In modern times, usually, the ownership of land is evidenced by the 
possession of a legal document called land title obtained after going through a process 
of formal registration of the terms of the acquisition.  
 
The acquisition of land is the outcome of an institutional procedure that is collectively 
agreed upon by relevant landed interests or actors within the state. The outcome of the 
process depends on the context of land ownership and the obligations that must be 
fulfilled in order to gain access to a piece of land. Having acquired the land, the owner 
decides what to do with his acquired property within the terms of the acquisition and 
the development requirements specified by local development planning agencies.  
 
1.4.3 INSTITUTION 
 
It is almost impossible to understand institutions from a single disciplinary 
orientation. This is because political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
organization theorists, economists, and other disciplines stress different aspects of it. 
It is however well accepted among the various social science disciplines that without 
people, language, and collective intentionality an institution can never exist. 
 
From the institution of human language to the political institutions of the state, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that human beings live in an institutionalized world. The 
study of institutions is the study of power relationships and influence- the substance of 
the discipline of politics. In spite of its pervasiveness, and the growing consensus in 
the social sciences that ‘institutions matter’ for rational human action and social 
interaction outcomes (Gran 2005a, 2007, March and Olsen 2004, Searle 1995, 2001) 
the definition of an institution is one of the most contested areas in social science.  
The concern of the study is to understand the effects of a particular type of institution, 
namely, the public land bureaucracy, on conflicts of interests among autonomous 
rational actors, and on rational collective action. The definition we seek for is 
therefore geared towards the understanding of how the political administrative 
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institutions of the state are created, evolve, and function to regulate diverse conflicts 
of interests. It is imperative that the definition of an institution accounts for the formal 
and the informal constitutive elements; as well as their relational linkages in social 
interactions. Two famous definitions of an institution from North (1990) and March 
and Olsen (2004) receives attention here to further our understanding about how 
institutions affect human action and outcomes.  
 
In the famous definition provided by Douglas North (1990:1), “Institutions are the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social and economic”. North’s definition is useful for its 
coverage of both the formal and informal aspects of institutions. Harris (2006:4) 
correctly notes that “formal institutions, like legal rules, are always and necessarily 
embedded in deep, informal social structures, involving such factors as trust, duty, 
and obligation, which have to be studied substantively”.  
 
A useful example of the formal-informal institutional duality is provided by Leftwich 
(2006:1): “Laws which grant, recognize, and protect individual land ownership 
establish formal institutions governing property rights in land. Communal systems of 
land tenure, on the other hand, may be thought of as informal, embodying rules which 
have been established by custom and convention and do not permit private ownership, 
purchase or sale. Both institutional arrangements have different implications”.  The 
proper integration of informal institutions into formal institutional structures is the 
political challenge for institutional designers. 
 
North’s famous definition of institutions leans heavily on the regulative aspects of an 
institution and suppresses the developmental collective intentionality behind the 
creation of institutions. Beyond the incentives structured by institutional constraints, 
the definition does not go far enough in clarifying why human actors who have no 
need for the promised incentives should follow institutional rules seen as 
“constraints”. The capacity of institutions to exert wilful compliance in the face of 
undesirable outcomes is an important aspect of political institutions that is missing.  
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Moreover, the definition limits our understanding of the basis, nature, and effects of 
the power conferred on political administrative institutions to shape social 
interactions. What exactly enables institutions like public bureaucracies to shape 
social interactions through coercive instrument? This remains unanswered in the 
definition. Even more importantly, formal institutions of the state go beyond 
enactment of the rules of the game. Rules, by themselves cannot have any impact on 
developmental goals if they are not embedded in human and material resources. 
 
March and Olsen provides a more comprehensive definition of an institution that fills 
some of the missing gaps in North’s definition: I their perspective, “An institution is a 
relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures of resources 
that make action possible- organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and 
structures of meaning, that explain and justify behavior – roles, identities and 
belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs” (March and Olsen 
2004:5).  
 
One can infer from March and Olsen’s definition that beyond incentives rational 
actors are more likely to follow institutional rules that even limit their own 
opportunities because institutions weave together identities, common purposes, and 
normative beliefs to make collective action possible among actors with conflict of 
interests in a common object. Their definition clearly separates the rules and shared 
meanings of institutions from the resources that make action possible. But March and 
Olsen also take institutions as given or “stable collections”. What remain unaccounted 
for are the origin, basis, and nature of the power embedded in political institutions.  
 
The study improves on the two definitions and tries to define institutions in a way that 
accounts for their origin, nature of their power status, and the basis of their resources. 
An institution is a relatively stable and meaningful system of constitutive rules of 
obligations discursively imposed on entities, people, and structures of resources 
through the collective intentionality of rational human actors; to interact in 
systematic relationships that explain and justify rational behaviour, action, or 
outcome. When actors collectively impose power status functions on organizational 
structures to function as institutions, there is reason to believe that they will subject 
themselves to the constitutive demands of their own obligations. Every institution is 
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normatively meaningful to the creators. Institutional survival may have nothing to do 
with the efficiency imperative stressed by transaction cost theorists. Also, institutional 
change may be inevitable when an institution loses the power status imposed on it. 
 
The origin and nature of the institutional power of political institutions in having an 
effect on rational human action is founded on institutional obligations. “Everything 
we value in civilization requires the creation and maintenance of institutional power 
relations through collectively imposed status-functions. These require constant 
monitoring and adjusting to create and preserve fairness, efficiency, flexibility, and 
creativity, not to mention such traditional values as justice, liberty, and dignity. 
Institutional power -massive, pervasive, and typically invisible- permeates every nook 
and cranny of our social lives, and as such it is not a threat to liberal values but rather 
the precondition of their existence” (Searle 1995:94).  
 
The fundamental feature in the creation of an institution is not merely the structures of 
resources, rules, or practices; but the collective intentionality of rational actors in the 
imposition of power status on such structures of resources. The process makes it 
possible for those structures, rules and resources to have power status and also interact 
meaningfully with autonomous rational actors. The type of power status imposed by 
actors on institutions differs across institutional sectors. This explains the difference 
between political, religious, economic, and academic institutions. For instance, the 
state differs from the church because it creators imposes upon the state a power status 
as a legal instrument of organized violence that may be used by governments to shape 
behaviour, structure incentives, and against enemies. The church, as a religious 
institution, does not have such a power status to legally use violence on members. 
 
Institutional differences notwithstanding, the fundamental principle underlying the 
initial creation of political and religious institutions does not take a different path 
aside collective intentionality, “we agree”. When an institution enjoys a high power 
status-function from relevant actors within the institutional field, the institution enjoys 
strong feelings of identification from it political subject actors. The expansion and 
survival of a political institution may however take a different approach aside 
collective intentionality of individual members. This is because a political institution, 
once created, may use violence against individuals in the name of collective interests.  
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1.4.4  TRADITTIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
Conceptual terms such as Native Authority, Customary Rule, and Indigenous 
Authority are used by some scholars (Dia 1996, Kimble 1963) in reference to the 
same type of political authority labelled Traditional Authority. In fact, the British 
colonial state preferred to use the term ‘Native Authority’ in reference to the system 
of authority which they met in the Gold Coast (now Ghana).  Traditional authority is a 
form of political institution at the local community level of governance in Ghana. The 
institutional basis of the system of traditional governance predates the modern 
Ghanaian state. Therefore traditional authorities and their political institutions largely 
derive their power and legitimacy from sources outside those conferred by the modern 
state makers. The political legitimacy of traditional authorities in Ghana is deeply 
embedded within cultural and historical contexts which even the modern Ghanaian 
state lacks (Ray 1999). The modern state and Traditional Authority political relations 
have implications for claims to the land occupied by the Ghanaian state.  
 
In the Ghanaian society, traditional authorities are generally called Chiefs and the 
traditional political institution is known as ‘Chieftaincy’. The 1992 constitution of 
Ghana defines a chief as “a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and 
lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled4, enskinned or 
installed as a chief or queen mother5 in accordance with the relevant customary law 
and usage”. The governance structure of the chieftaincy institution extends deeply to 
reach the doorstep of the ordinary native in the community. Every citizen of Ghana 
comes from a family, which constitute the basic structure of the traditional authority 
system of governance. Traditional authorities are always quick to point out this fact to 
their errant political subjects of the danger of being sanctioned for any behaviour that 
contradict the traditional norms of society.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The seat of authority of a chief in southern Ghana is a stool which is normally made of wood. 
Enstoolment is a process through which the selected royal becomes a chief. In northern Ghana, the seat 
of authority is the skin of an animal. A land that is communally owned is called Stool Land or 
customary land 
 
5 A queen mother refers to a woman who is installed from the royal family as “the senior female royal 
officeholder, not necessarily being literally, physically the mother of the chief” (Ray 1999:142). 
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Traditional Authorities therefore occupies powerful political institutions existing at 
the local level of the Ghanaian state that claims control over a defined territorial 
boundary that is constitutive of the people as subjects and also usually the land. “Such 
a territory has clear-cut boundaries and the ruler’s authority is supported by well 
developed administrative machinery and clearly defined judicial institutions” 
(Nukunya 1992:5). Within academic discourses, the defined geographical territory 
over which traditional authorities exercise political power is referred to as the 
traditional state. In the pre-colonial days traditional authorities performed the 
executive, legislative, and the judicial functions of the state through well structured 
offices. Traditional states like the Asante state, the Denkyira state, the Fante state, and 
the Dagomba state had their own police security networks and armed forces for the 
defence and protection of the state. Traditional authorities collected taxes from 
subjects and also conducted foreign policies beyond their geographical territories.  
 
The highest level of the traditional authority system of governance is occupied by 
paramount Chiefs who manage a number of local communities, with each headed by a 
sub chief. By their historical access to revenue from land and taxes, the members of 
royal families, usually, have received the best of formal education from prestigious 
educational institutions both within and outside Ghana. It is less surprising that today 
people who assume the position of paramount Chiefs are those who have also 
distinguished themselves in their former careers in politics, business, and public 
service as top government statisticians, top police and army officers, national 
legislators, banking officials and many other areas. They were part of the crème de la 
crème found in all sectors of the domestic and international political economy.  
 
The territory over which traditional authorities exercise political power normally 
comprise a homogenous ethnic group sharing common language, culture, and a sense 
of nationhood. They are bounded by the performance of a number of rituals to 
maintain and protect their traditional institutions. Some of the traditional states like 
Asante are highly centralized in the sense that it has an overlord chief whose authority 
is recognized throughout the territory that falls under his political domain.  
 
The unique set of shared culture, language, and nationhood in the traditional society 
combine to form an important capital that makes the chieftaincy institution a powerful 
 13
political force in Ghana; and play pivotal roles in the development of local 
communities. Even more importantly, the role played by traditional authorities in 
customary land administration makes their political organizations important agencies 
in processes of land acquisition.  If it is true that “36000 towns and villages in Ghana 
are being directly governed by Chiefs and that only 12000 are directly served by 
central government” (CDD 2001:38), then one can imagine the extent of the power, 
authority and role of traditional political institutions in land acquisition.  
 
One therefore sees parallels of the traditional state with the modern state as both 
exercise political claims over institutions of organized violence within their respective 
territories. Traditional authorities based their sources of legitimacy on some 
religiously defined, culturally accepted, and historically honoured divine right to rule. 
This divine right is used for making authoritative decisions regarding the maintenance 
of law and order, the behaviour of subjects, the use of land, and also the protection of 
societal values.  Traditional authorities in Ghana today, hold custom-sanctioned high 
power status in local communities and continue to perform many crucial functions 
particularly in customary land acquisition. The important role of traditional authorities 
and their institutions will be seen the discourses of government land acquisition. 
 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The study is organized into ten chapters. In chapter 2, the discourse analysis research 
methodology used for the study is discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework through which the two empirical cases 
of government land acquisition are analyzed and the findings understood.  
 
In chapter 4, the study delineates the institutional framework for land acquisition in 
Ghana by tracing its historical emergence through the political process of state 
making and state formation. The nature, character, and power status functions of the 
emergent public land bureaucracy for land acquisition are then presented in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 provides the context for rational action by autonomous actors with conflict 
of interests in government land acquisition.  The subject positions of the discursive 
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actors, the obligations they have committed themselves to as political subjects, and 
the political agencies they use to achieve their interests are discussed as the 
background for rational analysis of actions.  
 
The narratives of the two empirical cases of government land acquisition occupy 
chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, the discourse of compulsory government land 
acquisition that took place in Fumesua is presented. The discourse of the interaction 
regarding how government tried to compulsorily acquire the land, the opposition 
generated from other actors, the problems encountered by the discursive actors, and 
the failure of government to acquire the land, are narrated. Chapter 8 follows a similar 
narrative format. Here, how the discursive actors collectively managed to agree in the 
discourse of government land acquisition are captured. The differences and 
similarities of the problems encountered and the competence of the public land 
bureaucracy in mediating conflicts of interests in government land acquisition 
becomes clear.  
 
Chapter 9 delves into a theoretical analysis of the two cases of land acquisition to 
critically examine how the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy affects 
its competence to mediate conflict of interests among Government, Traditional 
Authorities, and Land Tenants in public land acquisition.  
 
The study ends with chapter 10 where the findings from the empirical analysis are 
summarized and the final conclusion made.  
  
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The institutional capacity of the Ghanaian state to create a sound property rights 
regime that effectively facilitate access to land is very important for the development 
of the state. Creating such institutional capacity is the problem facing government, 
investors, land owners, and land bureaucratic elites. The rest of the study focuses on 
how the institutional capacity of the state for land acquisition impacts on the 
competence of public land bureaucrats to mediate conflicts of interests among 
autonomous rational actors such as traditional authorities in a discourse of 
government land acquisition. 
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CHAPTER 2 
  
2.0   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The appropriateness of research methodology is very important for the scientific 
evaluation of the claims made by a study. This chapter discusses discourse analysis as 
a research methodology used for the study. Issues bordering on the appropriateness of 
the methodology, the data collection processes, the method of data analysis, and 
challenges encountered on the field are presented here. 
 
As Silverman (2006:280) correctly emphasizes, “It is an increasingly accepted view 
that work becomes scientific by adopting methods of study appropriate to its subject 
matter. Social science is thus scientific to the extent that it uses appropriate methods 
and is rigorous, critical and objective in its handling of data.” The choice of a 
methodological approach, as always in scientific research, depends on what the study 
tries to do and where it seems that one may be able to make progress.  
  
2.1 APPROPRIATENESS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Any methodological approach that is considered for research also has implications 
even for the theoretical models that might be used for the interpretation of research 
data. Alker (1996) suggests that political researchers reconnect their research 
methodology with communicatively oriented political phenomenologies or with 
critically interpretive logics of political inquiry into central political concerns of 
power and influence, systems of such relationships, and justifications for collective 
action. Qualitative discursive strategies are therefore suggested. Many other scholars 
also suggest critically interpretive logics for understanding institutional effect on 
rational action (Searle 1995, Rydin 2003).  
 
In the opinion of Alker, quantitative political methodologies are not appropriate for 
studying the substance of power and influence in institutional political relations. Alker 
(1996:788) takes an extremist position in describing quantitative political 
methodology as a package of “used, or remodelled tools developed by other 
methodologists for other disciplines’ key substantive problems” rather than for the 
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authentic study of the substance of power and influence in politics. In a research 
environment where the research population is not well defined and some of the actors 
under study are elusive, qualitative research methodology thrives better in comparison 
to the quantitative research approach.  
 
Communicative approaches enable the institutional analysts to unravel the normative 
values and obligations that influence the positions of practical actors, rational analysis 
of the choice of strategies, and the outcomes produced. Understanding the normative 
values that underlie institutional obligations entails a qualitative research endeavour. 
The qualitative research domain thus offered a more appropriate research approach for 
studying fundamental issues of power relations, subjective positions of actors, the 
choice of political agencies, and the rationality of actions in the discourses of 
government land acquisition.  
 
The qualitative approach offered by the methodology also helped in dealing with 
specification uncertainties regarding the identification of discursive participants 
involved in the discourse of government land acquisition. Discourse analysis enabled 
the construction of the discursive actors, their subjective positions, and also the 
political subject within the institutional elements of the public land bureaucracy. 
These laid the grounds for the rational analysis of actions taken by actors. Also 
important was the fact that, the methodology enabled the continuous modification of 
the research questions according to the dictates of logical clarity. Now the discussion 
looks at the substance of the methodological approach. 
 
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
Discourses “refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of 
subjects and objects. At this lower level of abstraction, discourses are concrete 
systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically political, as their 
formation is an act of radical institution, which involves the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
In addition, discourses always involve the exercise of power, as their constitution 
involves the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the 
relations between different social agents. Moreover, discourses are contingent and 
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historical constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political forces 
excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their 
control” (Howarth and Stavrakakis (2004:3).  
  
According to Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000:4) “Discourse analysis refers to the 
practice of analysing empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms…. 
empirical data are viewed as sets of signifying practices that constitute a discourse and 
its reality, thus providing the conditions which enable subjects to experience the world 
of objects, words and practices. This enables discourse theorists to draw upon and 
develop a number of techniques and methods in linguistic and literary theory 
commensurate with its ontological assumptions”. Institutional discourse analysis is 
driven by a theory that assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that 
their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules.  
 
Discourse analysis of social interaction and institutional effects on human action 
requires the analysts to finds answers to some basic questions. First and foremost one 
must identify who the discursive are. The analysts must then clearly specify the object 
of social interaction. This is because the object of institutional discourse is the centre 
around which the discursive participants define their positions. The identification of 
the participants and the object of discursive focus then enables the analysts to socially 
construct the discursive positions of the actors in order for one to appropriate 
understand the actions taken by the interactive participants.  
 
Gran (2004:36) also notes that “a discursive practice gives form to a field in society, 
the objects in the field and their order, their relations”. Institutional discourse analysis 
examines how participants, objects, discursive practices, and their relations all “enter 
or are parts of a structuration process giving continuously new form to social (or 
natural) reality” (Gran 2004:36). It is only when the actors, their discursive positions, 
the actual actions taken by the actors, and the outcomes produced from their 
interactions have been empirically accounted for, that the analyst can draw logical 
conclusions about the impacts of institutions on the actions of autonomous actors.  
 
Discursive positions articulated by actors with conflict of interests in the two cases of 
land acquisition were analyzed to find out the problems that affect the competence of 
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public land bureaucrats in facilitating access to land for government. It was noted that 
land as a discursive object has different meanings for the different interests involved 
in the social interactions. For capital investors, the value of land lies in its conversion 
into profitable investment activities such as for real estate development, commercial 
agriculture, and anything supportive of fixed capital investment. Land is thus 
meaningful to capitalists in economic terms. For government, the possession of land 
signifies political power, and control over subjects and everything on, under, or above 
land. Government discourse of land is weaved around power, authority, and political 
control. Traditional authorities also articulate similar discourse as government, but 
their position is also coloured by cultural and religious meanings of land.  
 
In the discursive positions of government and traditional rulers land therefore signifies 
something more than economic investment. One can therefore expect that in social 
interaction over land acquisition capital investors, government, and traditional 
authorities articulate conflicting discourses. Unravelling how such conflicting 
discourses are peacefully mediated by the public bureaucracy to pave way for rational 
collective action was important to understanding any institutional problems that were 
encountered in the process of land acquisition. The task of unravelling the discourse 
of land politics articulated by government, traditional authorities, and other actors 
with conflict of interests in the process of government land acquisition were made 
possible through the discourse analysis research methodology.  
 
Discourse analysis, as a research methodology, “is not a closed system which has 
already defined all its rules and categories, but an open-ended programme of research 
whose contours and aims are still very much in the making. A number of the 
discursive dimensions that have progressively emerged as important are still not 
sufficiently developed”. Notwithstanding this fact, it has also been noted that this 
speech act theoretic methodological approach offers promising new avenues for 
research (Howarth et. al. 2000).  
 
2.3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 
The study undertakes a micro-level institutional analysis of the impact of institutions 
on rational action. The unit of analysis focus at the level of social interaction or the 
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action arena where “two holons- participants and an action situation- interact as they 
are affected by exogenous variables and produce outcomes that in turn affect the 
participants and the action situation” (Ostron 2005:13). The reaction of autonomous 
actors to exogenous variables offset by the discourse of land acquisition will help to 
understand the institutional problems that impacts on the competence of the public 
land bureaucracy to effectively mediate conflict of interests among autonomous 
rational actors and facilitate access to land for government.  
 
According to Searle (1995:100-1); If we take as our primary target of analysis not the 
organizational structures, like governments, but the agents who operate on and within 
those structures, “then the great divide in the categorization of institutional reality is 
between what the agent can do and what the agent must (and must not) do, between 
what the agent is enabled to do and what he or she is required to do as a result of the 
assignment of status”.  
 
At the level of social interaction one is able to know the subjective discursive 
obligations that are articulated by relevant discursive participants (government, land 
owners, and land tenants) and how such subjective discourses are politically 
accommodated within or excluded from the political agency for land acquisition to 
produce collective action or outcomes. The factors that impacts on the competence of 
the public land bureaucracy as a collective organizational actor in mediating conflicts 
of interests in land acquisition can then be empirically appreciated.  
 
2.4 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
  
Searle (1995) provides the theoretical formula that underlies the collective 
intentionality of autonomous rational actors in the creation of institutions or 
institutional facts. The Searlean theoretical principle is expressed in the form: (We 
agree (X counts as Y) in context C)). This theoretical formula was used by the study 
to analyze the competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of 
interests among autonomous rational actors in a discourse of government land 
acquisition. The application of the formula thus took the form: (We (Government) 
(Traditional Authority) (Land Tenant) Agree (X counts as Land Acquisition) C)))))
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The study empirically analyzed two cases of government land acquisition. A 2 x 2 
word table was created from the above analytical formula to find out the similarities 
and differences in the two cases that accounted for the different discursive outcomes. 
A cross-case synthesis is an analytic technique supported by some social science 
research methodologists (Creswell 2007, Yin 2003) as a reliable method of analysis 
where the research studies two or more cases.  
 
The cross-case analytical approach helps to establish patterns of relationships in social 
interaction, looks for correspondence between two or more categories, and helps to 
display the data from individual cases according to some uniform framework. 
Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000:4) noted that discourse analysis “enables discourse 
theorists to draw upon and develop a number of techniques and methods in linguistic 
and literary theory commensurate with its ontological assumptions”. The 
constructivist analytical approach “offers novel ways to think about the relationship 
between social structures and political agency, the role of interests and identities in 
explaining social action, the interweaving of meanings and practices, and the 
character of social and historical change” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000:5). 
 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The study relied extensively on naturally occurring data and where necessary used 
interview data, or what Silverman calls “researcher-provoked data” for elaboration 
and clarification of interesting issues raised by the former type of data. These two 
types of data collected are discussed below.  
 
2.5.1 NATURALLY OCCURRING DATA 
 
Natural occurring data constitute a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data – 
speeches, reports, manifestoes, historical events, policy documents and many others - 
that are created independent of the researcher’s interest. These empirical data are 
viewed as “sets of signifying practices that constitute a discourse and its reality, thus 
providing the conditions which enable subjects to experience the world of objects, 
words and practices” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000:4). 
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The articulation of various discourses by the relevant actors with conflict of interests 
in the process of government land acquisition left in its path varieties of naturally 
occurring data. The Ghana Shippers Council (GSC), as the main project implementing 
agency, became the centre of attraction for land owners and land tenants. Letters, 
petitions, writ of sermons from private legal practitioners, were all directed by various 
actors to the GSC. The GSC sometimes also used press conferences to articulate its 
position on the challenges and pertinent issues raised by land tenants and land owners.  
 
Land tenants and traditional authorities had also left behind interesting texts 
particularly in the media through press conferences, violent confrontations, and 
demonstrations. Some of these interesting discursive data were collected for analysis. 
The acrimony from the social interaction over the acquisition of land by government 
raised concerns in the national House of Parliament. A written text over the unfolding 
deliberations in the legislative house was also collected. In the end, all these 
discursive texts enriched the empirical analysis of the cases under the study.  
 
2.5.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
 
Since the written texts created by discursive actors exist without the intervention of a 
researcher, most often they tend to leave out some crucial information which the 
researcher is interested in. This calls for researcher provoked data to fill in 
information gaps. Researcher-provoked data constitute the type of data created 
through the actual intervention of the researcher through research methods like 
interviews and observation. With this approach the researcher create data which 
would not exist independently apart from the researcher’s intervention. Qualitatively 
oriented non structured focused interviews were conducted with purposively selected 
relevant actors for such purposes. The interview data is presented in table 1. 
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Table 1: Fieldwork Interview Participants 
 
 
POSITION AGENT/SUBJECT-ACTOR NUMBER 
GOVERNMENT Ghana Shippers Council 6 
PUBLIC LAND 
BUREAUCRACY 
Regional Lands Commission 
Land Title Registry 
Land Valuation Board 
          5 
2 
1 
TRADITIONAL  
AUTHORITY 
Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat 
Boankra Traditional Authorities 
3 
3 
LAND TENANT Affected Farmers in Boankra 8 
Total  26 
(Source: Author, June-August 2006) 
 
Due to the many actors involved in the social interactions over land acquisition 
inadequate time made it impossible to interview land tenants and traditional land 
owners involved in the interaction over access to land in Fumesua. However, their 
discursive positions in the institutional interaction over land acquisition were captured 
through natural occurring data that were collected for analysis.  
 
2.6 RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
  
With high expectations I began my interviews by focusing on the Ghana Shippers 
Council since it was the agency mandated by Government to implement the inland 
port project. After official clearance had been given by the Deputy Chief Executive of 
the GSC, I began the institutional data collection process. To my surprise, it turned 
out that the land acquisition in Boankra was far from over because of conflict between 
the land owners in the sharing of money from the lease of the land. The conflict had 
courted media interest. I was therefore competing with local journalists for 
information on the same issue.  
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Due to the political twist which the land acquisition process had taken, both in the 
media and within traditional institutions, the relevant officials who had the required 
information were reluctant to release it. In the view of one GSC official, “the politics 
of the civil service” in Ghana was a reality that threatens the tenure of a civil servant 
in the unfortunate event that the media put a negative political spin on information 
that they give out to the public.  
 
Initially, on countless occasions, I was told by my interviewees not to record or write 
some important accounts that were considered to be “secrets” surrounding the 
interaction process. The event that finally made some officials of the GSC to release 
the required information was the shared experience between researcher and some 
officials who had received formal higher education in Norwegian Universities. Three 
out of six officials interviewed within the GSC had received higher education from 
Norwegian tertiary institutions.  
 
The problem of accessibility to relevant actors for interviewing was even worse with 
the traditional authorities. The Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat intimated that the 
process of facilitating access to the land far from over; and given the background of 
their bitter experiences with claimants to the land, it was undesirable to release 
information regarding the role of the Asantehene in the land transactions. Gaining 
access to the higher offices of traditional authorities became a problem for a 
‘commoner’. Interviewed officials at the Asantehene Land Secretariat usually laughed 
off the idea of interviewing the occupant of the golden stool by a commoner. It was 
less surprising that a commoner with no institutional obligations with higher 
traditional authorities should encounter an iron curtain that separated him from 
traditional rulers customarily considered by their subjects as irreproachable. 
 
Traditional Authorities and land tenants in Boankra were forthcoming with their 
version of what had transpired in the discourse of government land acquisition. Their 
willingness and cooperative attitude may be explained by the fact that they were still 
feeling aggrieved for having been cheated by their higher traditional authorities and 
government. A day prior to my interview with the Boankra Traditional Authorities, 
they had travelled to Kumasi to attend a scheduled meeting with the Asantehene and 
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the Ejisumanhene to deliberate over some chieftaincy problems that had stalled the 
disbursement of money paid by the GSC for the acquisition of the land.  
 
The data collection process was later to made headway with the initially reluctant 
public officials. In spite of the speed with which naturally occurring data were 
collected, the data were not collected on a silver platter. For instance, seeking basic 
information regarding how much money was paid for the lease of land was enough to 
trigger consultations among junior and senior officials at the Kumasi branch of the 
GSC as to whether or not to release this information. One should not assume that 
when relying on naturally occurring data, there is always free access to information or 
that some naturally occurring data have been stacked neatly under some file begging 
to be collected. Access to information did not just depend on the mere production of 
an introduction letter from a research department that assures the information provider 
of his anonymity or the academic usage of the information to be provided.  
 
The feet dragging behaviour of public servants in releasing public information was 
hardly surprising. At the time of the research, Members of Parliament were locked in 
debate over the passage of the Free Access to Public Information Bill. Whiles the 
opposition supported the passage of the bill, government had put the process on hold 
with the excuse that “the passage of the bill could be expensive if not well managed”; 
and that the country had not reached a stage where it needs and can successfully 
implement a Freedom of Information Law6. Some officials of the public land 
institutions had also claimed that their internal documents were not meant for public 
scrutiny. In the opinion of an official of the Lands Valuation Board, yearly 
administrative reports of the Board were not even available to junior staff members 
but kept under a lock by the boss.  
 
The initial apprehension exhibited by public officials in the release of the naturally 
occurring data, and the limited time available, forced the data collection process to 
begin with the interview of relevant actors involved in the discourse. The precedence 
                                                 
6 This was the position of the President of the Republic which he was reported to have stated during an 
interaction with delegates to the 41st Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights in Accra. The President’s position was also supported by the Attorney-General’s Office 
where the Bill had been sent for further studies. 
http://www.myjoyonline.com/archives/news/200705/4702.asp (18/05/2007) 
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given to researcher provoked data over natural occurring data was later to have an 
effect on the use of the interview data in the study. As confidence was gradually built 
with officials leading to the release of the required naturally occurring data, it came to 
light that much of the interview data was covered by the naturally occurring data. As 
Silverman (2006:202) remarked, “Indeed, if we can, at least to some extent, study 
what people are actually doing in naturally occurring situations, why should we ever 
want to work with researcher-provoked data?”. The reliance on naturally occurring 
data helped deal with issues of reliability of research data and interviewer anonymity. 
 
In spite of the numerous challenges encountered in the process of data collection, the 
interview data and the naturally occurring data that were collected complemented 
each other to provide a coherent picture of what transpired in the two arenas of social 
interaction over land acquisition. Particularly, the information collected through 
naturally occurring data proved to be more than enough on its own for the study 
analysis of the cases. Although not much used in the entire study, the researcher 
provoked data was also important as it elaborated and confirmed the authenticity of 
media reports, organizational reports, legal documents, and other official documents 
that were naturally produced from the social interactions.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Discourse methodology suggests that qualitative researchers recognize the advantage 
of using naturally occurring data over research provoked data in situations where the 
former exists. However, both sources of data complemented each other in the 
institutional analysis of the empirical cases of social interaction over government land 
acquisition. In the field research, the collection of naturally occurring data proved 
advantageous over researcher-provoked data with regards to speed, and access to 
information. It is however advisable that a researcher also gives adequate 
consideration to researcher-provoked data where interview participants are ready and 
willing to provide the required information without looking over their shoulders. 
Where naturally occurring data and researcher provoked data complement each other, 
it helps to enrich a qualitative case study. With our methodological strategy and its 
theoretical orientation discussed, the next chapter discussed the theoretical perspective 
constructed for the analytical understanding of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3.0   THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Analyzing the institutional capacity of states in managing conflicts of interests among 
organized actors in society through political administrative institutions takes the 
analyst to the heart of the substantive issues of power relations in political science. 
This issue is an old institutional theoretical problem in political science. At the centre 
of the theoretical discussion is the question of how it is possible for political 
institutions to manage common resources in society among autonomous rational 
actors with conflict of interests. Dunn (1980) put the theoretical problem this way: 
how far do human beings have good reason to rationally place their property and 
behaviour under political institutions of the state and be rationally committed to 
sustain these institutions even in the face of hazard?  
 
The political institution of research focus is Ghana’s public land bureaucracy and the 
object of discourse among the autonomous rational actors is land. Attempt by 
Government to gain access to land for development is the discursive issue among the 
actors. Discussion of the theoretical perspective will therefore be contextualized 
within the focus of the research study. The theoretical problem is therefore 
contextualized as follows: Under what circumstances can the public land bureaucracy 
competently manage conflict of interests among autonomous rational actors in the 
discourse of government land acquisition? The theoretical analysis therefore targets a 
micro-level analysis of the social interaction arena to find out how the institutional 
capacity of the public land bureaucracy impacts on its competence in mediating 
conflicts of interests among actors in the process of government land acquisition.  
 
The theoretical problem of how best political institutions can manage conflict of 
interests has received considerable attention from rational choice theorists (Ostrom 
1999, 2005, Shepsle 1996). But a critical appraisal of the rational choice theoretical 
perspective informs the pragmatist that the theory is not up to the task for explaining 
collective action among autonomous rational actors. The rational choice institutional 
school though focus a micro level institutional analysis but with idealistic conceptions 
of human rationality that are far removed from practical human rationality in action.  
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Rational choice theorists assume that “actors have complete and well-ordered 
preferences and that they maximize the net value of expected returns to themselves” 
(Ostrom 1999:44-45). From such an idealistic conception, all that the rational choice 
school can offer on the origin of institutions is that institutions are rules-in-use created 
through some commands of ‘boundedly rational’ actors that is expressed in the form 
“let there be an X” (Ostrom 2005:138). How such commands lead to the magical 
appearance of institutional rules is a mystery. If an institutional rule magically appears 
from the command, how does the rule help the institutional analyst to understand the 
power relations between practical actors? Clearly, rational choice theoretical 
assumptions fail to address the concerns of this research.  
 
An alternative theoretical perspective is therefore constructed to understand the 
impact on the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy on institutional 
competence in resolving conflict of interests in a discursive object of land. The 
alternative theoretical perspective is labelled Rational Institutional Political Theory. 
The rational institutional political perspective takes an actor-centred functionalist 
approach to the understanding of institutions. Simply put by Pierson (2004:107), 
“More generally, actor-centered functionalist arguments take the following form: 
outcome X (an institution, policy, or organization, for instance) exists because those 
who design it expect it to serve the function Y”. The discursive outcome is a 
momentous institutional reality created through collective intentionality and action. 
We turn to the discussion of the rational institutional political theory.  
 
3.1 THE RATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL THEORY: 
INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION IS THE BASIS FOR RATIONAL 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
The theoretical construction takes a mainstream political science perspective that 
expands on the institutional perspectives of Searle (1995, 2001) and Gran (2005, 
2007a, b). The concept of institutional obligations is the central thread of the theory. 
In fact, it is a fundamental concept in theoretical studies of politics (Shepsle 1996). 
Shepsle (1996:227) refers to institutional obligations as ‘Political Deals in 
Institutional Settings’ that explains “the making of governments”, or as in Tilly’s 
terminology ‘State Making’ (Tilly 1985). The theory invokes practical rationality as 
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its ontological assumption about individual rationality. ‘Practical rationality’, 
‘collective intentionality’ and ‘power status assignment’ are the tools with which the 
theory constructs the basic structure of institutions to account for the origin and 
effects of institutions on rational collective action.  
 
On the subject of rationality, Searle (2001:95-96), argue that “rationality is not formal 
argument structures, much less is it marginal utility and indifference curves. …the 
subject matter of the philosophy of rationality is the activity of reasoning, a goal 
directed activity of conscious selves”. In the political science tradition, practical 
rationality presume that “ethical appraisal is in part a fully cognitive activity, that it is 
irretrievably a part of the human condition to be exposed to the vicissitudes of politics 
and that what it is rational for human beings to do in relation to the political domain 
depends both upon ethical understanding and upon practical judgement of social and 
political causality” (Dunn 1980:2). Moral absolutism is therefore rejected as 
inconsistent with the profound historicity of human nature.  
 
Intentionality, “refers to that aspect of mental states by which they are directed at, or 
about, or of states of affairs in the world beyond themselves” (Searle 2001:34). 
Collective intentionality simply means the contents of an actor’s position which are 
directed at satisfying some conditions that exist, or are believed to exist. Power status 
assignment refers to the distinctive capacity of rational human beings to freely assign 
a special status to objects, phenomena to function at a higher level in ways that are 
meaningful to the actor. This distinctive human capacity to assign status-functions to 
objects is expressed in the form: X counts as Y in context C. Practically, land can be 
assigned a status as public land or customary land within a specific context. 
 
Laying the explanatory grounds for the creation of institutional structures, Searle 
emphasize that the key element in the move from the collective imposition of function 
to the creation of institutional facts is the imposition of a collectively recognized 
status to which a function is attached. As long as the people continue to recognize the 
institution as having a power status with assigned functions to perform, the 
institutional fact is created and maintained. An institution is considered as having 
public authority because “collective agreement about the possession of the status is 
constitutive of having the status, and having the status is essential to the performance 
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of the function assigned to that status” (Searle 1995:51). According to Searle, “The 
central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the 
decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective 
intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions 
without that imposition” (Searle 1995:41) .  
 
The collective imposition of status-functions on an object of discourse according to 
the formula: “We agree, X counts as Y in context C” (Searle 1995), explains the 
origin of institutional realities, whether formal or informal institutions. The 
underlying assumption is that, the acceptance of the statement that ‘X counts as Y’ 
also implies recognition that ‘X has power to function as Y’. The creation of political 
institutions therefore involves the imposition of power, meaning, and values on 
objects or phenomena. Institutions are not created through the desires, beliefs, or 
authoritative command of an individual.  
 
Thus, institutions are fundamentally constitutive rules of agreement through which 
regulative rules are imposed as obligations to shape human behaviour in future 
discourses.  The fundamental argument of the theory is best captured in the following 
words of Gran (2007a): “The institutionalist perspective implies that institutions are 
built through agreements. The agreements create collective intentions (we have 
agreed). The status of the agreements is continually evaluated through practice by all 
parties to the agreement. Any person usually acts in a maze of agreements. The 
institutions deliver materials to the acting person”.  
 
 Under norms of rationality, citizens have a wide freedom or choice over their actions. 
Obligation with institutionalized organizations provides desire independent reasons to 
autonomous rational actors for collective action. “There is always an element of 
freedom and therefore responsibility in the chosen act (except when external force or 
physical disability eliminates the experience of a choice situation). In this sense the 
institutionalist perspective implies agreements (obligations), freedom of choice and 
(therefore) an element of responsibility” (Gran 2007a:5).  
 
On the plane of practical rationality, an institution is constitutive of obligations that 
enable rational action but never constrain rational action. The collective acceptance of 
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power status-functions by members also commits them to recognize the obligations 
which they have freely created through speech acts as binding agreements. It is only 
when rational individual actors collectively agree and continue to recognize the power 
status-functions imposed on institutional structures like the public land bureaucracy 
that collective action is logically possible or practically realized. The creation of an 
institution also makes it possible for actors to impose higher obligations on 
themselves as rational reasons for future action. The institutionalist model of 
collective rational action is depicted in Diagram 1.  
  
Diagram 1: The Institutional Political Perspective of Rational Action 
           Obligations 
Institution    
 
                
Institutional  
Structure (Rules/ 
Organizational 
Resources) 
Autonomous 
Rational Actor Collective 
Action/ 
Outcome 
        Experience                    Learning 
(cf: Gran 2005a, Gran 2007a, Searle 1995) 
 
The autonomous rational actor is inter-positioned between the set of institutional rules 
and rational action. What makes collective action possible between autonomous 
rational actors with conflicts of interests is the creation of institutional obligations that 
are independent of subjective desires. According to Gran (2007a:6), “There is reason 
to believe that a person who expressly and freely has entered the agreements of an 
institution will act appropriately to the norms and rules of the institution. But there is 
no reason to assume that institutions determine what people do. Even the most 
established routines (most likely) contain the element of freedom of choice and 
therefore the possibility of rational (and irrational) action. Rational actions imply 
choice situations. If a rule determines what a person does without the person 
reflecting on the rule and the appropriateness of following it, the person’s faculty of 
rationality is not activated”.  
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The obligations that actors impose on organizational structures determine the 
“distinctive competence or inadequacy that an organization has acquired” (Selznick 
1957:42); and also defines the institutional character of the organization from other 
institutionalized organizations. The power status functions or institutionalized 
obligations imposed on political institutions gives it a distinctive character from 
economic institutions; and provide political institutions with the competence to 
distribute power and values among contentious actors. Acquired competence is what 
bureaucrats articulate in the discursive process of mediating collective action 
dilemmas among autonomous rational actors.  
 
The institutional capacity of an organization to mediate in conflict of interests among 
autonomous rational actors is a function of the prior imposition of this distinctive 
competence upon the organization by relevant rational actors. This type of distinctive 
competence imposed on organizations is given the name ‘Political Competence’. It is 
independent from the ‘Technical Competence’ that rational actors provide 
institutionalized organizations in the form of administrative personnel, financial 
resources, logistics, and structures to perform specific status functions. Put together, 
political competence and technical makes up the bureaucratic competence of political 
institutions that enable collective action. Whiles political competence and technical 
competence are not new concepts; they are given a new theoretical clothing here.  
 
Political institutions are not like any other social institution. Political institutions are 
organizational instruments created by rational actors for the distribution of power, 
values, and resources among organized actors in society. “Politics is fundamentally 
about the exercise of public authority and the struggle to gain control over it” (Moe 
1990:221). Rational actors are therefore as much concerned with the effectiveness of 
political agency for the attainment of objectives as much as they are with the 
substance of political power relationships. Rational actors will find no reason to 
impose legitimacy and resources on organizations that fail to fulfil the power status 
functions imposed on them.  
 
Where the state successfully welds together different interests into its political 
agencies, there is reason to believe that the institutionalized bureaucratic organizations 
will also enjoy higher power status-assignment and resources from constituent 
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political subjects. It also becomes practically difficult to change or reform an 
institution that enjoys a high power status assignment in society especially when it’s 
institutionalized values homogeneously eliminates destructive opposition and 
conflicts. The danger, however, is that, an institution with higher status with its 
network members risk becoming a conservative tool in the hands of members to 
oppress and suppress opposition groups.  
  
Autonomous rational actors who feel threatened by existing political institutions will 
also try to create insulationist devices to protect themselves and their properties from 
the political winners. Such insulationist devices might take the form of creating rival 
institutions to cater for their own interests or to overthrow existing coercive 
institutions. Long ago, Weber (1947:338) made similar observations in the following 
remark: “When those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the influence of 
the existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an 
organization of their own which is equally subject to the process of 
bureaucratization”. Actors who create rival institutions within the state to oppose 
government policies enjoy little toleration from the political regime (Tilly 2005). 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977:352) proposed that “Organizations that incorporate 
societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their 
legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities”. Whiles this 
proposition is well accepted, the rational institutional political theory rejects the 
hypothesis that organizational isomorphism with highly institutionalized environment 
leads to the conferment of legitimacy and resources, independent of the productive 
efficiency of the organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 2001). Underlying the 
rejected hypothesis is an assumption of human irrationality in the creation of formal 
institutions. It assumes that rational actors are more concerned with myths and 
ceremonial structures (Meyer and Rowan 1977) in their institutional environment than 
having a concern for the effectiveness of created political institutions.  
 
Selznick had also theorized that ‘formal cooptation’ of organized forces which are 
able to threaten the formal authority of an organization into the leadership structure of 
an organization is a means of “averting threats to its stability or existence” and secure 
legitimacy for its avowed objectives (Selznick 1949:13). Cooptation, he points out, 
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reflects a state of tension between formal authority and social power. In any case, 
cooptation does not come without a price for the political agency. “The character of 
the co-opted elements will necessarily shape the modes of action available to the 
group which has won adaptation at the price of commitment to outside elements” 
(Selznick 1949:16).  
 
One may ask how the cooptation of opposition into the organizational structure of 
political institutions produces institutional stability and legitimacy when “the use of 
formal cooptation by a leadership does not envision the transfer of actual power” 
(Selznick 1949:14)? Selznick acknowledged that rational actors who are co-opted into 
institutionalized organizations are interested in the substance of power and not 
necessarily in its forms (Selznick 1949:15). Formal cooptation of opposition into the 
leadership structure of an organization without any substantial obligation does not in 
itself provide reasons for rational collective action. 
 
In the politics of statemaking, state makers have historically used organized violence 
to claim ownership of everything within the boundaries that defines the territorial 
sovereignty of the state. The process of statemaking has involved “attacking and 
checking competitors and challengers within the territory claimed by the state” (Tilly 
1992:96). Organized violence has been historically used to even facilitate capitalism. 
The history of statemaking in Europe and by European colonial capitalist interests in 
Africa shows that “mercantile capitalism and statemaking reinforce each other” (Tilly 
1985:170). Even in modern times, it has been noted that “politics (at present) seems to 
be based in a monopoly of legal use of violent power” (Gran 2007b).  
 
Therefore, to speak of collective action among autonomous rational actors in a 
political discourse of land acquisition by Government, may empirically appear to be 
stupid. This is because the state is a political institution for protecting specific 
interests against others and not necessary a democratic collectivist instrument. 
Governments have normally used suppression against opposing groups in the political 
process of state making (Gran 1994, Tilly 1985, 1992). In normal political 
environments, Governments have relied on their monopoly over the concentrated 
institutions of organized violence within the state to achieve their objectives.  
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It is only under rare instances such as in moments of political disorder that weak state 
makers may try to pursue rational collective action with rival powerful organized 
elements. When faced with radical social disorder, disintegration, and dislocations, 
actors are compelled to (re-) align their interest with existing institutional structures 
that promises to fulfil their subjective positions that have been temporally dislocated. 
As Laclau points out, “various political forces compete in their effort to present their 
particular objectives as those which carry out the fulfilling of that lack. To 
hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function” (Laclau 1996:44 in 
Howarth and Stavrakakis 2004:9). Howarth and Stavraskakis (2004:14) also 
emphasize that in a political discourse, “the political subject is neither simply 
determined by the structure, nor does it constitutes the structure. Rather the political 
subject is forced to take decisions- or identify with certain political projects and the 
discourses they articulate – when social identities are in crises and structures need to 
be recreated”. In politics, human actors act as autonomous rational actors.  
 
The use of legalized violence by Governments to achieve political objectives does not 
invalidate the theoretical perspective that institutional obligations are the political 
strings that enable collective action among autonomous rational actors. Support is 
found from Tilly (1985:171) who noted the following:, “If we take legitimacy to 
depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the assent of the governed (or 
both at once), these conditions may serve to justify, perhaps even to explain, the 
tendency to monopolize force; they do not contradict the fact”. The use of force or 
violence in a discourse does not release an individual’s faculty of rationality unless its 
use has the prior authorization of the individual as part of the obligations that he has 
already committed himself to. The theoretical challenge however is the definition of 
the limit of political obligations which citizens have rationally entered into with 
political institutions within the state. 
 
The foregoing theoretical discussion all point to one key conclusion. That is, under 
norms of practical rationality, autonomous rational actors are more likely to follow 
institutional rules if these are recognized as having a power status that perform, 
symbolize, or represent their subjective positions. The inter-position of obligations 
between institutions and rational actors creates desire-independent reasons for rational 
collective action, whether beneficial or hazardous to self. When rational actors create 
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institutional obligations among themselves through collective intentionality, it 
provides bureaucrats the political competence to shape behaviour. There is also reason 
to believe that rational actors will equip their instrumental organization with the 
necessary bureaucratic resources for the performance of assigned status functions.  
 
In a political project of institutional engineering, governments through rhetoric and 
practical measures have usually attempted to weave together different strands of 
discourses in an effort to dominate a field of meaning so as to fix the identities of 
objects and practices in a particular way. Whether, indeed, an emergent public land 
bureaucracy functions as a rational collective organizational actor in discourses of 
government land acquisition is an empirical issue. It is accounted for by analyzing the 
subjective obligations articulated by autonomous rational actors and its fulfilment 
within the structuration of the discursive. This is the theoretical litmus test for the 
public land bureaucracy within the new democratic state of Ghana. 
 
3.2 VARIABLES THAT IMPACTS ON BUREAUCRATIC COMPETENCE 
 
The competence of public bureaucracies to mediate conflict of interests among 
autonomous rational actors in order to secure their collective agreement for collective 
problem solving action is affected by three independent variables. These variables are 
first, the obligations between the autonomous actor and the bureaucracy, which is 
referred to as institutional obligations; second, the institutional structuring of the 
bureaucracy, and; third, bureaucratic organizational resources imposed on the 
institutional structure. Together, these three variables constitute the overall capacity of 
an institution or public bureaucracy to have effects on the behaviour of autonomous 
rational actors in collective problem solving dilemmas. Attention is now turned to a 
broad discussion of these independent variables. 
 
3.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
Institutional obligations between public bureaucracies and their constituents provide 
bureaucrats the political competence in managing conflicts of interest around a 
discursive issue for collective problem solving action. Political competence is a 
crucial institutional resource that provides bureaucratic officials with real power and 
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authority to perform their status functions. Such competence, however, cannot be 
acquired through education or from the market. Institutional obligations, if they work 
in the modern democratic state, will typically reflect both the value homogeneity and 
the value conflicts in the larger society to make sure that a political regime can not 
completely eliminate rival interests and turn the public bureaucracy into opportunistic 
machinery for the implementation of its chosen agenda (Gran 2007a).  
 
The institutional capacity and competence of the public bureaucracy to contain and 
mitigate conflicts of interests in a discourse land acquisition to effectively facilitate 
access to land for government is influenced the obligations that it has with the 
relevant contentious actors. In Ghana, a discourse of land acquisition normally 
involves the land owner, the prospective land developer, and any other affected party 
such as land tenants. The collective agreement of these actors is required for the 
creation of an institutional fact of land acquisition.  
 
The theoretical argument is that the capacity of the public land bureaucracy to gain 
the collective acceptance and recognition of these actors to facilitate access to land 
depends on the fulfilment of demanded subjective obligations through the political 
agency. Actors with conflict of interests in a discourse of land acquisition have 
different interests, different preferences, different powers, and different meanings 
attached to the discursive object of land. Theoretically, each of these subjective 
positions is treated as exogenous to the political agency. 
 
The study by Gran (2007a) ‘Land Politics in the New Democratic State of South 
Africa’ proves the point that public bureaucracies are effective in mediating conflict 
of interests when they are seen as fulfilling the subjective positions of autonomous 
rational actors. The study disclosed that “The public land elite at the provincial level 
became a moderating and mediating elite between state and society, between central 
and local government. It was a level of government the opposition valued. It was not 
free from corruption but it did voice strong and weaker interests and demands in the 
rural areas” (Gran 2007a:19). According to Gran, whiles the provincial land elite was 
loyal to Government, it was independent of Government and also and had a wider 
spectre of development competencies that was valued in the rural areas.  
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To justify an action as rational, one must therefore know what subjective obligations 
are demanded by relevant actors from the public land bureaucracy and to what extent 
the subjective positions are politically institutionalized into the public land 
bureaucracy to enable collective agreement over government land acquisition. In other 
words, to what extent are the interests of investors, land owners, traditional 
authorities, land tenants, and the government accommodated within or excluded from 
the institutional framework for land acquisition? These are very important issues that 
need to be settled in any micro level institutional analysis of the competence of public 
bureaucracies to have effect on rational collective action among actors. How the state 
craftily interweaves the meanings and practices of relevant social actors into the 
public land bureaucracy will determine the political competence of bureaucratic 
officials to successfully secure collective action among autonomous rational actors 
with conflict of interests in the discourse of government land acquisition.  
 
3.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURING  
 
The creation of obligations does not automatically lead to the establishment of 
organizational structures that enable the fulfilment of such obligations. Rational actors 
create organizational structures as political agencies to perform specific status 
functions that fulfil their demanded obligations. March and Olsen (1984:739) noted; 
“Political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the 
power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions. Wealth, social 
standing, reputation for power, knowledge of alternatives, and attention and are not 
easily described as exogenous to the political process and political institutions. 
Holding office provides participation rights and alters the distribution of power and 
access”. How public bureaucracies are structured to meet the expectations of actors is 
very important for the actual fulfilment or realizations of dreams. 
 
The structuring of organizations constitute the actual process by which positions, 
influence, resources, and other benefits contained in obligatory relationships are 
distributed. Actors who lose out in the process of institutional structuring might soon 
discover that they have won for themselves an empty obligation that lacks an 
instrumental avenue for the fulfilment of expectations. Moe (1990:213) also observed 
that “Political institutions serve two very different purposes. On the one hand, they 
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help mitigate collective-action problems, particularly the commitment and 
enforcement problems so debilitating to political exchange, and thus allow the various 
actors in politics to cooperate in the realization of gains from trade. On the other hand, 
political institutions are also weapons of coercion and redistribution. They are the 
structural means by which political winners pursue their own interests, often at the 
great expense of political losers”. Institutional structuring of a bureaucracy is 
therefore an important variable that has an influence on the competence of bureaucrats 
to actually fulfil obligations that have been previously agreed.  
 
Historical institutionalists (Pierson and Skocpol 2004, Thelen and Steinmo 1992) 
agree with discourse theorists (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000) that important gaps in 
the structure of an institution might become critical junctures that might be seized by 
opportunists to either frustrate or obstruct overall institutional effectiveness. The 
structuring of institutions affects the calculations by individuals and groups of their 
optimal strategies and courses of action. This informs the rational actor about the 
logic of institutional appropriateness to the problem situation.  
 
For Thelen and Steinmo (1992:13), “The emphasis on institutions as patterned 
relations that lies at the core of an institutional approach does not replace attention to 
other variables – the players, their interests and strategies, and the distribution of 
power among them. On the contrary, it puts these factors in context, showing how 
they relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political situations are 
structured”. How institutionally effective is the public land bureaucracy in its 
organizational structuring to coordinate and fulfil the subjective obligations 
articulated by actors with conflict of interests in government land acquisition? 
 
From the discourse theoretical perspective, “The political subject is neither simply 
determined by the structure, nor does it constitute the structure. Rather, the political 
subject is forced to take decisions – or identify with certain political projects and the 
discourses they articulate- when social identities are in crises and structures need to be 
recreated. …the emergence of political subjectivity is the result of lack in the 
structure. It is this lack in the structure that ‘causes’ subjects to identify with those 
social constructions that seem capable of suturing the rift in a symbolic order. In 
short, it is in the process of this identification that political subjectivities are created 
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and formed. Once formed and stabilised they become those subject positions which 
‘produce’ individuals with certain characteristics and attributes”. (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000:14). 
 
The failure of the institutional structure, of those subject positions which are part of 
such a structure, compels the subject to act, and to re-assert its subjectivity. In 
moments of institutional dislocations, rival institutions try to weld together different 
positions in order to gain support from dislocated actors, including opposition groups. 
Moments of institutional failure induces identity crises for autonomous rational actors 
that were part of the failed structure. When identities are in crises it becomes difficult 
for the autonomous rational actors to articulate a homogenous institutional value. 
Dislocations in subject identities may ultimately lead to the ‘decentring’ of political 
power from failed institutional structures into rival or new hegemonic structures that 
promises to fill the lack. The institutional configuration of the public land bureaucracy 
will therefore shape political struggles, competences, preferences and self-identities of 
organized actors over resources and values in discourses of land acquisition.  
 
3.2.3 BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
 
Bureaucratic organizational capacities of institutions have received much scholarly 
attention in the study of institutions (March and Simon 1993, Scott 2001, 2003, 
Weber 1947). Until recently it looked as if the organizational resource capacity of 
institutions had become synonymous with the analysis of institutional capacity. There 
is no doubt that a developmental state will not only create organizational structures for 
the realization of political objectives; but will also resource the institutionalized 
bureaucracy with the necessary administrative personnel, financial resources, 
technical logistics, and other resources. Such organizational resources are necessary to 
equip bureaucrats with the technical competence required for a bureaucracy to 
function as a unified system that makes collective action possible.  
 
The availability of technical competence within a public land bureaucracy will ensure 
that transactions in land are simple, less costly, and timely. According to Kasanga and 
Kotey (2001:6), formal land acquisition “requires high-calibre, trained and skilled 
administrators, lawyers, surveyors and other supporting staff. It also requires 
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equipment, particularly for accurate and fast surveying, production of maps and plans, 
and storage of information”. Without such bureaucratic resources, it is almost 
impossible for actors involved in a discourse of land acquisition to take collective 
action. Land transactions require actors to have knowledge about the size, value, 
ownership, and exact location of the physical land. Lack of documentary proof of 
ownership; the absence of maps, lack of plans of scientific accuracy to enable the 
identification of land boundaries; and the lack of prescribed forms to be followed in 
land acquisition will be serious organizational drawbacks for collective action. 
 
Adequate organizational resources capacity will not only reduce uncertainty, 
opportunism, and transaction costs, but also likely to impacts on trust relations and 
rule following among actors who have materialist expectations. The availability or 
non availability of information regarding the identity of actors, the ownership of land, 
the history of land transfers, and the size, value, as well as proper boundaries of land, 
is likely to stall collective action. The negotiation of access to land can go on forever 
if the actors choose to religiously follow the appropriate rules of behaviour. There is 
no doubt that the organizational resources capacity of public bureaucracies is a crucial 
independent variable that is likely to have a significant influence on the discourse of 
land acquisition. The important issue is whether the public land bureaucracy in Ghana 
possesses adequate organizational resource capacity to perform the power status 
functions that have been imposed on them.  
 
Unlike political obligations, bureaucratic organizational may even be acquired from 
the market. The organizational resource capacity of an institution therefore maintains 
a relative autonomy from the institutionalized obligations imposed on the structure. At 
the same time the organizational resources capacity of a public bureaucracy is what 
enables it to perform the political obligations imposed upon it. Therefore the two are 
not totally isolated from each other. There is a positive synergetic relationship 
between the institutional obligations imposed on an organization and the technical 
competence of bureaucratic officials to effectively mediate conflict of interests among 
relevant autonomous rational actors for collective action. The provision of 
organizational resources to a public bureaucracy to function effectively is therefore 
not independent from the productive efficiency of that bureaucratic organization. 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The institutional capacity of public land bureaucracies to mediate conflicts of interests 
in domestic land economies is a function of the obligations that have politically been 
woven into the institutional fabric the bureaucratic structure by autonomous rational 
actors.  Institutional obligations make it possible for actors with conflicts of interests 
in land to espouse a homogeneous value about the set of rules that shape expectations 
and action. In environments where there are no obligations among rival groups, the 
usual mechanisms are instruments of violence for the protection of private interests.  
 
The actual fulfilment of institutional obligations demanded by actors however 
requires political agencies. Obligations cannot be fulfilled in the void. When rational 
actors have institutionally structured organizations as instrument to fulfil their 
expectations, they must also resource the organization with the necessary human and 
material requirements. Such technical competence does not however amount to 
political competence. Where organizational resources are in abundance, do 
autonomous rational actors also recognize the public bureaucracy as a legitimate 
rational collective organizational actor to use such resources effectively? The 
competence of public organizations to effectively mediate conflicts among 
autonomous rational actors depends first and foremost on the obligations that exist 
between institutionalized organizations and relevant autonomous actors.  
 
In a discourse of contentious politics, rational actors may not only seek to realize their 
objectives but also seek to remove the interest of other contending actors from the 
discursive structure in order to advance their own positions. Rational actors therefore 
also have a concern for the structuring of institutionalized organizations as much as 
they have a concern for the actual fulfilment of obligations through the discursive 
structure. The organization of governmental institutions affects what the state 
bureaucracy actually does in its relations with organized interest groups. Unique 
patterns of organizational development may constrain or remove the fulfilment of 
obligations that have been institutionally structured by actors for collective action.  
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In sum, institutional obligations clearly specify the expectations of each actor with 
regards to roles, procedures for distribution of benefits, and rules specifying the 
conditions under which sanctions may be applied for deviant behaviour. Institutional 
obligations thus provide a measure of stability into social interactions between 
rational actors. This strengthens the institutional capacity of public bureaucracies to 
competently shape rational behaviour and expected outcomes. Together, institutional 
obligations, the structuring of political agencies and bureaucratic organizational 
resources will provide a public land bureaucracy with the political and technical 
competence to have effects on collective action among autonomous rational actors 
with conflict of interests in a discourse of government land acquisition. 
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CHAPTER 4 
  
 
4.0   LAND POLITICS IN GHANA 
 
This chapter defines how the institutional framework for land acquisition emerged 
within the Ghanaian State. Delineating the institutional capacity of the public land 
bureaucracy for land acquisition is not a simple matter of just pointing to some 
institutional structures and the official functions they perform. The institutional 
context for land acquisition is defined by political actors who created the State as a 
collective organizational actor.  The institutional context for land acquisition is a 
higher institutional reality whose creation was dependent on the making of the state. 
The discussion looks at the historical process of state making and its impact on 
current land politics in Ghana.  
 
Attention is given to how certain historical junctures defined the context of land 
ownership and its consequence for the competence of the public land bureaucracy to 
mediate conflict of interests among relevant organized actors in a discourse of 
government land acquisition. The extent to which discursive identities, practices, and 
cultures were successful in collectively imposing power status-functions on the 
institutional structure that emerged as the Ghanaian State is very important to 
understand the institutional foundations of the public land bureaucracy. 
 
The discussion is presented along three paths: First, a discussion of land politics in the 
pre-colonial era of state making for the understanding of the role that competing 
discursive cultures and practices about land shaped the systems of land ownership in 
the post-colonial state. Land politics in the Ashanti traditional State is used to 
illustrate how the ownership, power, and control over land featured in the politics of 
the pre-colonial state. This will help to understand the discourses of government land 
acquisition for the inland port project which took place in the Ashanti region. Second, 
the chapter discusses how political elites who inherited the colonial state perceived 
and tried to deal with the problem of land ownership. And third, the discussion of the 
prevailing systems of landed ownership and how it shapes access to land for capitalist 
production concludes the chapter.  
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4.1 LAND POLITICS IN THE TRADITIONAL STATE  
   
The Asante State (Asanteman) is made up of territorial divisions (aman) with its 
capital in Kumase (usually spelt Kumasi). The Asante State is presided over by a King 
called Asantehene who exercises control over the disposition of subjects within the 
political nation. A territorial division is made up of a number of towns that are also 
ruled by sub-chiefs who owe allegiance to the Paramount Chief (Omanhene). A 
village under a township is headed by another sub-chief called Odikro (Adikrofuo in 
plural). The sub-chiefs owe allegiance to the paramount chief. All the paramount 
chiefs in turn owe allegiance to the overlord of the Asante State, the Asantehene- who 
symbolizes the soul and spirit of the Asante State. The Asantehene is first and 
foremost a paramount chief ruling the Kumasi territorial division. The Asantehene is 
both the president of the Kumasi Traditional Council (made up of all sub-chiefs under 
the Asantehene’s territorial division) and the Asante Traditional Council (made up of 
all paramount chiefs in the Asante State).  
 
The traditional chiefs in Asante hold enormous custom-sanctioned power, authority 
and high status within local communities over subjects and land. Berry (2001: xix) 
observes that negotiating access to land in Asante is “much about power and the 
control of people as about access to land as a factor of production”. MacCaskie 
(1984:175-76) also argues that “authority over subjects and land was the 
quintessential feature of the political economy of power in the Asante State…. 
Subjects and land were socio-political rather than economic resources. The acquisition 
of both served as an indicator of achievement and status. Indeed, accumulation or loss 
in this area constituted a ready benchmark for the measurement of upward or 
downward mobility”. It was also not unusual for chiefs to present a number of their 
subjects or villages as gifts to other chiefs during important occasions such as the 
installation of a new Asantehene.  
 
Mostly through military warfare, traditional rulers in Kumase subjugated the 
surrounding chiefships and incorporated them into the Asante union. MacCkaskie 
notes that, “In the 1760s, the authority of the Asantehene Osei Kwadwo was such that 
he was able to execute the immensely powerful Bantamahene Adu Gyamera and his 
son Opoku Tia, and to strip the Bantama stool of no less than 77 villages”. Through 
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fines imposed by customary law, other towns and villages with their subjects and land 
were also added to the Asante State. It was also common for paramount chiefs to sell 
portions of their territories to defray stool debt (MacCaskie 1984).  
 
However, by 1874, the once powerful Asante empire “had completely broken up”; 
and all the divisional states had reasserted their independence (Webster and Boahen 
1967:129). At present, therefore, the control of the Asantehene over the 
administration of lands within the Asante State is limited. Each paramount chief now 
has autonomous control over the administration of land under his divisional territory. 
The Asantehene intervenes in the land affairs of paramount chiefs only when there is 
a dispute over land between two paramount chiefs7. In instances of such land conflict 
the Asante Traditional Council, with the Asantehene as president, tries to resolve the 
conflict. How come that the powerful Asantehene have lost his power over land and 
subjects within the boundaries of the empire?  
 
The decline of the power of the Asantehene and the Asante Empire has been 
attributed by scholars to internal weakness of the Asante provincial system of 
administration and largely to the intervention of the British colonial forces 
(MacCaskie 1984, Ray 1999, Webster and Boahen 1967). Ray (1999:128-29) 
observed that “After Britain’s defeat of the Asante state in 1874, Britain moved 
decisively by means of conquest or treaty to impose its colonial state and certain 
aspects of capitalism over the political authorities who, in large measure, had run the 
pre-colonial states in what is now Ghana. In the main, the British colonial state did not 
extinguish these political authorities, but rather transformed them from kings into 
‘chiefs’ otherwise called traditional authorities or traditional leaders”. The defeat of 
Ashanti shattered the power of metropolitan Asante over the divisional states.  
 
MacCaskie (1984) recounts the historical events of 1888-89 that perpetually limited 
the power of the Asantehene over land and subjects within the declined empire8. 
According to MacCkaskie, internal bickering and violent conflicts for the control of 
                                                 
7 This state of land politics in the Asante Traditional state was reiterated by officials of the 
Asantehene’s Land Secretariat who were interviewed during the fieldwork.  
8 The historical validity of MacCaskie’s account appears very plausible although history is subject to 
different interpretations and contestations over time. The position of interviewed officials with the 
Asantehene’s Lands Office that the King does not have power over “Amanhene nsaase” or lands under 
paramount chiefs also lends credence to MacCaskie’s research account. 
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the royal dynasty in the metropolis in the aftermath of the decline of the empire led to 
power trade offs between the Asantehene and his divisional chiefs. Two candidates, 
Yaw Twereboanna and Agyeman Prempeh, contended for the Golden Stool. As a 
result of this power struggle, the Asantehemaa (Queen-mother of Asante) who was the 
mother of Agyeman Prempeh promised to restore to all who would help her son their 
lost properties which included villages, servants, and political positions among others. 
This desperate vital concession was seized by many chiefs. The end of the battle 
produced two results- the victory of Agyeman Prempeh and the loss of the 
Asantehene’s power over land and subjects under his divisional chiefs. Members of 
the victorious coalition gained back the independence of their land and subjects.  
 
Like many other chiefs of the victorious coalition, the Ejisuhene was not only 
advanced to the status of Omanhene, but “most importantly, he had restored to him 
some twenty to thirty villages” (MacCaskie 1984:183). In 1889, the now 
Ejisumanhene “insisted upon an act of reassurance- a solemn oath to be taken  
between his and Agyeman Prempeh’s representatives guaranteeing in perpetuity the 
irreversibility of all the restitutions made…. This oath was administered at Ahyiamu (a 
place of meeting), a piece of land lying between Ejisu and Krapa” (MacCaskie 1984: 
184).  
 
The events of 1888-89 marked a critical juncture in the institutional distribution of 
power within the Asante State. This historical path defined the future land-power 
relationships between subsequent occupants of the Golden Stool and their divisional 
chiefs. MacCaskie (1984: 186) notes the strenuous, though intermittent, attempts by 
occupants of the Golden stool “to restore the status quo ante that obtained prior to the 
Ahyiamu Oath. Amanhene and provincial chiefs have equally strenuously resisted 
these encroachments”.  
 
One can see that traditional authorities have since the pre-colonial era articulated their 
discourses of political power around the object of land and everything on that land. 
Land was the subject of power trade offs between higher and lower chiefs, as well as 
between colonial imperial powers and local chiefs. The role of chiefs was later to take 
a nose dive when western educated organized groups emerged to joined forces with 
colonial interests to make the modern state and subjugate the power of chiefs. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the power of chiefs have declined in the modern state, 
the discursive cultures and practices of traditional land institutions that have gained 
deeper roots in the mindset of the people. The discursive cultures and practices of 
traditional land institutions was to subsequently affect the power of post colonial 
governments in claiming legal sovereignty of the modern state over land and people. 
 
4.2 THE MAKING OF THE GHANAIAN STATE: 1800 - 1992 
 
The British colonial powers who arrived on the political scene found well organized 
traditional political institutions through which they introduced the system of indirect 
rule to effectively pursue their strategic and commercial interests. The colonial 
government passed various laws that included the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 
1883, the Native Administrative Ordinance of 1927, and the Native Authorities 
Ordinance of 1944 as a political mechanism to enhance the power of Traditional 
institutions and make it the linchpin of indirect rule.  
 
With regards to the system of land administration, Ninsin (1989:3) commented that 
the colonial government pursued “a deliberate policy of sustaining not just the 
communal basis of government but also the primordial basis of social solidarity and 
territorial organization”. One cannot relegate to the background the important role 
played by local organized groups in protecting traditional land institutions from the 
colonial state. As early as 1897, traditional authorities together with some educated 
elites had formed the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) to successfully 
oppose the Lands Bill of 1894 that had sought to take over the land in the whole 
country as Crown land, and administer it along European based individual property 
right system (Kimble 1963:332). With the basic structure of customary land 
administration left intact by the British, the subsequent introduction of export-oriented 
cash crops like cocoa by the colonial administration increased the economic power of 
traditional rulers due to their control over customary land rights (Ray 1986).  
 
By 1934, British colonial officers had used persuasion and military conquest to create 
the Gold Coast out of the indigenous political units. The territorial boundaries and the 
political basis for the future Ghanaian state were therefore laid. The presence of the 
British on the Gold Coast saw the gradual emergence of a new, largely western 
 48
educated, political class who challenged the colonial administration and also resented 
the dominant power of traditional authorities. As partners of colonial rule, traditional 
authorities were seen by the rising western educated class as collaborators of a system 
of foreign domination. Traditional authorities on the other hand advocated for the 
restoration of political independence to the indigenous rulers of the people rather than 
a radical shift of political governance to the new western oriented organized class. 
These two indigenous political forces competed for power from the colonial 
administration and also sought political support from the broad masses.  
 
The World War periods saw the gradual rise of a more organized nationalist 
movement in the Gold Coast to oppose British rule. The Western educated class were 
divided into two main political parties namely the United Gold Coast Convention 
(UGCC) and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP). The UGCC represented the old 
class of Western educated elite largely made up of lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and 
senior civil servants who pressed for political independence within the shortest 
possible time. The mainly youthful CPP led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who had 
broken away from the UGCC, appealed to the broad masses such as farmers, 
fishermen, petty traders, and low class civil servants to demand self government now. 
Meanwhile, powerful traditional rulers used their traditional institutions to organize 
political activities such as street demonstrations and the boycotts of European goods 
to protests against high inflation, unemployment, and colonial rule.  
 
The ideological competition for political space in the Gold Coast witnessed a gradual 
reduction in the power and influence of the disparate traditional rulers and a 
simultaneous rise in the power of the more organized class of western educated elites. 
The intensity of opposition to colonial administration in the aftermath of World War 
II, forced the British colonial authorities to reluctantly hasten arrangements for the 
transfer of political power to the indigenous people of the Gold Coast. The discourse 
of power transfer articulated by Traditional Authorities was vehemently opposed by 
the CPP and the UGCC. These two organized political parties felt that the old 
apparatus of government was out of date (Kimble 1963). The British colonial 
government bowed to the demands from the organized political parties for general 
elections to be held and political power transferred to the victorious party.  
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Consequently, in the 1951 general elections the CPP won a majority of seats in the 
legislature. The party was asked to form the government for a joint rule with the 
British colonial government until the country was granted final political 
independence. The transfer of political power to indigenous elite also formally 
marked the beginning of the process of institutional structural choice for land 
administration by Ghanaian governments. However, traditional authorities were not 
going to lose their central political role without a fight.  
 
Shortly before the British granted political independence some traditional authorities 
re-organized themselves to protect their power over land and subjects. In Ashanti 
region, Traditional Authorities joined forces with some disgruntled politicians who 
had lost the 1951 elections to form a new nationalist movement called the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM) to demand a federal form of government as opposed to 
the CPP’s unitary political ideology. A federal governance system would guarantee a 
greater measure of political autonomy to traditional authorities over their land and 
subjects. The CPP government had clearly signalled its intentions to deal ruthlessly 
with chiefs who refuse to cooperate with the new political regime. Once again, the 
political ideological conflict was settled through general elections in 1954 and 1956 
all of which the CPP emerged victorious with a unitary executive government. Not 
surprisingly, the 1957 Constitution banned chiefs from active participation in multi-
party politics.  It is not surprising that the overthrow of the CPP government in 1966 
was happily welcomed by traditional rulers who in fact readily joined the new 
government, the National Liberation Council (NLC), to overturn their misfortunes.  
 
Between 1966-1981, as one political regime was toppled by another in rapid 
succession, political elites and traditional authorities were constantly found at each 
others throat over the structuring of the appropriate institutional framework for 
political governance and especially over land administration. Neither side could 
command the necessary power to ensure outright victory over the other, as traditional 
authorities remained stronger in their societies, and political elites in control of state 
power could also not ignore the social legitimacy of chiefs in the bid to broaden the 
base of their political power. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took 
over political power in 1981 through the barrel of the gun. The military regime ruled 
the country until 1992 when they returned Ghana to multi-party democratic politics.  
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The contentious politics between Traditional Authorities and the modern state makers 
in the post-colonial state extended to the making of the 1992 Constitution. The 
drafters of the 1992 constitution tried to accommodate the discursive cultures and 
practices of the traditional state makers and the modern state makers within the new 
democratic state. From the presidential advisory “Council of State” to the creation of 
the “Houses of Chiefs” system, the constitutional designers tried to integrate 
traditional institutions of authority into the governance structures of the modern state. 
Significantly, “this contention between these political forces within the Ghanaian state 
reveals a deeper rooted debate over the degree to which traditional authorities have 
claims not only to their own bases of legitimacy, but even to remnants of their pre-
colonial sovereignty. This in turn has further implications for the continued survival 
of the customary land tenure in Ghana” (Ray 1999:131).  
 
It is paradoxical that under the democratic state the people are not only recognized as 
free citizens but also as subjects to their traditional authorities. The divided 
sovereignty of the state over land and subjects is manifested under the following 
constitutional provisions. Under chapter 1 of the 1992 Constitution, article 1 (1) 
stated: “The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and 
for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and 
within the limits laid down in this Constitution”. In Chapter 22, article 270 (1) of the 
same Constitution is stated: “The institution of chieftaincy, together with its 
traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed”.  
 
An important insulationist mechanism for Traditional Authorities is provided under 
the following provision: “Parliament shall have no power to enact any law which- (a) 
confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or 
from a chief for any purpose whatsoever; or (b) in any way detracts or derogates from 
the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy” (Article 270 (2a, b)). 
Significantly, however, the power of chiefs to formally influence legislative political 
decision making or participate in multi-party democratic politics was severed with the 
following clause: “A chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any chief 
wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin” 
(Article 276 (1). One therefore has a constitutionally bifurcated state that will have 
consequences for institutional accountability between the rival political institutions.  
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4.3 THE QUESTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP  
  
The above politics surrounding the making of the Ghanaian state has translated into 
unique patterns of land ownership in the country. Two major forms of land ownership 
tensely co-exist with implications for different institutional processes for gaining 
access to land under each land ownership system. At one extreme is the system of 
customary land ownership whereby the ultimate or allodial title in land is vested in 
traditional authorities (stools/skin, families, lineages and clans). As custodians of 
customary land, traditional rulers have certain rights in the land, and also certain 
responsibilities towards their communities.   
 
It is estimated that 80% of the land in Ghana is owned by traditional authorities 
(Hammond 2005, Kasanga and Kotey 2001). Customary lands are managed under a 
system of customary law whereby members of the communal group are allowed to 
use portions of the available land (usufructuary right) for purposes such as farming. 
Although usufructuary right is heritable, it is not proprietary right. In other words, the 
member’s right of usage does not become a permanent right of appropriation whereby 
he can legally sell or dispose off his inheritance. Upon the extinction of the original 
owner’s family, the land reverts back to the traditional authority (Ninsin 1989, 
Hammond 2005). Only the traditional authority has the legal right to lease land to non 
members of the family, clan or lineage.  
 
Public land ownership accounts for the remaining 20% of land within the state. Public 
land is land owned by government. Post independent governments have also used 
legal instruments of compulsory acquisition to acquire customary land in the name of 
public interest. Whichever system of land ownership under which an investor 
successfully negotiates access to land is subject to a process of legal formalization by 
the state land institutions. Government commuted the judicial and administrative roles 
of traditional rulers to ceremonial ones and took steps to limit the legal force of 
customary rules and practices as well” (Berry 2001: xxviii). Through legal 
racketeering on customary land transactions, the state is able to obtain revenue from 
the payment of taxes on formal land acquisitions. With the prevailing contradictory 
claims over land within the state, the question of land ownership has been vaguely 
defined and its acquisition takes a complex institutional path. 
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Not surprisingly, traditional authorities and communities whose lands had been 
compulsorily acquired by the state are now using sections of the 1992 Constitution 
that require government to return to original land owners all public lands for which 
the state has not used as originally planned. The state has also established the Office 
of the Administrator of Stool Lands to collect and manage rents and royalties in 
respect of stool lands which it disburses to the appropriate traditional authorities 
according to the following prescribed formula.  
 
The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) takes 10% to cover 
administrative expenses. Of the remaining revenue, 25% is paid to the landholding 
stool; 20% to the traditional authority; and 55% to the District Assembly (Kasanga). 
Traditional authorities have questioned why government institutions should get a 
disproportionate share of the disbursement (Kasanga 2000). “Worse still, the 
Administrator of Stool Lands could withhold payment of any amount due to a stool if 
(a) there was a dispute regarding the occupancy of the stool or ownership of the stool 
lands, and (b) he had reason to believe the monies will be frivolously dissipated” 
(Kasanga 2000: 5).  
 
Moreover, the legitimacy of government land institutions in managing rents and 
royalties from stool land is also challenged by traditional authorities. In the opinion of 
traditional authorities, “they are perfectly capable of managing their lands based on 
their long standing customary land laws and procedures” (Kasanga and Kotey, 
2001:7). Traditional authorities also accuse the OASL of even failing to promptly 
distribute stool land rents and royalties back to the appropriate traditional authorities. 
 
As to whether the public land bureaucracy that emerged actually possess the 
competence to facilitate access to land for capital investment is seriously questioned 
because the relevant actors with conflict of interests in land have failed to collective 
impose power status-functions on the public land bureaucracy created by the state for 
land acquisition. Traditional land owners, modern political elites, and subject-citizens 
who have interest in land articulate different discursive positions on what should be 
the proper legal institutional framework for land ownership and its acquisition.  
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It is not impossible for government to weld together autonomous subjective discursive 
positions into the bureaucratic apparatus for land acquisition so as to gain political 
support, social legitimacy, and material resources for the public land bureaucracy. 
This will give public land bureaucrats the distinctive competence to mediate conflict 
of interests in land acquisition. The type of power status imposed on the public land 
bureaucracy to function as a rational collective actor would be significant in 
determining its capacity in mediating conflicts of interests in land acquisition. 
  
4.4 LAND POLITICS AND TYPES OF LAND ACQUISITION UNDER 
THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 
 
The contentious claims of modern state makers and traditional state makers over the 
same land have given rise to three types of land acquisition in Ghana. These are (a) 
customary land acquisition, (b) compulsory state land acquisition, and (c) public land 
acquisition. Each system provides the appropriate linguistic symbolic powers that 
define the institutional obligations and procedural ways to the creation of an 
institutional fact of land acquisition.  The institutional procedural ways to the 
acquisition of land under each system are discussed in turn.  
 
4.4.1 CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISITION 
 
The institution of customary land tenure is defined by the discursive cultures and 
practices of traditional systems of authority. Customary land is communally owned 
and the chief or family head is the custodian of the land. “Kinship, reverence for the 
ancestors, and belief in the spiritual power of the earth” have combined to give 
customary land tenure its unique character (Busia 1968:40). Customary land 
acquisition is the dominant form of land acquisition within the state due to the large 
area of land held under customary land tenure.  
 
A person interested in leasing a piece of customary land is expected to find the real 
traditional authority or family that owns the allodial title to the land. There are 
different types of traditional authorities performing different functions within the 
system of traditional governance. Not all traditional authorities therefore own allodial 
titles to land. Some traditional authorities have been assigned caretaking 
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responsibilities over portions of land whose allodial title is held by other traditional 
authorities, usually paramount chiefs. In principle, even the paramount chief manages 
the communal land on behalf of the royal family and each member of the royal family 
can claim ownership of the same piece of land.  
 
Identifying the appropriate traditional land owner for negotiations is therefore very 
important otherwise the prospective investor might later discover that he has paid a 
non refundable ‘drink money’ to the wrong traditional authority. The interesting 
aspect of customary land acquisition is that the transaction must receive the 
concurrence of the authority holding the allodial title in the land, the land caretaker, 
and in some instances a representative of the royal family for the acquisition to be 
statutorily legal. Such customary leverage structures are meant to ensure transparency 
and accountability in customary land transactions.  
 
When the interested agent is successful in finding the appropriate land owners, and 
the land has been certified by the owners as vacant, then all the parties negotiate for 
the fulfilment of the demanded customary obligations. According to customary norms 
customary land is not for sale. Whatever amount of money is negotiated and paid by 
the agent therefore covers not the outright purchase of the land but only a lease over a 
certain period of time. However, it has been observed that negotiations for access to 
land are conducted as if the land is being sold outright, and the amount of money 
demanded by traditional authorities is usually equivalent to the market value of the 
land (Antwi 2001, Berry 2001, Hammond 2005). According to Hammond (2005), 
“customary transactions are to all intents and purposes a transfer of customary 
freehold” and that it is the state that imposes a new status of leasehold on the “original 
transaction”. Berry (2001: xvii) also notes, “Stools still control much of the land in 
Asante, but the process of allocating it has become thoroughly commercialized and 
formalized. Chiefs sell fifty – or ninety-nine year leaseholds to individuals or firms; 
plots are carefully surveyed; and records are kept at the Lands Commission to avoid 
mistakes or fraudulent transactions”.  
 
One particular problem that faces the interested agent at this stage is whether the land 
in question has not already been sold to another party. This would be difficult to 
verify if the land has already been sold to a previous party. As Ray (1999:125) also 
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noted about customary land acquisitions, “such leases were usually oral in nature, or 
even if they were written, were sometimes subject to disputes based on whether the 
person granting the lease actually had the authority to control the land, because 
several branches of the family might be themselves in disputes as to who had this 
authority, based on who was the proper occupant of the relevant traditional authority 
office- such offices being contested potentially by several members of the relevant 
family or families”. In most circumstances therefore, whether a plot of land is vacant 
or has already been sold can only be known at the stage of physical development on 
the land. At that stage, everybody can see the physical work being undertaken on the 
land and other claimants can legally challenge rival claimants.  
 
After the land owners and the interested agent reaches agreement over the terms of the 
acquisition and demanded customary obligations are fulfilled, by traditional custom 
the land is legitimately and legally transferred to the lessee. However, customary land 
transaction at this stage is still considered “illegal” by the state unless it is formally 
legalized by the public land bureaucracy. It is interesting to ask whether the public 
land bureaucracy have the competence to enforce customary land transactions that 
occurs below the state formal institutional structures. When the Lands Commission is 
satisfied that the customary transaction is genuine, the interested agent is then asked 
to pay a tax on the acquisition at the office of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Perhaps, what now remains to be done is the conferment of title on the land 
transactions as legally registered and recognized by the state. This function is done by 
the Land Title Registry. The interested agent can now proceed to develop his plans on 
the land, subject to approval by the Town and Country Planning Department.  
 
It is important to note that traditional authorities regard the collective agreement 
between the allodial land title chief/family head and the land caretaker chief/elders as 
sufficient conditions for the acquisition of customary land. This is because 
government land institutions have a different position on what legally counts as the 
institutional requirement for legal land acquisition.  In fact, the two positions no doubt 
spring from the articulation of two powerful institutional discourses of claims to the 
same within the state. The inherent divided sovereignty of the state over land, and 
even the people, is now manifested in a situation of legal pluralism in the discourse of 
customary land acquisition.  
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Generally, the literature on customary land acquisition asserts that the process is more 
cumbersome when compared to public land acquisition. Crook (2005:3) notes, “even 
those scholars who celebrate the flexibility of local, traditional land tenures 
acknowledge that access to land remains ‘contested and negotiable’, and that there is 
real ambiguity over which judicial venues have the authority or capability to resolve 
continued conflict”. On the contrary, one can also argue that the inflexibility of the 
modern state in its ownership claims over customary land within the state is the 
reason for the prevailing system of legal pluralism. The alleged cumbersome nature of 
customary land acquisition has to do with the many traditional authorities with 
different functions in the local community. This makes it difficult for interested agents 
to identify the appropriate land owners for the negotiation and transfer of available 
customary land.  
 
4.4.2 COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION 
 
Article 20 of the 1992 Constitution gives legal backing to Government to 
compulsorily acquire land anywhere within the state. Compulsory land acquisition is 
the preserve of government. In compulsory land acquisition, traditional discursive 
claims over a piece of land are deconstructed by government through organized state 
institutions of violence supervised by the public land bureaucracy. Government is the 
sole authority to authorize the legal disposition of land to private individuals, groups, 
and public organizations.  It is obvious that compulsory land acquisition by the state is 
only a re-statement of the claims of the modern state over Ghana’s land.  
 
Kotey (1996:254 in Kasanga and Kotey 2001:23-4) observes that the law on 
compulsory land acquisition “made little or no provision for any meaningful 
consultation with the owner (s) of the land or the persons whose interests will be 
affected by the acquisition….Neither the community in which the land is situated nor 
the wider public is in any way consulted or offered an opportunity to express a 
position on the necessity or desirability of a proposed acquisition or on site selection. 
Indeed, usually the first time the owner of a land, or a person who has an interest in 
the land, becomes aware that his land has been compulsorily acquired is when he 
becomes aware of the publication of an executive instrument or when he sees some 
workmen enter unto the land pursuant to an executive instrument”.  
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Post colonial governments have used compulsory land acquisitions to acquire land for 
national development projects, and also to weaken powerful traditional institutions of 
authority. The strategic political approach of Nkrumah’s CPP government to land 
acquisition is succinctly captured in the following observation by Ninsin (1989:168): 
 
“By 1958 the government was strong enough to move first against the most 
powerful chiefs, and later on chiefs in general. It did so by undermining the 
independent economic base of these chiefdoms. Between 1958 and 1962 the 
following laws were enacted: The Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act, 1958 
(Act 8), The Ashanti Stool Act, 1958 (Act 28), the Lands Control Act, 1960 
(Act 79) and The Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123). These laws, in 
various ways, gave the state power over stool and other lands; power to 
authorize the acquisition and use of such lands for either private or public 
purposes; and to regulate the collection and use of stool revenue. In the end it 
succeeded in deepening the dependency of chiefs on, and their subordination 
to, the state”.  
 
If the state was that strong enough it is a mystery that it did not use its acquired 
instruments of violence to wholly deconstruct customary claims over the same land 
which the modern state claims legal sovereignty and ownership. At the local level 
where the power of chiefs are most felt, the CPP government used a host of local 
government ordinances such as the Local Government Ordinance of 1951, to create 
bodies other than the chief’s court to control and manage stool lands and associated 
revenues. The Lands Administration Act, 1962 (Act 123), also gave government the 
power to compulsorily appropriate large tracts of land for its large scale agricultural 
modernization programme.  
 
Ninsen further noted that the CPP government, “in addition to promoting state 
enterprises in agriculture also attempted to respond to some of the grievances of the 
peasantry through the Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107) and the Rents 
(Stabilization) Act, 1962 (Act 109) and related instruments. The purpose of Act 107, 
as stated in the preamble, was ‘…to protect farmers whose titles to land are found to 
be defective” (Ninsin 1989:168). The Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) 
Act, 1962 (Act 2) was also enacted “to protect purchasers of land and their successors 
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whose titles are found to be defective after a building has been erected on the land” 
(Ninsin 1989:170). Obviously, the aim of government was to weld together the 
interests of peasant farmers against their traditional institutions of authority.  
 
Compulsory land acquisition by the state gives form to public land. The articulation of 
compulsory land acquisition by governments is contradictory to the discourse of 
customary land acquisition. Unless government has successfully deconstructed 
customary claims over a piece of land, no public land can be created or owned by the 
state. Once a customary land becomes a public land, how is it acquired? The 
institutional procedural ways to public land acquisition completes the discussion on 
the three types of land acquisition within the state. 
 
4.4.3 PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION 
 
PNDC Law 42 defined public land to “include land over which the Government, an 
agency or organ of Government exercised or participated in the exercise of the power 
of disposition” (Kasanga 2000:5). Public lands are managed on behalf of the state by 
the Lands Commission. An agent who is interested in acquiring a public land is 
required to negotiate with the Lands Commission.  
 
An application for public land should be backed by a banker’s reference of 1000 
British pound sterling before he is allocated a government land. Kasanga (2000:9) has 
observed that this specific regulation guiding the acquisition of public land by 
interested individuals has “priced the low income, the middle income, and the silent 
majority generally out of the public land market”. But in theory, access to public land 
is open to all Ghanaians on a ‘first come, first serve basis’ (Kasanga 2000).  
 
One should not forget that what constitutes public land was originally customary land 
that has been forcefully but legally seized by the state through organized state 
institutions of violence. Legally, therefore, a land developer with expressed interests 
in acquiring public land is not required to fulfil any obligations demanded by 
customary land institutions. It may be argued that, the acquisition of public land is 
backed by the state institutions of violence. The interested agent therefore may have 
access to coercive mechanisms to back his interest when necessary.  
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Notwithstanding the fact that the agent does not need the agreement of any traditional 
authority before he can legally and legitimately acquire public land, Hammond (2005) 
has observed that the agent is still required under traditional societal norms to seek the 
‘blessing’ of traditional authorities in the community where the public land is situated. 
The agent is required and actually subject to the existing traditional norms governing 
land management in the particular community. The acquisition of public land may 
therefore not be as simple as it looks.   
 
When one considers the fact that the creation of public land is devoid of any collective 
agreements between government and customary land institutions, one can imagine the 
potential opposition that faces the agent after he has legally and legitimately been 
transferred the public land. From the perspective of the state, however, the acquisition 
of public land depends on the fulfilment of purely statutory defined institutional 
obligations performed within the public land bureaucracy without any recognisance to 
traditional land institutions. It is assumed that the interested agent need not go through 
the customary institutional processes again before the acquisition of public land is 
legally recognized.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The legacy of the Ghanaian post-colonial state is best captured in the words of Donald 
(1996:210): “At one level, it comprised the colonial state, which included a variety of 
legal traditions, rules and administrative practices transplanted directly to the 
continent in a manner recognizable to Europeans themselves. Below the state were 
dozens of other institutions that included the remnants of some former African states, 
village chieftaincies, trade networks, age grade orders, secret societies, Islamic orders, 
and lineage units, among others”.  Mamdani (1996) also aptly captured the colonial 
legacy of the African state as a bifurcated entity in which the ordinary person is torn 
in his actions between the position of the citizen articulated by the modern state and 
the powerful discourse of the political subject articulated by traditional authorities 
within the state. Thus within the same territory exist a dual state with different basis 
of claims over land and subjects.  
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The institutional engineering of the Ghanaian State was from the pre-colonial era 
controlled by traditional authorities who rightly claimed ownership over the land 
which they have carved out of war making. The question of land ownership was 
therefore defined along the lines of customary property interests. The traditional 
Nation-State was used by the very class who owned land to protect their private 
interests within the public sphere of power. The modern Ghanaian state that inherited 
the colonial legacy failed to extinguish the traditional state but superimposed its 
claims over the same land and people.  
 
Land politics in the bifurcated state has therefore come to be dictated by the 
discursive cultures and practices articulated by the traditional state makers and the 
modern state makers. On one hand is the discourse of compulsory land acquisition 
that has been articulated by governments through legal force and organized violence 
supervised by a public land bureaucracy. Below the formal state institutional 
apparatus is the dominant discourse of customary land acquisition that enjoys 
patronage from local networks, and even international investors. Between the two 
poles, one encounters the discourse of public land acquisition where the interested 
agent fulfils the formal obligations demanded by the state and the informal customary 
obligations demanded by traditional authorities. 
 
The contradictory institutional division over land claims is re-affirmed by the 1992 
C0nstitution. What the constitutional designers succeeded in making is a state with 
divided sovereignty over its land and subjects. The loyalty of the ordinary individual 
within the state in social interactions over land acquisition is torn between the 
discourse of citizenship articulated by the modern state and the discourse of subject 
superimposed by traditional authorities. The constitutionally bifurcated state is 
pregnant with problems of institutional accountability between customary land owners 
and the state. The modern Ghanaian state ultimately gave birth to a public land 
bureaucracy that may have inadequate political competence to mediate discourses of 
government land acquisition unless support is found in organized state institutions of 
violence. Violence may not reinforce capital production when its begat violence from 
rival institutions of organized actors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.0   THE PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY 
 
The chapter discusses the relevant organizations that make up the public land 
bureaucracy for government land acquisition. Attention is focused on specifying the 
organizational units, language, symbols, procedural rules, obligations, and 
organizational resources of the public land bureaucracy that defines the framework for 
government land acquisition in Ghana. Four public land organizations; namely the 
Lands Commission, the Survey Department, the Land Title Registry, and the Land 
Valuation Board receive attention for discussion. 
 
The power status functions of these four organizations and their bureaucratic 
relationships are particularly discussed for the analysis of how its impacts on their 
institutional competence to mediate conflict of interests in government land 
acquisition. It is hoped that the analysis of the institutional character of the public land 
bureaucracy would help shed light on its systemic competence in a discourse 
government land acquisition, prior to the analysis of the actual empirical cases.  
 
5.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND ACQUISITION 
  
The institutional arrangement for land administration in Ghana is characterized a 
plurality of public organizational structures. According to Kasanga (2000:2), the 
implementation of specific legislative instruments leading to the establishment of 
various public land agencies suggests “some unintended political objectives”, notably 
to: 
 
• Weaken traditional and customary institutions and authorities 
• Stifle traditional and customary land management functions, their influence, 
and basis for economic and financial support 
• Impoverish local authorities economically and financially by controlling local 
revenue sources 
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• Neutralize political opponent by acquiring and/ or vesting their lands, so that 
local revenues will not be channelled to opposition parties or groups, likely to 
destabilize the ruling government 
• Reward and satisfy comrades, political cronies, top civil servants, the military 
and security forces to give them a stake in the sharing of the booty and to keep 
them quiet in the face of gross injustice to the silent majority 
• Exercise absolute, negative, and corrupt power over lands, people and all 
productive resources in the country.  
 
 The historical institutional analysis of state making in Ghana clearly shows that 
Kasanga’s assertion of government’s ‘unintended political objectives’ is misplaced. 
The reality of the historical relations of power struggle over land between the modern 
state and traditional authorities leaves a big question mark over how the systematic 
weakening of the power of rival traditional institutions can objectively be described as 
“unintended political objectives”. The strategic weakening of rival traditional 
institutions over land ownership claims within the state has been the key feature of 
post independent land politics in Ghana (Austin 1964, Ninsin 1989).  
 
Military and civilian governments have sought not only to consolidate their political 
hold over divergent ethnic groupings in the state but also to weaken the power of the 
traditional state makers. Given that the deconstruction of traditional land institutions 
is unintended; one would expect to see genuine political attempts made by 
government to weld together the subjective obligations demanded by traditional 
authorities into the public land bureaucracy. Whether or not this is the case would 
soon be made clear as the study analyzes the nature of power status-functions imposed 
on the public land bureaucracy for facilitating government land acquisition. 
 
The institutional framework for the general administration of land is summarized in 
Table 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: THE PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION 
SECTOR AGENCY STATUTORY BASIS FUNCTIONS 
 
Survey Department 
 
Survey Act 1962 (Act 1127) 
 
• Responsible for the provision of accurate, reliable, scientific geo-
information for the socio-economic development of Ghana 
• Responsible for quality control in survey practice in Ghana 
• Regulation of practising Surveyors through the process of licensing of 
Surveyors and checking on quality of instruments used 
• Provision of large scale maps for settlement planning 
Engages in: 
• Framework Survey 
• Demarcation of International Boundaries 
• Topographic Mapping 
• Cadastral Mapping 
• Conflict Mapping 
 
Lands Commission 
 
Lands Commission 
Act 1994 (Act 483) 
 
• Responsible for allocation of Public Lands for public Development 
• Facilitates compulsory acquisition of land for and on behalf of government 
• Grants and manages leases in respect of state acquired land 
• Grants concurrence to stool land transactions 
• Provides land ownership searches for the public 
• Manages vested lands in conjunction with land owning stools 
• Assist courts in conflict resolution by providing records and information 
 
District Assembly,  
Town and Country 
Planning Department 
 
Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance Cap 84 
Local Gov’t Act 1993 (Act 
462) 
 
• Ensures orderly planning for all areas of the District 
• Assist in determining the payment of compensation in respect of injurious 
affections occasioned by the implementation of a scheme 
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Administrator of Stool 
Lands 
 
Office of the Administrator 
of Stool Lands Act 1994 
(Act 481) 
 
• Collection of rents in respect of stool lands and compensation in respect of 
stool lands acquired by the government 
• Establishment of Stool lands account 
• Collects minerals and forest royalties and disburse according to prescribed 
formula 
• Coordinates with the Lands Commission and other agencies to formulate 
policies for effective stool land management 
• Engages in consultations with stool land owners 
 
 
Land Title Registry 
 
 
Land Title Registration Law 
1986 (PNDCL 152) 
 
• Registration of title to land 
• Establishes adjudication Committees to handle conflict during the 
registration process 
 
 
Land Valuation Board 
 
The Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana 1992 
 
 
• Provides valuation services for and on behalf of government 
• Undertakes assessment of compensation payable upon (compulsory) 
acquisition of land 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Yeboah 2005:1) 
 
 
 
 
From the above table, one can see that the state possess an extensive institutional 
apparatus for land administration that extends from the national level to the local 
level. On a critical view, however, it is clear that the Lands Commission, the Survey 
Department, the Land Title Registry, and the Land Valuation Board constitute the 
bureaucratic network for land acquisition. The power status functions of the other 
institutionalized organizations occur either before or after the creation of an 
institutional fact of land acquisition. The institutionalized organizations that constitute 
the identified bureaucratic framework for land acquisition are discussed in turn.  
 
5.1.1 THE LANDS COMMISSION 
 
The Lands Commission is the parent organization from which the Land Title Registry, 
the Land Valuation Board, and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands were 
created as separate bodies. The Lands Commission was first created by the 1969 
Constitution of Ghana, to replace the colonial Lands Department. The Commission 
has travelled under different legislative acts that follow renewed politics of state-
making. It was re-established in 1994 under the Lands Commission Act 483.  
 
The Commission therefore have custody all records of deeds registration throughout 
the country. The Lands Commission therefore provides services of land ownership 
searches for the public. When necessary, the Commission also assist the country’s 
courts in land conflict resolution through the provision of available information 
(Yeboah 2005). The most crucial power status function of the Lands Commission in 
the discourse of government land acquisition is that it facilitates the compulsory 
acquisition of customary lands, or more appropriately, the deconstruction of 
customary institutions of land ownership to create public lands.  
 
As partners in the deconstruction of customary land ownership in the discourse of 
compulsory government land acquisition, the organization comes into direct 
confrontation with customary land owners. Traditional land owners see the Lands 
Commission as an agency used by government to violently seize their lands. Kasanga 
(2000) noted that this function has made the Lands Commission unpopular with 
customary land owners. The Lands Commission, not surprising, is inundated with law 
suits from aggrieved land owners demanding the payment of compensation or the 
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return of their lands. All public lands that have been compulsorily acquired by the 
state are managed by the Lands Commission. Gaining access to this category of land, 
known as public land, therefore depends on negotiations with the Lands Commission.  
 
Also more important for state-traditional authority relations is the consent and 
concurrence of the Lands Commission to all customary land transactions before any 
customary land is granted to non members of the stool/skin. Clearly, this function is 
not only to control the disposition of land by traditional authorities but also to enable 
the government to assert its political authority over the territorial boundaries of the 
sovereign state. In any case capital investors must first clear important lower level 
leverage structures in land acquisition before entering into the arena of formalization. 
“Grants of stool and family land require the consent and concurrence of the principal 
elders for validation prior to processing” (Somevi 2001:6).  
 
The unique character of the Lands Commission is not just its direct partnership with 
government in the collective use of legalized aggression for land acquisition, but also 
the composition of its membership. Quiet surprisingly, aside its pool of technical 
expertise, the Lands Commission has membership representations nominated from the 
Houses of Chiefs (at national and regional levels of administrative jurisdiction), the 
Ghana Bar Association, the Ghana Institution of Surveyors, the Department of Town 
and Country Planning, the Association of Farmers and Fishermen, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the Ministry responsible for Lands and Forestry.  
 
It is intriguing to ask, how is it possible that the co-opted representative from the 
House of Chiefs will consent to government deconstruction of customary land 
institutions without the fulfilment of obligations demanded by customary land 
owners? Perhaps, this is only ‘informal cooptation’ clothed under legal formalism in 
“response to the pressure of specific centers of power within the community” 
(Selznick 1949:14); rather than the formal imposition of actual power status on the co-
opted representatives to make any meaningful impact in the discourse of compulsory 
land acquisition. As earlier questioned, will the cooptation of organized forces into the 
leadership structure of the Lands Commission lead to the conferment of legitimacy 
and resources to make the organization politically competent in mediating conflict of 
interests in a discourse of government land acquisition?  
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Whether the widespread vertical and horizontal membership network enjoyed by the 
Lands Commission also transforms it into a powerful collective organizational actor 
to mediate conflict of interests in government land acquisition is an empirical issue 
that will soon be settled by the study. What is known from its former chairman is that 
“In spite of some positive achievements the practical benefits of the Lands 
Commission to the silent majority (i.e. the rural, peri-urban and urban poor, the 
disabled, the unemployed, the low and middle-income earners etc) are not apparent. 
On the contrary, the evidence suggests that, in the past, interventions by the Lands 
Commission in respect of compulsory acquisition and the non-payment of 
compensation have resulted in social unrests, the displacement of helpless villagers, 
landlessness, and hopelessness in some affected communities” (Kasanga 2000:ii). 
 
5.1.2 THE LAND TITLE REGISTRY 
 
The Land Title Registry, established in 1986 (PNDCL 152), is the statutory institution 
responsible for land title registration and its administration in the country. The Land 
Title Adjudication Committee of the Registry also operates as domestic tribunals and 
free from technicalities to adjudicate on disputes arising from title registration before 
any land disputes is sent to the state judicial system. This provision is to compel 
contesting parties to make use of the committee in order to discourage expensive 
litigation through the state courts system. Whatever might be the good intentions 
behind the establishment of this committee, it has refused to function (Brobby 2002). 
 
The Land Title Registry was established to undertake systematic compulsory 
registration of all lands in the country; and also to convert the existing registration of 
deeds in the custody of the Lands Commission into land titles. However, it has been 
noted that inter-organizational conflicts between the Lands Commission and the Land 
Title Registry has made the former to usually withhold its records of deeds from the 
latter (Somevi 2001:14). Moreover, only a handful of areas in major cities and towns 
have so far been declared a land title registration district and therefore the Lands 
Registry of the Lands Commission continues to register deeds in the rest of the 
country not yet brought under the land title registration system.  
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Within the few areas declared as registration districts, the Land Title Registry has 
made only limited progress (Antwi 2001, Brobby 2002, Somevi 2001). The limited 
progress, according to Somevi (2001:5), “stems partly from the fact that it has 
deviated from the internal rules for its operation. Notable deviations include the use of 
bad identifiers, failure to work slowly and take time to bring areas into registration 
systematically. Its current operations are expensive, time consuming and lack 
simplicity”. Land title registration, it has been noted, depends on accurate survey, 
base maps, and the demarcation of an entire country. This being the case, inter-
organizational cooperation and coordination of functions between the Land Title 
Registry and the Survey Department- another separate public land organization- is 
imperative for successful title registration. However, the evidence suggests that the 
Land Title Registry is also hampered by inadequate staff and resources.  
 
Clearly, the functional failures of the Land Title Registry is laid at the door steps of 
the usual administrative and organizational bottlenecks traditionally thrown about as 
reasons for failures encountered by public organizations. If these organizational 
weaknesses are corrected, is there a reason to believe that the Land Title Registry can 
perform its functions effectively? Will adherence to administrative procedures be 
enough to “puts a registry in touch with individuals, traditional authorities, and 
government agencies” to build “confidence, respect, trust and co-operation” as 
suggested by Somevi (2001:7)? How does adherence to administrative procedures 
build trust relations among actors with conflict of interests when the internal 
institutional rules does not cater for the obligations demanded by autonomous actors?  
 
5.1.3 THE SURVEY DEPARTMENT 
 
The Survey Department came into existence in 1901. Since the colonial era it had 
performed the land registration function until the Lands Department  (now the Lands 
Commission) took over in 1947 (Somevi, 2001:14). The Survey Department is 
responsible for large scale mapping of settlements, training of surveyors and 
cartographers. The Department is also responsible for cadastral survey showing the 
extent, value, and ownership of land for land registration, taxation, and other purposes 
in land transactions. Moreover, the director of Surveys, in consultation with the Chief 
Land Registrar, is required to demarcate the boundaries of all lands in new land title 
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registration districts. In the event of government intentionality to compulsorily acquire 
land somewhere, the Survey Department prepares the acquisition plans.  
 
The technical functions performed by this land organization make the organization 
very important in land acquisition. Fundamentally, there is no doubt that the provision 
of such important technical functions elucidates the conferment of power status from 
land developers as counting towards land acquisition. However, the purpose of land 
survey in land acquisition is to clearly delineate the boundaries of a plot of land from 
adjoining land ownership claims. Therefore, any conferment of power status on the 
process as one that rationally counts towards land acquisition is possible where the 
boundaries of land can be clearly delineated from all encumbrances and its value 
appropriately computed. Where land owners cannot be identified the functions of the 
survey department is uncalled for.  
 
From the available literature on land registration, it appears that whiles there is a high 
level of inter-organizational cooperation between the Survey Department and the 
Land Title Registry, there is not much functional cooperation between the Survey 
Department and the Lands Commission (Somevi 2001:15). It is strange that the 
Advisory Board and Steering Committee of the Land Title Registry consist of each 
“heads of the Lands Commission, Survey Department, Town and Country Planning 
Department and about two other appointees” (Somevi 2001:10); yet its functional 
performance is stifled by some of the same represented organizations. Consequently, 
government public lands and private lands have been plotted to be in conflicts with 
each other. An investor who has been transferred a public land may find his legally 
acquired land already inhabited by private individuals. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Survey Department is reputed to possess the best land surveyors in the country, 
the lack of inter-organizational functional cooperation with the Lands Commission 
leaves in its path problems of land acquisition for land developers.  
 
5.1.4 THE LAND VALUATION BOARD 
 
The 1992 Constitution imposes an obligation on the state to compensate farmers for 
their crops in the event of compulsory of land acquisition. The Land Valuation Board 
provides valuation services for and on behalf of government in public land transfers; 
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and also by undertaking assessment of compensation payable upon compulsory 
acquisition of land. In any case, the Land Valuation Board has no enabling legislation 
to perform its functions effectively (Kasanga 2000:6). Payment of land and crop 
compensation by the Board is a unilateral process defined by legalized aggression.  
 
In customary land acquisition, the Board has no role to play. And no institutional 
avenues are available to help affected land tenants from receiving due compensation 
for the destruction of their property. Since there are no institutional obligations 
between affected property land lands and the Land Valuation Board with respect to 
the payment of compensation in customary land acquisition, capital investors are left 
with the responsibility of sorting claims of compensation demanded by all affected 
groups, including opportunists. The alternative open for dissatisfied property owners 
is the judiciary system since the Land Tribunals established under the State Lands Act 
1962, 125, for such purposes have all collapsed (Brobby 2002).  
 
Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL), a giant mining corporation in Ghana, has 
made the following observation: “Mineral rights are legally defined to include the 
rights to reconnoiter, prospect for, and mine minerals. A mineral rights holder must 
compensate for any disturbance to the rights of owners or occupiers and for damage to 
the surface of the land, buildings, works or improvements, livestock, crops or trees in 
the area of mineral operations. The act does not provide compensation for the land 
itself. According to the Minerals and Mining Law, compensation is determined by 
agreement between the concerned parties, with the approval of the land valuation 
Board. In practice, this agreement involves a broad section of stakeholders, including 
affected farmers and local traditional and political leaders” (NGGL, October 2005:1). 
NGGL have developed its own guide to compensation for customary land acquisition 
as it deems appropriate. The implication of this critical juncture is that the fate of poor 
farmer is left hanging in a balance between their chiefs and giants capitalists. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
From the theoretical point of view, institutional balkanization does not only lead to 
the articulation of heterogeneous values as each organizational unit jealously seek to 
promote and protect its core values; but also every organizations will try as much as 
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possible to annihilate rival institutions that threaten their survival. Conflicts among 
functionally related organizations within the same institutional field weakens their 
institutional capacity to functional as a rational collective actor. The institutional 
framework for land acquisition in Ghana is presented in diagram 2. 
 
Diagram 2: The Institutional Framework for Land Acquisition in Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land Caretaker Royal Family/Land 
Owning Family 
Paramount Chief/Family Head 
    LC 
SDLVB 
LTR 
PUBLIC LAND 
BUREAUCRACY 
TRADITIONAL LAND 
INSTITUTION 
(LTR- Land Title Registry; LC- Lands Commission; LVB- Land Valuation Board; 
SD- Survey Department) (Source: Author) 
 
 
The institutional framework for land acquisition is divided between the modern state 
institutional framework for land acquisition and the traditional state institutional 
framework for land acquisition. These two institutional networks have different 
institutional obligatory requirements whose fulfilment count as land acquisition. 
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Sitting at the upper section of the dividing line is the diamond shaped public land 
bureaucracy that has been unable to sparkle for private capital investors in facilitating 
access to land, but perhaps might glitter for government. The functional survival of 
the public land bureaucracy with regards to formalization of land transactions is 
dependant on what transpires within the informal traditional institutional sector.  
 
Although the LTR sits at the top of the formalization process, its ability to function is 
dependent on the concurrence of the LC to all land acquisitions. There is also a direct 
technical functional relationship between the Survey Department and the Land 
Valuation Board in a discourse of compulsory land acquisition. The Land Title 
Registry, the Survey Department, and the Land Valuation Board all depend on what 
transpires at the Lands Commission for the performance of their status functions. 
However, in customary land acquisition the Lands Commission is also dependent for 
its survival on land transactions within the traditional institutional sector. And thus the 
whole public land bureaucracy is largely dependent on the transaction traditional land 
institutions in delivering land to capital investors because 80% of the country’s 
physical land is customarily owned. In the politics of compulsory state land 
acquisition, the Lands Commission is independent from traditional land institutions. 
 
The diagram also suggests that inter-organizational coordination and cooperation is 
crucial for the functional effectiveness of the public land bureaucracy in land 
acquisition. Formal transactions in land by prospective land investors, land owners, 
and land tenants involve dealing with all these agencies. Their relational linkages 
make effective coordination of their related functions critical to the efficient and 
effective acquisition of land. The powers, functional status, and institutional 
relationship of the Lands Commission, the Land Title Registry, the Survey 
Department, and the Land Valuation Board are discussed in turn. 
 
Long before the formal acquisition of land takes place, the institutional capacity of the 
public land bureaucracy to cooperatively facilitate formal access to land is weakened 
by institutional bickering, lack of cooperation, and functional duplication. Ironically, 
in customary land acquisition, the functional survival of the four public land 
organizations is largely determined by the transactions within the relatively stable 
informal customary land institutional framework that exist below the legal authority 
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of the state land bureaucracy. As the public land organizations continue to engage 
each other in internal fights for survival, they have little time to pay attention to 
events taking place outside their environments.  
 
Quiet strangely, the crippling effect of the institutional problems that exists within 
customary land institutions is usually ignored in the diagnosis of the problems that 
impacts on the competence of public land bureaucrats to facilitate access to customary 
land. The Lands Commission is taken to be the beginning of the continuum of the 
institutional framework for land acquisition. How traditional land institutions detract 
from the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy in land acquisition shall 
be fully exposed later in the empirical analysis of the study.  
 
Looking at the fact that the 1992 Constitution bans traditional authorities from multi-
party politics, they may only articulate their discourses for actual political 
representation in the structures of the public land bureaucracy through mechanisms 
that lie outside the national political decision-making legislative institutions of the 
state, or, perhaps, through the lobbying of political elites and elected legislators. The 
possibility of weaving traditional values, expectations, practices and economic 
interests into the fabric of the formal institutional framework for land acquisition in 
the future might depend on three factors.  
 
• First, it depends on the benevolence of government political decision-making 
elites.  
• Second, it depends on the capability of traditional authorities to marshal 
enough political power to penetrate the dominant coalition group that controls 
the discourse of land administration reforms in Ghana.  
• And finally, on changes in the worldview of the country’s international 
financial development partners, particularly the IMF/World Bank, who 
coincidentally have for along time opposed customary land practices.  
 
In the absence of formal institutional obligations between traditional institutions and 
the public land bureaucracy, the question that remains to be settled is under what 
conditions would traditional authorities rationally and collectively agree with the 
public land bureaucracy to successfully create an institutional fact of government land 
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acquisition? How does the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy 
impacts on the competence of bureaucrats to mediate conflict of interests among 
government, traditional authorities and land tenants in a discourse of government land 
acquisition? This is the important issue the study now turns to seek answers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75
CHAPTER 6 
 
6.0 GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITIONS FOR THE INLAND 
PORT PROJECT: CONSTRUCTING THE DISCURSIVE 
ACTORS AND THEIR SUBJECTIVE POSITIONS FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
 
The chapter identifies the relevant actors that were involved in the discourses of 
government land acquisition. Attempt is then made to discursively construct the 
subjective positions of the identified actors on land ownership and it acquisition so as 
to analyze the impact that the public land bureaucracy had on their demanded 
obligations and actions. As earlier indicated, without a definition of the subjective 
positions of rational autonomous actors involved in a discourse, one cannot 
meaningfully analyze the impact of exogenous institutional variables on rational 
behaviour or discursive outcomes.  
 
6.1 CONSTRUCTING THE RELEVANT DISCURSIVE ACTORS IN THE 
DISCOURSES OF GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITION 
 
For the institutional analysis of the capacity and competence of the public land 
bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests in government land acquisition, discourse 
analysis requires the researcher to identify the relevant actors and define their 
discursive positions on the object of land and what counts as land acquisition In the 
discursive interactions over land acquisition by government in Femusua and in 
Boankra, the study identified three categories of actors whose collective action was 
required for the legal creation of land acquisition.  
 
The discursive actors were Traditional Authorities (customary land owners), Land 
Tenants, and Government itself. The definition of land tenant in this study is inclusive 
of all persons, groups, and organizations that have usufructuary rights over a piece of 
land, acquired through contractual agreement and therefore does not own the allodial 
title over the land. Land tenants therefore include farmers and property owners who 
through usufructuary agreements with allodial title owners occupy a piece of land. If 
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the acquisition of land was to succeed within the institution of property rights, then 
the collective agreement and recognition of these three actors was legally required. 
  
6.2 CONSTRUCTING SUBJECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE ACTORS 
  
Attempt is made to define the positions of Traditional Authorities, Land Tenants, and 
Government so as to analyze how their demanded obligations were mediated by the 
public land bureaucracy for collective action over land acquisition. The positions of 
rational-subjects supply the value premises that underlie rational actions. “Value 
premises are assumptions about what ends are preferred or desirable… The more 
precise and specific the value premises, the greater their impacts on the resulting 
decisions, since specific goals clearly distinguish acceptable from unacceptable (or 
more from less acceptable) alternatives” (Scott 2003:50-51).  
 
Discourse theorists distinguish between subject positions and political subjectivity in 
order to capture the positioning of subjects within a discursive structure, on the one 
hand; and to account for the agency of subjects on the other hand. The concept of 
subject position accounts for the multiple forms by which discursive agents are 
enabled as social actors. The concept of political subjectivity, on the other hand, 
simply refers to an agency or institution; in this case the discursive actor’s relations 
with the public land bureaucracy.  
 
It is worth noting that in discourse theory, the rational subject can have a number of 
subject positions, rather than particular interests, that are discursively constructed by 
being defined against other identities. Rational social actors, after all, draw boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders in the political construction of institutional hegemony. 
Griggs and Howarth (2000:55) thus correctly emphasized that “interests and identities 
are political constructs with precise discursive conditions of existence”. 
 
The competence of bureaucratic officials within the public land bureaucracy to induce 
actors with conflicts of interests in land to identify with government land acquisition 
is not contingent on voluntarism but on the political construction of institutional 
obligations among discursive actors. The creation of acceptable obligations among the 
discursive actors within the institutional structure of the public land bureaucracy is 
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what provides desire independent reasons that influence rational action. When 
demanded obligations are politically sutured into the fabric of the public land 
bureaucracy it is likely to enable collective agreement and rational action among 
Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in the discourse of land 
acquisition. Attention is now directed to the construction of the positions of 
Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants. 
 
6.2.1 THE POSITION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES: POLITICAL 
POWER, CULTURAL VALUES AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
 
According to Ashanti traditional custom, land is held by chiefs or traditional 
authorities in trust for their subjects (Busia 1968). Customary land is owned by the 
living, the dead, and the unborn. Individuals and organizations cannot buy or sell free 
hold interests in customary land. “Chiefs could allocate land to both subjects and 
strangers and collect tribute from the latter, but they could not alienate land itself” 
(Berry 2001: xvii). The economic value of land to traditional authorities is not a 
contentious subject among scholars in Ghana. The process of allocating land to local 
and foreign investors has become thoroughly commercialized and Traditional 
Authorities have usually disposed off fifty- or ninety nine year leaseholds to 
individuals, groups or firms (Berry 2001, Ubink 2005).  
 
The position of traditional authorities on land is politically constructed into a 
determined discourse of cultural values, political power, and economic development. 
Traditional values underlying customary land allocation is not strictly based on a 
calculation of cost and benefit as is the case with the rational economic actor within 
the transaction cost theorem. The economic value of land to traditional authorities is 
welded within a cultural ritual called the ‘drink-money’. The ‘drink-money’ is money 
demanded by traditional authorities to purchase drinks for the performance of rites to 
symbolise the allocation of land. In most cases, however, the drink money demanded 
is equal to the market value of the negotiated land (Antwi 2001, Hammond 2005). 
However, members of the local community are allowed by their traditional authorities 
to obtain land at a lower cost of the actual market value (Ubink 2005).  
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Developmental motivations also seem to have a strong influence in the discourse of 
customary land disposition. Ubink (2005) report that some chiefs in Ashanti uses one 
third of the financial proceeds from land allocations to develop their community by 
building a school, a library or a palace. The remaining two thirds is divided among the 
royal family, the chief and the elders. Some traditional authorities, on the other hand, 
claim outright ownership of land proceeds for themselves and their royal families 
without any concern for the development of their community. Such opportunists 
justify their actions on the grounds that “land belongs to the royal family, since it was 
members of the royal family who fought for the land” (Ubink 2005:4). The 
implication is the complete extinction of the rights of land tenants who are not 
members of the royal family in the event of disposition of the customary interest.  
 
The value of land to traditional authorities transcends its economic benefits. 
Ownership and control of land symbolizes the political power of traditional 
authorities. The value of land to Traditional Authorities, according to Berry (2001), 
lay in their ability to exercise power and control over local communities. Access to 
land is “much about power and the control of people as about access to land as a 
factor of production” (Berry 2001: xix). Traditional Authorities do not sit 
unconcerned for their political power in land to be usurped by rival chiefs, 
government or other political racketeers without a struggle.  
 
The discursive position of traditional authorities over land ownership has been a fierce 
arena of political contention with government in post independent Ghanaian politics. 
Berry (2001: 124) reports that indigenes in land owning communities “counted on 
their traditional rulers to defend stool lands against challenges from rival chiefs. Land 
litigation often drained stools’ resources, taxed their subjects, and if successful, stood 
to benefit the Chief and elders more than the community, but a chief who did not fight 
for stool land courted accusations of incompetence, or worse”. Thus, access to and 
possession of land has great political value for traditional authorities beyond the 
apparent economic benefits that accrue from its disposition. 
 
Discourses of customary land acquisition is not just a process of market economic 
exchange but more significantly is the performance of cultural rituals that reinforces 
the political authority and power of traditional authorities over subjects and land. 
 79
Chiefs swear to protect the norms, value and institutions of their people during their 
installation into traditional office. The process of negotiating access to land is littered 
with the obligatory performance and recognition of symbolic rites. Customary 
agreement by the lessee to observe cultural traditions that surround the possession of 
the demised land is constructed in the discourse of customary land acquisition.  
 
The actions of traditional authorities in land transactions are shaped by the rights and 
responsibilities conferred on them as custodians of customary land. They seek to 
protect traditional values, norms, and culturally defined obligations before access to 
land is granted to the interested party. It is nearly impossible for traditional authorities 
to shirk their traditional responsibilities and institutional obligations to focus solely on 
their self-interest. “Agreement to delegate use rights are not simply based on 
economic or productive considerations. They are inextricably both economic and 
social, either because they are based on alliances or patronage between family groups, 
or because the arrangements include a certain number of non-land related clauses 
which refers to the demand that those gaining access to land must observe a number 
of social rules and obligations towards the delegating party and his family” (Delville, 
et. al. 2002:9). The fulfilment of customary norms centred on the object of land 
enables traditional authorities to legitimately claim their status.  
 
Traditional land owners consider collective agreement between the lands owning 
family as sufficient grounds for land acquisition and may not even care at all as to 
whether the agent formalizes the transactions with the public land bureaucracy as 
demanded by the modern democratic state. The state requires an agent who has 
acquired customary interest in land to compulsorily register his title in the property 
before the acquisition of the interest is statutorily recognized as legal. Interestingly, 
the collective agreement of government and traditional authorities is crucial for an 
agent to gain legal land title covering land acquisition.  
 
Considering the significant authority retained by chieftaincy institutions in Ghana, it 
is important to recognize the immense political, social, and economic influence they 
wield over access to land for investment. It is conceded that much of the functions of 
traditional authorities in the pre-colonial and colonial days have been taken over by 
the modern state. This notwithstanding, the role played by traditional rulers in land 
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administration within their local communities makes them crucial actors with veto 
powers whose institutions cannot be bypassed by ordinary agents who have interests 
in customary land acquisition. The land developer is mandated by a historical 
institutional path to obtain the consent of the relevant traditional authorities before he 
can gain legitimate access to customary land.  Failure to recognize the historically 
honoured social, cultural, and political value of land to traditional authorities is bound 
to throw a discourse of land acquisition into chaos, conflict, and possible failure.  
 
6.2.2 THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER LAND 
  
Legally, the entire landscape occupied by the state is legally owned by Government, 
the modern state maker. Located on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, Ghana shares 
its 2,285 km. (1,420 mls.) of boundary with Ivory Coast to the west, Burkina Faso 
(formerly Upper Volta) to the north and Togo to the east, as well as having 572 km. 
(355mls.) of coastline (Ray 1986:1). For Government, the geographical landscape that 
defines the territorial sovereignty of the Ghanaian state within the Commonwealth of 
Nations defines the extent of its political authority, power, and control over the land 
and citizens living under the umbrella of the democratic state. 
 
Consequently, governments articulate a discourse of compulsory land acquisition to 
deconstruct all other interests and claims over a portion of land needed for national 
development. Public land ownership represents a discursive moment that results from 
the successful deconstruction of the discourse of customary and private land 
ownership over the discursive land. Customary obligations demanded by traditional 
land owners or any other affected private land owner (s), are not observed by 
government on the terms demanded by the affected parties. If no obligations are 
collectively created in compulsory land acquisition, is there any reason to believe that 
the creation of public land from customary land would be collectively recognized by 
Traditional land owners, farmers, and other property owners? And would the 
subsequent acquisition of public land be peacefully recognized by parties with conflict 
of interest in the affected land? 
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Clearly, the discourse of compulsory state land acquisition does not involve the 
creation of prior collective agreement among government, land tenants, and 
customary land owners because the position of government is that land is owned by 
the modern state. In the opinion of Government, compulsory land acquisition through 
legal coercion is in the interest of the public. Constitutionally stated, “the taking of 
possession or acquisition if necessary in the interest of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality, public health, town and country planning or the development 
or utilization of property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit” (Ghana, 
1992 Constitution, 20 (1a)). For the state, such important functions of government 
override private concerns. The interest of the state is supreme.  
 
Public schools, hospitals, and transportation networks are all built on public land for 
the benefit of the public. In the opinion of Government the state cannot beg private 
land owners for land to pursue activities that benefit the same citizens. All law 
abiding, good intentioned and developmentally progressive citizens of the state are 
legally obliged to support the discourse of compulsory land acquisition articulated by 
Government or face the coercive might of the state.  
 
Government has no bad intentions behind the compulsory acquisition of private land. 
So the 1992 constitutional discourse assumes. Article 20 (5)(6) of the constitution 
therefore states “Any property compulsorily taken possession of or acquired in the 
public interest or for a public purpose shall be used only in the public interest or for 
the public purpose for which it was acquired. Where the property is not used in the 
public interest or for the purpose for which it was acquired, the owner of the property 
immediately before the compulsory acquisition, shall be given the first option for 
acquiring the property and shall, on such reacquisition refund the whole or part of the 
compensation paid to him as provided for by law or such other amount as is 
commensurate with the value of the property at the time of the reacquisition”. It is 
interesting that the private property owner who received “fair and adequate 
compensation” for the compulsory acquisition of his property may now only redeem 
the same property from the state by paying for its market value. The implication for 
government claims over the ownership of land, as well as everything on it, is obvious. 
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Are there any mutual institutional obligations between Traditional Authorities and the 
Public Land Bureaucracy for the former to collectively agree and recognize the 
creation of public land from customary interests? Generally, apart from being citizens 
of the state, one finds no institutional obligations within the public land bureaucracy 
that compels customary land owners to surrender their customary interests in land to 
government. In overall, the institutional obligations articulated by the public land 
bureaucracy “relates to rent collection, rent reviews, consents, redevelopment, 
surrender and renewals and environmental enforcement including cleanliness of 
premises and drains, repairs, nuisance to adjoining premises, compliance with 
planning regulation, waste disposal and occupancy ratio” (Somevi 2001:6).  
 
Within the discourse of compulsory land acquisition, Government is simultaneously 
positioned as the modern state maker bringing economic development to citizens; as 
the regulator of land acquisition within the state through its public land bureaucracy; 
as the promoter of capitalist interests; and finally as a collective political actor having 
the welfare of the poor or the public at heart. The public land bureaucracy is also 
aligned as a player, referee, and lineman in the discursive game of compulsory land 
acquisition by government. Institutional obligations and procedural matters demanded 
by customary land institutions are not the primary concerns of the public land 
bureaucracy. Government does not fulfil any customary obligations in the 
deconstruction of customary land ownership apart from formalizing its factual 
institutional creation in line with the requirement of compulsory land title registration.  
 
6.2.3 THE POSITION OF LAND TENANTS: USUFRUCTUALISM AND 
PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL DISLOCATIONS 
 
Constructing the discourses of the land tenant over land ownership and its acquisition 
has been quiet problematic for scholars due to the dynamism of customary land law as 
well as the contentious politics of land ownership between the modern state and the 
traditional state. Article 20 (2a) of the 1992 Constitution makes provision for “the 
prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation” by the state to affected land 
tenants. Payment of compensation is done through the public land bureaucracy. The 
Land Valuation Board takes up the responsibility of ensuring the payment of 
compensation to affected property owners.  
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Where the state fails to honour this obligation, again the Constitution provides “a right 
of access to the High Court by any person who has an interest in or right over the 
property whether direct or on appeal from other authority, for the determination of his 
interest or right and the amount of compensation to which he is entitled” (Ghana, 
1992 Constitution, 20 (2b)). Moreover, Article 20 (3) of the Constitution states that 
“Where a compulsory acquisition or possession of land is effected by the State … 
involves displacement of any inhabitants; the State shall resettle the displaced 
inhabitants on suitable alternative land with due regard for their economic well-being 
and social and cultural values”. Constitutional democratic governance, if it works, 
might fortify the property of the land tenant against threats posed by traditional 
institutions under customary tenure. 
 
However, one should also not forget that the land tenant is both a citizen of the state 
and a subject of a traditional authority. Both rival institutions articulate contradictory 
positions about their political subject in discourses of land ownership. The position of 
the land tenant is historically contingent on the politically subjective definitions of 
public law and customary law. Customary law is subject to varied interpretations 
depending on location, ethnic orientations, and strength of other actors with conflict 
of interests. The position of the land tenant in a discourse of compulsory land 
acquisition may therefore be explicitly undefined when one goes beyond the payment 
of compensation. The land tenant may support any discursive actor who helps him to 
fulfil his economic lack. 
 
Unlike compulsory land acquisition, within the discourse of customary land 
acquisition, the farmer loses control and eventually possession of his farmland when 
traditional authorities lease out the land to developers (Hammond 2005, Kasanga and 
Kotey 2001). Does the farmer demand compensation for his crops from the traditional 
authority who has leased out his farmland or from the land developer? While the issue 
of compensation is not contentious under compulsory acquisition of land by the state, 
it is less clear under the discourse of customary land acquisition.  
 
The question at this point is whether the land tenant would identify with government 
political deconstruction of the discourse of customary land ownership against his 
immediate traditional authority for his economic benefit. Or the land tenant would 
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weld the discourse of customary land ownership to protect his interest against the 
vagaries or uncertainties of “fair and adequate compensation”. Even more crucial is 
the fact that the land tenant does not have a political agency of his own to effectively 
articulate his discourse of compensation. He may therefore be easily captured as a 
political subject of his immediate traditional authorities or the coercive arms of the 
modern state during moments of contentious land politics.  
 
The organization of farmers associations in Ghana has been orchestrated by 
exogenous political forces like political parties to gain political capital during 
campaigns for multi-party elections; rather than the endogenous development of such 
organizational networks by land tenants themselves to articulate their interests. Such 
mushroom associations are also formed by political opportunists in moments of 
institutional dislocations from events like military coups to garner widespread support 
for legitimizing undemocratic authority (Oquaye 2004). Historical experiences of the 
land tenant gained from previous discursive interactions with government and 
traditional authorities might prove decisive in determining his identity and political 
subjectivity within the structuration of the recurrent discourse of land acquisition. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, government, traditional authorities, and land tenants all have different 
discursive positions on land ownership and acquisition. The political challenge for the 
public land bureaucracy is how to weld together these conflicting discursive positions 
within the land economy into a homogenous institutional discourse to strengthen its 
political competence in mediating conflict of interests among the three actors for 
collective action. In the end, whether the land bureaucracy will have any effect on 
collective action among these rational actors will be determined by the nature of its 
institutional obligations with the discursive actors. Institutions survive not because 
they perform some important functions but because of the power status-functions 
collectively imposed on them and recognized by relevant autonomous rational actors. 
 
Without institutional obligations, trust and goodwill cannot be assumed to 
automatically exist among discursive actors who have conflict of interests in a 
discursive object or issue. It is interesting that the positions of Government, 
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Traditional Authorities, and land tenants, in one way or the other legally counts 
towards land acquisition under the 1992 constitution. Their collective agreement and 
action is therefore imperative for the construction of an institutional fact of land 
acquisition within the democratic state. Now it is time to look at the two empirical 
cases of land acquisition to see how the positions of government, traditional 
authorities, and land tenants were articulated and mediated within the institutional 
parameters of the public land bureaucracy for collective action over land acquisition.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7.0  GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITION IN FUMESUA 
 
The chapter narrates the case of government land acquisition in Fumesua where after 
years of social interaction with traditional authorities and land tenants, Government 
failed to gain access to land to implement the inland port project. The narrative lays 
out the socio-political dynamics of the discourse of public land acquisition that took 
place among the actors.  
 
The central objective of the case study narrative is to examine the institutional 
capacity and competence of the public land bureaucracy in mediating conflict of 
interest in public land acquisition to secure collective action among the actors. The 
discourse theoretical narrative is informed by the conceptual assumptions from the 
Rational Institutional Political Theory. 
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7.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCURSIVE LAND IN FUMESUA 
 
 
SIZE OF LAND 230 Acres 
 
 
OWNERSHIP 
Claimed by Government as Public Land acquired in 1964 through 
state legal instruments of compulsory land acquisition (Lands Act 
123, 1960). Moreover, Article 260 of the 1992 Constitution 
obliges government to renegotiate compulsorily acquired lands 
with their original owners if government intends to use the land 
for a different purpose other than the purpose for which the land 
was compulsorily acquired.  
 
The claim of public ownership was contested by traditional 
authorities from whom the state had compulsorily acquired the 
land. Traditional Authorities claimed that compensation for the 
land had not been paid. On Customary tenure, ownership of 
portions of the land was the subject of litigation among about four 
communities.  
 
OCCUPANCY Partly inhabited by subjects in the local communities.  Thus, part 
of the land had already been leased out to developers by 
traditional authorities.  
 
SUITABILITY 
FOR THE 
PROJECT 
Described by surveyors and architects as very suitable in terms of 
geographical composition. Moreover, it had comparative 
advantage over the other identified lands in Boankra in terms of 
infrastructural development such as water, electricity, telephone 
facilities. In terms of transportation network it lay at the 
intersection of the rail network that links the region with the rest 
of the country. Land was closer to the commercial capital, 
Kumasi, than the land in Boankra. 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork data, 2006. 
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7.3 PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION FOR THE INLAND PORT PROJECT: 
AFFIRMING STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER LAND OWNERSHIP 
It was natural for government to look for land within its public land resources to use 
for the inland port project. The Ghana Shippers Council identified suitable unused 
public land in Fumesua. The vast stretch of land, measuring about 1530 acres, had 
been compulsorily acquired by the state in 1964 for the construction of a scientific 
village under the management of the Council for Scientific and Institutional Research 
(CSIR). Gaining access to a portion of the vast public land was considered a matter of 
formality between the CSIR and the GSC with the consent and concurrence of the 
public land organizations.  
  
Following ministerial discussions between the Ministry of Road and Transport 
(having ministerial responsibility over the GSC) and the Ministry of Environment, 
Science and Technology (also having ministerial responsibility over the CSIR), 230 
acres of land was transferred to the GSC. Government, acting through the Ghana Free 
Zones Board (GFZB), declared the land a Free Zone area. Within a Free Zone area, all 
imports for trade, production, and construction activities are exempt from direct and 
indirect taxes and duties.  
 
Under huge political razzmatazz, a sod-cutting ceremony was organized by the GSC 
and the Ministry of Trade and Transport on the transferred land for the 
commencement of the project. Recounting the events of the ceremony, a Member of 
Parliament (MP) had observed, “most of the Members of Parliament, especially those 
from Ashanti at the time of this sod-cutting, were all invited to the ceremony and we 
all saw the fanfare, the expectations were high, Ashanti Members of Parliament were 
in full regalia, everybody was there”9.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Parliament Debates Official Report, Fourth Series. Vol. 23. No 7. p.400  
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Picture 1: The Acquisition of Public Land in Fumesua 
 
(Some Members of Parliament, political elites, the capital investors, and traditional 
authorities taking part in the ceremony to plant some trees on the land to signify the 
acquisition of land. Source: GSC, Kumasi Branch) 
7.4 OVERRIDING SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS WITH ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL DETERMINIATION 
In the process of clearing the land, a scientific research that was being conducted on a 
portion of the land for three decades by the Building and Roads Research Institute 
(BRRI) was destroyed. The BRRI is a branch of the CSIR that conducts research into 
the damages caused by termites. The issue of the damage was raised on the floor of 
Ghana’s National parliament by the Chairman of the Committee on Environment, 
Science and Technology. The Member of Parliament (MP) for the Fumesua area who 
had brought to the attention of the House problems of land acquisition being faced by 
the GSC responded:  
“…we must be able to compare the relative cost or advantages to any particular 
place. I say so because this termite menace he is talking about is true. The point is, 
what is the economic advantage of the termites as opposed to the economic advantage 
of the inland port? The termites which he is talking about- we have told BRRI to go to 
another place and cultivate the termites. Who cares about the termites? People are 
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hungry for work to do. Economic interest must override the scientific interest he is 
talking about. What have they created ever since? After all, Mr. Speaker, BRRI is not 
paying any ground rent”.  
After a series of press warfare between the GSC and the CSIR, the matter was 
resolved by the concerned government ministries for the project to continue. The 
construction firms moved their moved their machinery to the project land and cleared 
the bushy land. Searle (1995) notes that one way to create an institutional fact is to act 
as if it exists and if one is lucky to secure collective agreement from the relevant 
actors then one can get away with it. In this case however, the institutional creators 
were unlucky to get away with their creation as the public ownership of the land was 
to be legally and violently challenged by local communities. Contentious discourse 
over the land had just begun. Its unsettled history of public land acquisition soon 
caught up with Government present economic interest. The problem of public land 
acquisition for the inland port project was far from over.  
Contributing to the parliamentary debates on the problems faced in the acquisition of 
land for the project, another Member of Parliament commented:  
“What was budgeted for is going to increase because of the delay. After all, I think 
the problems of encroachment and land acquisition have been dealt with. I do not 
know what is still delaying the project. Since the Minister is here, probably he will 
throw more light on it because I do not see much work going on at all and we all took 
part in the tree planting. The trees are grown, no buildings are yet in place. I do not 
know when we are going to start actual full work because the preparatory work has 
been done”.   
The narrative now turns to the problems of public land acquisition encountered by 
Government over the discursive land in Fumesua.  
7.5 OPPOSITION FROM TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO 
GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITION 
The discursive public land, however, had an unsettled history of acquisition. The 1530 
acres of vast land compulsorily acquired by the state belong to about six 
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predominantly farming communities (Fumesua, Aperade, Mesewam, Parkoso, 
Kyerekrom, and Kokobra). Traditional authorities of the affected villages described 
by a Member of Parliament as “the real land owners” challenged government’s 
discourse of public land acquisition. As is the case with government deconstruction of 
customary land ownership in the process of public land acquisition, compensation for 
the land was not paid to the customary land owners.  
A Member of Parliament pointed out to his colleagues on the floor of Parliament, “We 
know for a fact that compensation has, as we speak, not been paid to the owners of 
certain parcels of the land and this has contributed to the encroachment that we 
see…if compensation is not paid for land acquired then it becomes difficult to stop the 
real owners from encroaching or putting the land into some other use”. Moreover, 
the affected communities had not been resettled as required by the law on public land 
acquisition. The transfer of public land from its original use purpose to a new purpose 
also implies that Government had renegotiated the terms of the acquisition of the land 
with the original land owners as constitutionally obliged. This was however not done 
by Government.  
Moreover, crops compensation had not paid to some of the affected farmers. Other 
farmers had also rejected the compensation paid to them as “grossly inadequate” 
(Antwi 2000:44). Theoretically, the rational institutional political theory requires 
collective agreement and recognition by these land tenants over public land 
acquisition for successful transfer of the same land to third parties. The compulsory 
acquisition of the land had rendered many farmers landless and also disrupted their 
economic livelihood. Some of the landless land tenants had now turned to the CSIR 
for low skilled employment and others had deserted their affected locality for better 
opportunities in the urban areas (Antwi 2000).  
Due to the problem of landlessness that was facing the affected communities, the 
Aperade community which was directly situated within the publicly acquired land, 
had renegotiated with the CSIR for the release of some portion of the vast land for 
farming purposes. The CSIR had in principle formally agreed to their request and 
documentation was being prepared to that effect. Therefore land tenants and their 
traditional authorities were at an advanced stage of negotiations with the CSIR when 
government also re-entered the land for its inland port project.   
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7.6 HETEROGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, VIOLENT 
DISCOURSES AND BUREAUCRATIC COMPETENCE  
From the onset GSC entered an environment where traditional authorities were 
already hostile to government. Even sod-cutting ceremony had been supported by 
heavy police and military presence. The re-creation of public land in Fumesua was 
through the state’s organizational machinery of violence. While the discursive land 
was statutorily a public land, traditional rulers in the local communities did not agree 
with such government discourse nor recognized the moment of public land acquisition 
completed in 1972 by the military government of General Acheampong. According to 
the contentious discourse that was articulated by Traditional Authorities over the land, 
the process of public land acquisition had not been completed by Government. They 
were demanding the payment of compensation for the land.  
Moreover, traditional authorities articulated the discourse of the constitutional 
provisions that obliges Government to renegotiate and fulfil traditional obligations for 
customary land acquisition when the state no more finds use for the original purpose 
for which land had been publicly acquired. Finding such legal support for their 
opposition to government land transfer, traditional rulers in the affected communities 
continued to encroach on the land and leased out plots of the land to interested agents. 
People who had been allocated portions of the discursive land by traditional 
authorities started building houses on it. Within a fortnight, many new houses had 
sprung up on the discursive land. A survey conducted by the Ghana Shippers Council 
in 1996 showed only 13 buildings at various stages of development. By November 
1998, the number of houses had increased to 139.10. Therefore the buildings were 
considered illegal structures by government. This group of property owners were also 
not going to sit down unconcerned for their ‘illegal’ properties to be demolished as 
would not receive any compensation. 
With such heterogeneous institutional values over land ownership and contentious 
discourses of land claims that were articulated by government and the affected local 
communities, the competence of the public land bureaucracy in mediating conflicts of 
interest in land to facilitate public land acquisition was brought to the fore. The Lands 
                                                 
10 Parliamentary Debates, p. 398 
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Commission was called in to resolve the conflict. If the success of the Lands 
Commission in land conflict resolution depends on perceptions of contending actors 
about its neutrality (Yeboah 2005), then the position of the Lands Commission as an 
organizational instrument used by the state for the compulsory acquisition of the 
discursive land compromised its neutrality. Notwithstanding its rich panel of co-opted 
members from traditional institutions, legal bodies, surveyors, planners, and farmers 
and fishermen associations, the Lands Commission was described by the GSC as 
“useless” in resolving the contentious discourses over the land. 
The failure of the Lands Commission to successfully mediate the contentious 
discursive interests over the land also signalled the Ghana Shippers Council to look 
elsewhere for support in gaining access to the land. The Ghana Shippers Council tried 
to seek support from local citizens in the affected communities by projecting itself to 
the communities as an economic developer that seeks to offer employment to the 
many landless local residents. In Aperade, the Ghana Shippers Council also attempted 
to dislocate the support base of traditional authorities. They articulated a discourse to 
the effect that the traditional authorities had travelled to the United States and 
elsewhere outside the country and sold portions of the land prospective land 
developers. Local residents were urged not support their traditional authorities 
because the latter’s opposition to the project was informed by personal 
aggrandisement rather than seeking the collective interest of the community.  
The campaign by the GSC to gain local support failed. Rather, as recounted by an 
official of the GSC, ‘traditional authorities in Aperade led their subjects who were 
armed with cutlasses, clubs, and other dangerous weapons; and chanting traditional 
war songs, to chase out government officials and construction workers from the land’. 
In the opinion of the interviewed official, the people supported their traditional 
authorities because their rulers had been misinformed them about their true intentions 
for opposing the project. The institution of customary land ownership as earlier 
discussed is founded on a discourse of cultural rituals in which traditional authorities 
hold land in trust for the dead, the living, and the unborn. It is rational for traditional 
authorities to chant traditional war songs amidst the beating of war drums to mobilize 
the support of their subjects against dangerous situations that threatened the 
ownership of their customary land, their traditional positions, and political power. 
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Having failed to gain local support, Government now tried to use coercion and 
legalized aggression to gain access to the land. Every public institution that mattered 
was called in. The Kumasi Regional Coordinating Council, the Police Administration, 
and Military officers were used to intimidate the traditional authorities in Aperade to 
agree to the acquisition of land by government. When viewed from the military 
background of the government, the coercive approach was not surprising. The 
approach to land acquisition is however not different from the institutional character 
of the state as a collective organizational actor with monopoly over violence within its 
discursive boundaries. From the theoretical perspective of the study, coercion and 
violence does not reinforce collective action among rational autonomous actors.  
Within the national legislature, Parliamentarians were also divided over government’s 
coercive approach to gain access to the land. On one side of the debate were those 
who advocated for the use of the state’s institutions of violence to force out 
encroachers by demolishing the building structures on the land because “None of 
these developers have been issued with a building permit”. Other members disagreed 
and dissociated themselves from any violent government action. Of this group who 
oppose the use of violence by government, a member stated that the employment of 
organized violence was the approach used by the Lands Commission to force out 
developers who had encroached on land that had been acquired by government to 
protect water resources in the same region. However, he further pointed out, “we are 
all aware of the difficulties in mobilising money for development in the country; and 
indeed, it is not comfortable news to hear that a building that costs about 200 million 
gets demolished within a twinkle of an eye”. Another Parliamentarian pleaded that 
“the proper thing is done” by government and compensation should be paid for the 
land as a way to secure collective agreement from “the real owners” of the land. 
Members of the legislature could therefore not agree on the way forward to 
government acquisition of the land. 
Meanwhile, traditional authorities in Aperade, with the support of some local 
politicians who had political links to the central government, also tried to gain support 
within government circles. They petitioned the office of the President of the Republic 
and succeeded in getting the Office to summon officials of the GSC to a meeting at 
the colonial castle to deliberate over the issue. At the Castle meeting, the discourse of 
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national economic development prevailed over private land claims; and the traditional 
authorities were castigated as saboteurs of state economic development. If anything at 
all, “Seen from the top down, trust networks receiving protection from patrons escape 
from the ruler’s repression, but gain relatively little toleration and even less 
facilitation from rulers” (Tilly 2005:111).  
The aftermath of the meeting did not reduce the violent confrontations between 
Government and local communities. On the one hand, Government continued to rely 
on its concentrated institutions of violence to intimidate traditional authorities. The 
Aperade community, on the other hand, violently attacked and ransacked the 
construction machinery and equipment on the land. Government was therefore forced 
modify its position and renegotiate the public acquisition of the land with the local 
communities that claimed customary interest in the discursive land. 
7.7 MODIFYING THE DISCOURSE OF PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION: ENCOUNTERING INSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS OF CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
  
Government now showed political will to fulfil the customary and constitutional 
obligations relating to the issues of crop compensation, land compensation, and 
resettlement of affected communities for the important project to go ahead. As events 
unfolded, these issues were not the only problems that hampered access to the land. 
More historically embedded problems of land ownership added to the obstacles of 
land acquisition. Some of the local communities were locked-in over a dispute of the 
ownership of portions of the land. The historical complexity of the litigation over 
ownership of the land is captured by Hammond (2005) in the following narrative 
based on interviews with traditional authorities in Fumesua; 
 
“The disputed land is one that the people of Kokobra purport to have granted to an 
expatriate who some years ago required it for an investment project, which project 
was later abandoned. Their claim is based on a layout (plan) of the parcel of land 
that had been prepared by the expatriate when the land was acquired. There is 
however no evidence of this grant having been recorded. The people of Fumesua are 
also claiming the land as their stool land. Without any documentary proof tracing the 
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root of title to the land, it remains a daunting task finding an amicable solution to this 
dispute. Inter-marriages and migration amongst the two communities have further 
made it difficult to depend on historical account to determine the true owner of the 
land.  
 
In a related boundary dispute, the Fumesua stool is battling a neighbouring village, 
Bebre, over grants being made by the chief of Bebre, as building plots, to prospective 
developers. The disputed land in this case is part of the land that was acquired by 
government for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), but due to 
compensation problems the land is yet to be developed and now is being encroached 
upon. The case went to the Asantehene who delegated the Asokorehene (a sub-chief) 
to mediate, but this has not been resolved. The youth of Fumesua have on a number of 
occasions been restrained by the chief and elders of the town from taking the law into 
their own hands to attack and drive away the ‘encroachers”.11 
 
For centuries, the boundaries had proven elusive. In the midst of the land ownership 
crises, Government could not rationally negotiate with any of the claimant to the land. 
As officials of the GSC pointed out, whichever claimant came forward for 
negotiations over the land, another claimant emerged from nowhere to serve notice 
that they were also waiting at the end of the tunnel to continue the fight. The genuine 
land owners could therefore not be determined by the GSC for negotiations over the 
land. Meanwhile, local villages and families continued to fight over the land.  
 
The sitting of the inland port project on the land was the fuel that re-ignited the dried 
woods of conflict between the local communities. Government’s readiness to 
renegotiate the acquisition of the land with traditional authorities encouraged the 
communities to redraw the frontiers of their claims in readiness for battle with each 
other. Government was now no more the opponent and this new development was to 
change the discourse of the interaction. Each traditional authority now sought to 
present itself to government as the genuine customary owner of the land as well as the 
legitimate representative of local interests in the affected community. In a legal notice 
                                                 
11 Hammond’s interview report was corroborated by the Deputy Director of the Regional Lands 
Commission in Ashanti region through a personal interview.   
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served by traditional authorities in Fumesua to another claimant they positioned 
themselves as follows: 
 
“About 5 years ago, our client, in exercise of his right as Caretaker, made a grant of 
the land and other Golden Stool lands in his possession, to the Ghana Shippers 
Council for development as an Inland Port. Before the grant, however, our client 
assured the Ohu Family and other families who farm on the land that he would pay 
their share of the compensation he was expecting from the Council. Due to some 
unpleasant developments for which the Council cannot be held responsible, the 
project has not yet taken off and the compensation has therefore not been paid. But 
our client is committed to pay the families the compensation due them as soon as it is 
paid by the Council. 
 
The project will be of immense benefit to the Fumesua community in particular and 
Asanteman and Ghana in General. It is therefore the duty of every member of the 
Community to assist the Council to make the project a success.  
 
Unfortunately the Ohu Family does not appreciate this. The demands made by 
Messrs. Ankamah & Associates, Legal Practitioners, Accra, for and on behalf of one 
Madam Amma Atta of the Ohu Family, and the deman made by your client, Nana Yaw 
Boateng, a Kumasi Chief who, for obvious reasons12, has described the land as 
“Dadiesoaba/Ohu Stool Land” amply support this view. Our client hereby states 
clearly and categorically that the land is Golden Stool Land attached to the Fumesua 
Stool, and he is the Caretaker of the land for the Golden Stool. He is therefore the 
person competent to claim compensation from the Council. He has already submitted 
the claim.  
 
Our client however re-iterates his commitment to pay the families whose farming 
rights have been affected by the grant the part of the compensation due to them as 
soon as it is paid by the Council.  
 
                                                 
12 The underlined words are from source and not the making of the author 
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Your client should therefore direct all enquiries regarding the compensation to our 
client and not repeat not to the Council. 
 
From the above discursive position of the Traditional Authorities in Fumesua, one 
could see that even the Fumesua village alone was fighting on more than one 
battlefront with other claimants to the same piece of land. Alliances between some of 
the claimants had also been formed to strengthen their claims of customary interest in 
the discursive land. Traditional authorities in Fumesua also considered it rational to 
urge their subjects to support Government land acquisition. Moreover, the interests of 
the affected land tenants were welded by their traditional authorities to forestall any 
heterogeneous claims that might delay the negotiation. Other local communities like 
Aperade and illegal property owners did not change their opposition to the land 
acquisition process.  
 
7.8 DECENTERING THE DISCURSIVE STRUCTURE FROM PUBLIC 
LAND BUREACRACY TO TRADITIONAL LAND INSTITUTIONS 
 
Government found its public land bureaucracy “useless” in the modified discourse of 
land acquisition that excluded the use of organized violence. Government compulsory 
acquisition of the land had been imposed on already existing unresolved historical 
conflicts that had now gained deeper roots. Public land bureaucratic officials lacked 
the competence to identify the genuine land owners and the farmers from the many 
claimants that demanded a place at the negotiation table. Government therefore turned 
to the highest level of traditional authorities to use their time tested land institutions to 
mediate the conflict over the customary ownership of the land for successful 
Government land acquisition. 
 
The Kumasi Traditional Council under whose jurisdiction the discursive land had its 
allodial title rooted accepted the challenge to resolve the conflicts over the customary 
interests in the land. The Council proceeded to systematically resolve the conflicts. 
The Asantehene’s land court began with the resolution of the land conflict between 
Traditional authorities in Fumesua and Bebre/Wurakese. Traditional authorities in 
Bebre/Wurakese produced two witnesses and tendered three documents (a court 
judgement on a case between Nana Fumesuahene and Madam Yaa Ohu, writ of 
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summons and a declaration of title to the disputed land, a part scheme of Fumesua, 
Bebre, and Anwomaso) in support of their land claims. Traditional authorities in 
Fumesua also produced three witnesses including a retired surveyor, plus documents 
(Lease signed by Otumfuo Opoku Ware II, a part scheme of Fumesua, Bebre and 
Anwomaso, and a drawing indicating the Fumesua railway station).  
 
On 6th May 2000 the land conflict resolution committee concluded: “From the 
forgoing facts, the committee is of unanimous opinion that all the disputed land areas 
fall within Wurakese Stool land”. This unanimous ruling by the Asantehene’s land 
court had failed to lay the matter to rest as the guilty party refused to accept the initial 
outcome. Two different committees had to be commissioned consecutively by the 
Asantehene “to go into the case and come out with correct decision”. The 
Asantehene’s Land Review Committee had to carefully analyze more fresh historical 
evidence, documents from the public land organizations, and other legal rulings from 
the statutory courts for Nananom (Chiefs from eleven royal clans presents at the last 
hearing) to authoritatively pronounce the Fumesuahene liable, and entered judgement 
in favour of Bebre/Wurakese Traditional authorities on 1st April 2004.   
 
The Asantehene concluded the judgement on the land conflict with the following 
words: “It is Nananom who are assisting me in connection with land cases of this 
nature. If I appoint a Committee to deal with land matter, there may not be the 
absolute truth. …. As such once the two Committees have reported that the land 
belongs to Wurakesehene I will not dispute about that”. Traditional institutional 
sanctions were authoritatively imposed by the conflict resolution committees on the 
guilty party as their traditional custom obliges them.  
 
7.9 HOW THE GREAT HOPES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WERE 
DASHED BY TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 
  
Resolving all the historical land disputes between the communities that claimed 
ownership of portions of the project land was not going to take a day’s miracle. 
Unwritten records, oral accounts of transfers of ownership, the creation and recreation 
of false historical accounts by some of the parties, and unclear boundary demarcations 
had proven contradictory and retarded the speedy resolution of the dispute. As fresh 
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historical evidence were being produced by each party in every sitting of the council, 
which had required reviews by a different review committees, it became difficult to 
speedily resolve the disputes. 
 
The Fumesua-Bebre/Wurakese land conflict was just one of the many contentious 
discourses of customary conflict of interests in the land. If it had taken about four 
years to resolve this single conflict then only God knows how long it was going to 
take for the others to be amicably and authoritatively resolved. Notwithstanding, the 
positive assurances given by the Ministry of Road and Transport, concerned MPs, 
government officials, and the Ashanti Traditional Council to appropriately resolve all 
the problems of customary land tenure that hampered government land acquisition, 
the Aperade village succeeded in bringing the entire project to a complete halt.  
 
For some unexplained reasons, long before the Asantehene’s Lands Court had 
finished the resolution of the Fumesua-Bebre/Wurakese conflict; traditional 
authorities of the village took the matter to the Kumasi High Court which placed an 
injunction on further development of the land until the judicial resolution of the 
matter. Perhaps the slow nature of the conflict resolution process informed the 
traditional authorities to secure their interests. Attempts by Government to by-pass the 
litigating villages and gain access to the land through the higher offices of Golden 
Stool might also have forced the Aperade village to likewise by-pass their traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms to seek inslutionist devices provided by the judiciary 
arm of the state under the 1992 Constitution.   
 
After seven years of protracted confrontations between the government, the GSC, and 
numerous claimants to the identified land in Fumesua; the great hopes of capital 
investment, employment generation, and accelerated economic development; held by 
political elites, local and foreign investors, and unemployed youth were dashed. Once 
again, the institutional capacity and competence of the state in facilitating access to 
land for investors had been called into question. If anything at all the public land 
bureaucracy, particularly the Lands Commission, that tried to resolve the conflict, 
were seen by traditional authorities and their subjects as partners in crime to 
government’s compulsory acquisition of their land.  
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7.10 RELOCATION OF THE INLAND PORT PROJECT TO BOANKRA 
  
The Government of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) could not gain access 
to land to carry out the inland port project before losing political power to the 
opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the 2000 multi-party general elections. 
Coincidentally, the new Government had its widest support base in the Ashanti 
region. Having newly emerged from a democratic process with its linchpin in the rule 
of law, the use of violence as a mechanism to acquire land in its regional stronghold 
might have become unattractive to the new Government. In July 2001, Government 
relocated the inland port project to Boankra, the second preferred area where suitable 
land had been identified. A new process of land acquisition was therefore started.  
 
7.11 CONCLUSION 
 
From the above case study narrative, it appears that the competence of the public land 
bureaucracy to facilitating access to land for government is structured on institutions 
of violence. The public land bureaucracy does not reflect a rational collective 
institutional actor. Institutional obligations demanded by traditional authorities for 
their collective agreement and recognition of land acquisition felled outside the scope 
of the public land bureaucracy. The public land bureaucracy also found it difficult to 
fulfil the payment of compensation to land tenants who were affected by the 
compulsory acquisition of their land, as constitutionally obliged. It therefore became 
impossible for the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interest in public 
land acquisition and secure collective agreement among Government, Traditional 
Authorities, and Land Tenants for their collective action on land acquisition.  
 
It also emerged from the narrative that in an environment of public land acquisition 
devoid of the support of the organized violent institutions of the state, land acquisition 
suffers from problems engendered by the nature of customary land ownership.  
Interestingly, where government decided to renegotiate with traditional authorities 
over their customary interests in the discursive land, problems inherent in customary 
land tenure such as unclear definition of land boundaries lead to conflicts among 
traditional authorities and among families which made public acquisition of the land 
almost impossible.  
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Traditional authorities who possessed the political competence to mediate in the 
conflict over the customary interests were also not well equipped with the technical 
expertise and capacity to speedily resolve the conflict. Traditional institutions 
depended on the public land bureaucracy for technical information and expertise. 
Ironically, traditional land institutions and the public land bureaucracy functioned on 
the north and south poles with little collaboration.  
 
An Ashanti proverb says ‘If nakedness tells you that he will give you cloth, listen to 
his name’. If government could not use its own land institutions to facilitate access to 
land for a project of immense economic importance, where is the reason to believe 
that the public land bureaucracy possesses the capacity and competence to facilitate 
access to public land for private capital investors? The case study narrative now 
follows the inland port project to its relocated abode in Boankra to see how 
government was able to acquire land and finally brought the project into 
developmental reality. The central focus of the narrative remains on the institutional 
capacity and competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of 
interests among government, traditional authorities, and land tenants for their 
collective agreement and action over government land acquisition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
CHAPTER 8 
 
8.0  GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITION IN BOANKRA 
 
The chapter follows the same narrative procedure as in the previous chapter. The 
chapter narrates the discourse of land acquisition that followed the relocation of the 
inland port project to Boankra where Government was able to gain access to land. The 
socio-political dynamics of the discourse of customary land acquisition that resulted 
in the acquisition of land is laid out.  
 
The central objective of this second case study narrative remains on capacity and 
competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interest in land 
acquisition for government. This time, the discursive land is a customary owned 
rather than compulsorily acquired public land. The implications, problems, and 
discursive outcomes are pursued in the narrative below. 
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8.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCURSIVE LAND IN BOANKRA 
  
SIZE OF LAND 400 Acres 
OWNERSHIP The land was Customarily owned by the Ejisu Traditional 
Council headed by the Omanhene of Ejisu Traditional Area. 
However, because the usufructuary right of the land falls 
under the Boankra Stool the consent and concurrence of the 
Ejisu Traditional Council together with representatives of 
the Elders/Counsellors and People of Boankra Stool is 
required; according to customary law and to the custom and 
usage of the Ejisu Traditional Area, before the land could be 
legally leased to government.  
OCCUPANCY The land was in used by tenant farmers under usufructuary 
rights, and therefore legally entitled to compensation for the 
destruction of affected crops in the event of disposition of 
the land to government. 
SUITABILITY FOR 
THE PROJECT 
Only 60% of the land was suitable for development due to 
steep gradients. It was estimated that the development costs 
of the site will be relatively high.  
 
Moreover, there was absence of water supply. Extending a 
15 km pipeline from the Ghana Water Company (GWCL) to 
the site was deemed to threaten the commercial viability of 
the project.  
 
The state of the rail infrastructure was also described to be in 
a poor condition and needs rehabilitation in order to become 
a serious alternative to road connection.  The project site 
was a distance of 30 km to Kumasi. In totality, the land had 
less comparative advantage than that of Fumesua. 
 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2006.  
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8.3 CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISITION FOR THE INLAND PORT 
PROJECT: AFFIRMING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TRADITIONAL 
AUTHORITIES OVER LAND  
Government’s relocation of the inland port project to the new location in Boankra 
gave the project a new discursive identity as the Boankra Inland Port. Government’s 
decision to acquire customary land in Boankra significantly decentred the discursive 
institutional structure for land acquisition from the public land bureaucracy to 
customary land institutions. The overlord of the new discursive institutional structure 
was no more government but traditional authorities.  
The law of compulsory state land acquisition was this time not invoked by 
Government, although it still lurked around as a possible threat to the customary 
ownership of the land should the need arise. But given the bitter experience in 
Fumesua, it was unlikely that the new democratic Government, as a rational actor, 
would use it in the new discourse of land acquisition.  
The decentring of the discursive institutional structure for land acquisition now meant 
that the Lands Commission was not going to be used by Government to compulsorily 
acquire the land as public land. Government was therefore now required by traditional 
authorities to fulfil the institutional obligations for customary land acquisition to 
secure the collective agreement, recognition and action of chiefs and their subjects. 
This institutional dimension to the new discourse of land acquisition has several 
implications that will be discussed in the analysis of the problems of land acquisition. 
Traditional authorities in Boankra, land tenants farming on the land, and government 
collectively agreed that the Ejisumanhene is the legitimate customary owner of the 
allodial interest in the land. The collective agreement on the identity of the discursive 
land as customary land was significant in the sense that without collective agreement, 
collective intentionality, and collective recognition among the actors on the identity of 
the discursive object there could be no basis for further rational collective action as 
made clear in the theoretical discussion. The decentring of the discursive institutional 
structure could however not avoid existing traditional institutional problems within 
Boankra that raised its head to challenge successful land acquisition. 
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8.4 TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL DISLOCATIONS AND 
UNCERTAINTIES IN CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISITION 
The first problem that confronted government was a raging chieftaincy dispute that 
had resulted from the death of the Boankra chief (Boankrahene) leading to 
dislocations within the leadership structure of the chieftaincy institution that connects 
the Caretakers of the discursive land to the allodial title holder of the land, that is, the 
Ejisumanhene. The Boankra village had been without this sub-chief for over a decade. 
The enstoolment of a successor was the subject of dispute between different factions 
of the royal family.  
The traditional institutional dislocation is also confirmed in another study by Ubink 
(2005:9) who aptly summarized it as follows: “One of the rival factions of the royal 
family is supported by the Ejisumanhene- the paramount chief of the area- who 
enstooled the chief candidate of the faction as Boankrahene during a ceremony at the 
palace. This enstoolment was challenged by the queenmother and elders of Boankra at 
the regional House of Chiefs in Kumasi. The House of Chiefs decided in favour of the 
queenmother, stating that she was the one to choose a new chief”. Thus by 2002 when 
the GSC relocated the project to Boankra, there was no legally recognized Land 
Caretaker Chief to lead traditional authorities in Boankra to interact with Government 
in the discourse of acquisition.  
Because of the above institutional dislocation in Boankra, the GSC was served with 
legal notices from rival factions in the chieftaincy dispute to warn of the danger of 
dealing with any false claimant to the vacant traditional office. A legal notice served 
by one of the factions in Boankra read as follows: 
 
“We write to you as solicitors for Nana Abena Afriyie, Queen mother of Boankra and 
Opanin Kwabena Dapaah, Abusuapanin or Head of the Boankra Royal Family. 
 
Our instructions hold that a high powered delegation comprising a select group of top 
officers in charge of your Inland Port project in the Ashanti Region did approach our 
clients and their elders for a parcel of land (approximately 400 acres) for the all 
important inland port project and this was duly granted. 
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Our clients are aware of the seven year delay of the take-off of the project due to a 
protracted land litigation over the former site at Fumesua and it is the fervent prayer 
of our clients that NOTHING shall stall the take off of this all important project which 
the gods of their land had caused to be sited at Boankra to engender development and 
employment for the youth of Boankra. 
 
Our clients have however instructed us to warn you about the activities a NANA 
KWABENA DWUMA ABABIO who styles himself as the chief of Boankra and to point 
out to you that he is an imposter and that there is no chief of Boankra at the moment.  
 
The said imposter has never been nominated, selected or installed/enstooled by any of 
the accredited authorities of Boankra stool….Sir, you are therefore cautioned NOT to 
deal with this imposter in any way over the affairs of the project and the land. 
 
You are not to entertain any claims of compensation or any claims for anything in 
connection with the land with him. You are to deal only with our clients whom your 
officers approached for the release of the land”. 
 
It is interesting to note that the rival factions in Boankra had keenly followed all the 
brouhaha over land acquisition in Fumesua and were now in a position to use its ghost 
to hunt the GSC. How was the GSC to determine from the rival factions the genuine 
one to transact business with? This is a dilemma that also faces many capitalist agents 
in Ghanaian communities where there are chieftaincy disputes. The institutional crises 
also fall outside the legal institutional boundaries and competence of any of the 
organizations that make up the public land bureaucracy. If the acquisition of the land 
was to take place, then the crises needed to be resolved as quickly as possible. Like in 
Fumesua, Government once again relied on the concerned higher traditional 
authorities in the Ashanti Traditional State to mediate and resolve the dispute for 
collective action to take place over the acquisition of the land.  
 
The Asante Traditional Council stepped in as the higher traditional authority with the 
power to mediate in the conflict of interests over the traditional office and in the land. 
However, new discursive identities had to be constructed on the discursive frontiers to 
define the position of the Asante Traditional Council, the Ejisu Traditional Council, 
 108
and the divided front of traditional authority in Boankra to avoid the articulation of 
heterogeneous values and obligations.  
 
8.5 THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF NEW DISCURSIVE 
IDENTITIES TO OVERCOME COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS 
IN GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION OF CUSTOMARY LAND 
 
One should not forget that discourses are contingent on political relationships and 
historical constructions. It involved the exclusion of certain possibilities and the 
structuring of relationships between the actors involved in the discourses over the 
resolution of the conflict. The process of identity formation involved the drawing of 
traditional political frontiers in the exercise of authority over customary land 
ownership and management in Ashanti. The redefinition of traditional leverage 
structures of power and authority within the Asante Traditional State was to affect the 
successful acquisition of land in Boankra. 
 
The political construction of the relationship between the Ejisumanhene, who is the 
Paramount Chief of the Ejisu Traditional Area as well as President of the Ejisu 
Traditional Council; and the Asantehene, who is also the Paramount Chief of the 
Kumasi Traditional Area, President of the Kumasi Traditional Council, and President 
of the Asante Traditional Council, was not without problems. Interestingly, the 
discursive frontiers was contingent on the historical events at Ahyimu where the 
Ejisumanhene had regained his authority over land and subjects within his division; 
and the Asantehene had simultaneously lost his authority over land and subjects under 
paramount chiefs (MacCaskie 1984).   
 
The limited power of the Asantehene to resolve the crises can be extracted from the 
following words of a Lands Officer in the Asantehene Lands Secretariat, “Amanhene 
nsaase sem dee, Asantehene nni ho hwee ka”. Literally it is interpreted to mean that, 
‘In land matters under paramount chiefs, the Asantehene has no say in it’. And as 
emphasized by the rational institutional political theory, the outcome of discursive 
interactions among autonomous rational actors is reinforced by the experience gained 
by actors from previous interactions. 
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The Ejisu Traditional Council was keen to reassert its position as the traditional 
institution that possessed the authority to determine the outcome of the discourse over 
the resolution of the conflict and also the sharing of the financial proceeds from the 
lease of the land to Government. However, the Asantehene was also conscious of 
exerting his limited political power over his semi-autonomous divisional chief 
because the Asante Traditional Council was the highest decision making political 
institution within the Asante Traditional State and not the Ejisu Traditional Council. 
According to the interviewed Lands Officer in the Asantehene Lands Secretariat, “The 
Ejisumanhene thought that all the money should be given to him but the Asantehene 
disagreed and insisted that traditional institutional procedures should be followed”. 
The disagreement over the political construction of the relationship between the 
Ejisumanhene and the Asantehene impeded the speedy resolution of the chieftaincy 
dispute in Boankra for the customary acquisition of the discursive land.  
 
Government, the Ashanti Traditional Council, the Ejisu Traditional Council, and the 
rival factions in Boankra tentatively managed to collectively construct and assume 
new discursive identities first towards a satisfactory discourse of conflict resolution 
and second towards a satisfactory negotiation outcome. The rival factions who were 
fighting over the vacant office had to collectively assume a new identity as “the 
representatives of the Elders/Counsellors and People of Boankra Stool”. The new 
identity assumed by the rival factions enabled the negotiation parties to clearly define 
a homogenous discursive frontier for traditional authorities in Boankra in their 
position as Caretakers of the land within the discourse of customary land acquisition.  
 
The Ejisu Traditional Council maintained its political position as the allodial title 
owner of the discursive land. And the Asantehene assumed a defined position as “a 
CONFIRMING PARTY” to any collective agreement that would be reached 
between Government, the Ejisu Traditional Council, and the representatives of the 
Elders/Counsellors and People of Boankra Stool. Significantly, the Asantehene, in his 
capacity as the President of the Asante Traditional Council, was to manage the 
financial proceeds from the lease of the land pending the successful resolution of the 
chieftaincy conflict in Boankra. The discursive frontiers that were drawn limited the 
power of the Asantehene to authoritatively resolve the chieftaincy conflict because the 
case was under a paramount division over which his power was historically limited.  
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The above power struggle notwithstanding, the discursive actors collectively agreed 
as follows: “Owing to the pending Chieftaincy litigation in the Boankra Chiefdom 
area, and the urgent need to conclude the transaction relating to the grant of a 
portion of the Boankra Stool Land to the LESSEE herein (for development into an 
INLAND PORT) it has become desirable for the Ejisu Traditional Council acting 
through the Omanhene of the Ejisu Traditional Area (in which Boankra Stool falls) 
and on the directive of OTUMFUO OSEI TUTU 11, ASANTEHENE to stand in and 
act for itself and the Boankra in respect of the said grant”13.  An amount of 3.2 
billion cedis demanded by the Ejisumanhene as drink money for lease of about 400 
acres of customary land under the Boankra Stool was paid by government into an 
escrow account that was to be managed by the Asantehene.  
 
Although the power of the Asantehene to mediate in land affairs of other Paramount 
Chiefs under the Traditional Council was limited, his position as the overlord of the 
Asante Kingdom was highly instrumental in reaching the collective agreement 
between feuding factions, the Ejisumanhene, and the Government over the acquisition 
of the discursive land in Boankra. In the language of communicative rationality 
theorists, the provisional agreement that was reached is termed “modus Vivendi” 
(Erikson 1993). Modus Vivendi denote an expression of a provisional agreement that 
is partial and temporary, and one that is based upon the force of the better argument 
and not upon (bargaining) resources. These sorts of arrangements provide reasons for 
furthering discussions in other cases where the parties can reach agreements, and it 
also enhances tolerance and respect, making it possible to go on discussing disputed 
views on a higher level of understanding” (Erikson 1993:22). 
 
8.6 THE CONSTRUCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS WITH 
TRADITIONAL LAND INSTITUTIONS 
 
The collective agreement between Government, the Asante Traditional Council, the 
Ejisu Traditional Council, and “the representatives of the Elders/Counsellors and 
People of Boankra Stool”, first and foremost enabled them to create an institutional 
fact of land acquisition. Based on that institutional fact, they were then able to 
                                                 
13 The information is contained in the MoU prepared in the form of a lease document.  
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collectively impose further institutional obligations on themselves as reasons for 
future rational action. These higher institutional obligations were created within a land 
lease agreement among the discursive actors.  
 
Also significant was the fact that the collective agreement by the traditional 
authorities was not only binding on the present actors but “…where the context so 
admits or requires include its successors and assigns”. This confirms the cultural and 
religious definition of customary land in Ashanti as being owned by the present, the 
unborn, and the dead. Moreover, the traditional authorities agreed to “execute a 
Leasehold Agreement in respect of the demised premises in favour of the Lessee and 
at the latter’s expense”. It is important to observe that the decentring of the 
institutional structure for land acquisition from compulsory state land acquisition to 
customary land acquisition had now put government at the receiving end in the 
construction of higher institutional obligations. 
  
The traditional authorities granted “perfect assurance…according to customary law” 
for a 99 year lease of land to the GSC “commencing from 1st January, 2002 with an 
option of renewal for further term of Fifty (50) years and subject however to the 
payment of ground rents in every year which ground rent is subject to an upward 
review every three (3) years and subject further to the offer of customary drink and 
other terms herein contained in this Memorandum of Understanding”. Significantly, 
out of the 3.2 billion cedis demanded by traditional authorities to be paid by 
Government as customary drink money for the lease of the land, Government was 
only required to make an upfront payment of 2.240 billion whiles the remainder of the 
amount was invested by the Ejisu Traditional Council and the Elders/Counsellors and 
People of Boankra as their “capital/equity contribution to the business to be 
undertaken on the demised land by the LESSEE to wit; Inland Port”.  
The capital/equity contribution made by the traditional authorities in the inland port 
project entitled them “to receive from the Lessee One Percent (1%) of the annual 
gross profit of the Lessee’s business operations on the subject premises commencing 
from the third year from the date of this agreement and which business operations 
shall nevertheless commence not later than three (3) years from the date of this 
agreement”. Furthermore, the parties agreed that the 1% percentage benefit shall be 
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subject to review every two (2) years commencing from the sixth year from the date 
of the agreement.  
The GSC and the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA), representing 
Government, also agreed perform the following obligations on the demised land 
premises as its social responsibility to the Boankra Stool and its subjects: 
1. To construct, develop, and build for the benefit of the Lessor and its subjects 
during the first phase of the Lessee’s operations on the subject premises (that 
is to say within three (3) years after executing this agreement) a Junior 
Secondary School (J.S.S.) classroom block whose model and structural design 
shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties. 
2. To construct, develop and build for the benefit of the Lessor and its subjects 
during the second phase of the Lessee’s operations on the demised premises 
(that is to say within six (6) years after executing this agreement) a Senior 
Secondary School (S.S.S.) complex comprising but not limited to a two-storey 
classroom block with all the requisite modern facilities together with a school 
canteen. 
3. To afford a greater opportunity to be accorded the Lessor’s Stool’s subjects 
and citizens to be engaged by the Lessee to fill all vacancies of unskilled 
labour in job placements and establishments in the Lessee’s business 
operations on the subject premises. 
In any case, as at August 2006 when the fieldwork research for this study was 
completed in Ghana, the inland port had not yet been completed let alone starts its 
business operations. Certainly the question of enforcement of institutional obligations 
enters the discursive framework. After all, the feuding factions had not been able to 
resolve their differences and shift attention to their developmental needs. However, 
Government had built the J.S.S. classroom block for the Boankra people, which was 
in use at the time of the fieldwork data collection. The obligation to build the J.S.S 
classroom block should not be taken as an act of charity to a poor community. The 
previous J.S.S classroom block was directly situated on the 400 acre-land acquired for 
 113
the inland port and earmarked for demolition. The new J.S.S classroom block was 
therefore a replacement for the destruction of public property. 
Picture 2: School Building in Boankra affected by Customary Land Acquisition 
 
 Source: Author, June-August 2006) 
Below is a picture of the new J.S.S Classroom Block that was constructed for the 
Boankra community as dictated by the terms of the obligations imposed on 
Government by Traditional Authorities. 
Picture 3: New School building in Boankra built by Government 
 
(Source: Author, June-August 2006) 
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From the above picture one could see that the bold inscription ‘Ghana Shippers 
Council J.S.S’ embossed on the school building as if a school never existed in the 
Boankra community before the project arrived. In the politics of the discourse of 
government land acquisition, political elites try to use every opportunity to convince 
discursive opponents that Government is seriously committed to its developmental 
discourse in order to win political support fir itself in future discourses.  
Ubink (2005:11) had commented that “the Ejisumanhene -the paramount chief of 
Ejisu- favoured exactly those chiefs who alienated much stool land and shared the 
proceeds with him. The fact that this would usually not leave much revenue for 
community development seemed not to bother him”. The truth value of Ubink’s 
assertion partially seemed to hold in the drama that characterized the acquisition of 
land in Boankra, when the Ejisumanhene unsuccessfully tried to by-pass traditional 
institutional leverage structures to install his preferred sub-chief. What the 
Ejisumanhene might have forgotten is that the outcome of customary land transactions 
is path dependent on collective action between the allodial title holding chief and his 
land caretaker sub-chiefs. The re-investment of part of the financial proceeds from the 
disposition of the Boankra Stool Land however discredits Ubink’s opinion regarding 
the developmental disposition of the Ejisumanhene.  
To forestall any unexpected action by either party to their collective agreement, they 
even went further to specify the mode of future correspondence communications 
between them. Institutional learning from land acquisition in Fumesua had taught 
Government not to leave anything to chance. Before concluding the agreement, the 
parties also agreed that “in the interest of peace, harmony and good neighbourliness 
any or all differences arising from any document or any interpretation of any term or 
provision of any such document and for that matter all differences arising between 
them in respect of this agreement of any agreement relative to the demised premises 
shall be settled amicably between them through negotiations and that in the event of a 
failure to resolve any dispute as aforementioned the matter shall be referred to 
Arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1961 (Act 38) or 
any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force”.  
At long last the public land bureaucracy has now partially found its feet in the 
discourse of Government land acquisition. The original agreement of the higher 
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institutional obligations that have been created must be consented to and concurred 
for it to be legally recognized by Government. And this was the power status function 
of the Lands Commission of which it duly fulfilled. One should not forget that the 
lease agreement has been signed by representatives of the factions in Boankra who 
were fighting over the vacant traditional office- that is, both genuine and false 
claimants, involved in the discourse of land acquisition.  
The Survey Department also went in with their scientific survey equipment to survey 
and record the size, value, ownership, and other technical information on the land for 
a formal lease document to be prepared, consented to and concurred by the Lands 
Commission. What remained was for the Land Title Registry to complete the 
formalization process. However, the registration of title in land required the signature 
of the appropriate land caretaker and the allodial title holder. Because the conflict in 
Boankra had not been resolved, this final phase of formalization of land acquisition 
remained outstanding. The Land Valuation Board however still found its power status 
functions out of coverage area because the discourse was not compulsory state land 
acquisition. The institutional gap in the payment of compensation to land tenants who 
properties have been affected by the lease of customary interests in land was revisited.  
 
8.7 THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN PAYMENT OF 
COMPENSATION TO LAND TENANTS REVISITED 
 
The issue of payment of crops compensation to farmers in Boankra who had been 
rendered landless by the customary disposition of their farming lands created 
problems for the speedy acquisition of the land. The absence of state institutional 
mechanisms for the payment of compensation over customary land acquisitions had 
created problems for Traditional Authorities, Government and Land Tenants, and the 
public land bureaucracy. This was not a discourse of compulsory state land 
acquisition whereby the Lands Commission and the Land Valuation Board were 
required to pay compensation to the affected property owners. 
 
All along, the farmers had been agitating for their grievances to be addressed. 
However the already overloaded problems posed by the chieftaincy crises had not 
permitted the grievances of the farmers to be addressed. The GSC decided to shoulder 
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the burden of sorting out the claims of each farmer. In a letter written by 53 farmers to 
the GSC, they had listed 18 of the claimants as “cheats and parasites on in-land port 
compensation”14.  On the contrary, these 18 claimants were later cleared by the 
Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Police Service as genuine.  
 
In the absence of clear institutional mechanisms to address issues of crop 
compensation, the affected had farmers used the media to discursively articulate their 
grievances. They also resorted to what they called “peaceful demonstrations”15 to 
back up the demanded obligations. The farmers had also tried to use their local 
community leaders such as their elected local government representative or the 
Assemblyman to champion their cause.  Many interviewed farmers claimed that they 
had been dissatisfied with the slow approach of the Assemblyman.16  
 
Realizing the institutional vacuum existing within the public land bureaucracy, the 
affected farmers later turned to their indigenous traditional institutions for help. In a 
petition sent to the GSC, the farmers wrote:  
 
“We the representatives of the farmers concerned do really appreciate the efforts 
being taking by Nana in resolving the impasse of compensation and payments to 
farmers whose crops have been damaged by the Shippers Council. Even though the 
process is slow and hazardous, we can’t see our way through the end of the tunnel 
despite the request for compensation. We therefore RESOLVE whole-heartedly to 
throw our weight behind Nana Aboagye Adjei II, the Ejisumanhene and Landlord of 
the acquired lands to REPRESENT US and deal with all matters related to the 
compensation payment to the aggrieved farmers.  
 
We are grateful and promote Nana Ejisumanhene to represent the leaders and 
affected farmers. We are not against disruption of the project as envisaged. We count 
on your cooperation”17.  
 
                                                 
14 Letter by a section of farmers dated 28 October 2003 to the GSC.  
15 Letter by some affected farmers to the GSC dated 24 August 2003. 
16 Interview with an affected farmers at Boankra dated 30 July 2006  
17 Petition by leaders of farmers affected by the GSC’s acquisition of land at Boankra for the inland 
port project, dated 3 November 2003 
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Following a meeting between the farmers, the GSC, the Ejisumanhene and local 
government officials of the Ejisu-Juaben District Assembly, an amicable settlement 
was reached. In order to deal with the complex issues of crop compensation the GSC 
employed the services of officials of the Land Valuation Board to value the crops of 
each land tenant. However, the valuations done by the Board measured up to its status 
as a public land organization whose power status functions is only useful in the 
discourse of compulsory state land acquisition. Both the GSC and the land tenants 
rejected valuation figures as outrageously low18 to satisfy the farmers who had lost 
their crops in the discourse of government land acquisition.   
 
The GSC therefore employed the services of a private land valuer to re-value the 
amount of compensation that was appropriate to be paid to each land tenant. The new 
valuation figures were collectively accepted by the GSC and the land tenants as fair. 
Subsequently, at a meeting held in Ejisu-Juaben District Assembly hall the land 
tenants were compensated for the damage of their crops. Here, the creation of yet 
another higher obligation between the GSC and the land tenants was the basis for their 
collective agreement that an institutional fact of land acquisition has legally been 
created. Without prior collective agreement on the institutional context of land 
ownership between Government and Traditional Authorities, the creation of such 
higher obligations with the land tenants could not have been possible as clearly 
emphasized by the rational institutional political theory. The terms of the obligations 
created between the GSC and the Land Tenants is exhibited in Appendix 2.  
 
Although some of the farmers interviewed are still not fully satisfied with their 
compensation, their dissatisfaction has not stopped the GSC from going ahead with 
the construction of the inland port project on the legally acquired customary land. The 
obligatory commitment entered into by the land tenant obliges him to recognize the 
compensation he has received as “being the full and final settlement for all claims”. 
The land Tenant has already legally declared within the terms of the collective 
agreement that there is no other entitlement due him in respect of crops compensation. 
 
                                                 
18 Interview with Freight and Logistics Officer, GSC 
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8.8 GOVERNMENT HOPES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REVIVED 
IN BOANKRA WITHOUT LAND TITLE REGISTRATION 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was collectively recognized by the rival 
factions in Boankra, the Ejisu Traditional Council, and the Asante Traditional Council 
as sufficient grounds for Government to gain access to land for the construction of the 
inland port project. At the same time the modus Vivendi enabled each of the actors to 
partially realize their interests.  
 
Picture 4: The uncompleted Administration Block of the Inland Port Project 
 
 
Source: Author, June-August 2006) 
Although the first phase of the inland port is nearly completed, as at the time of 
rounding off the fieldwork research in August 2006, the project had come to a 
standstill seemingly due to lack of funds. Construction workers had not been paid 
their salaries for several months. This brought resentment, anger, and unrest among 
the workers leading to agitations and demonstrations. Almost all the casual workers 
were laid off by the management on the grounds that they had not followed due 
procedures in addressing the problems. Since majority of the casual workers were 
from the Boankra community, there was anger and resentment in the community 
towards government. It is worth noting that a substantial portion of the money 
earmarked for the project had already gone down the drain as sunk cost in the 
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unfruitful interactions over land acquisition in Fumesua. It is therefore not surprising 
that the project was now facing financial problems. 
At the time of rounding off the field research in August 2006, the Ashanti Traditional 
Council had still not been able to resolve the chieftaincy succession crises in Boankra. 
Therefore Government had not been able to legally obtain land title covering the legal 
acquisition of the land due to the unresolved chieftaincy crises in Boankra. Whatever 
be the case, the continuation of the inland port project revived the dampened hopes of 
the Government, political elites, interested local and foreign investors, and local 
unemployed people in and around Boankra.  
After over a decade of seeking access to land, Government had finally been able to lift 
the inland port project from the drawing board to the ground and the capital 
investment initiative might soon yield the expected results. Until the Asante 
Traditional Council is able to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in Boankra, the public 
land bureaucracy cannot also perform their power status functions of formalization. 
Up to this stage, the usefulness of the public land bureaucracy in discourses over 
customary land acquisition is undermined and seriously questioned. 
8.9 CONCLUSION  
 
The above empirical case of customary land acquisition by government confirms the 
weak institutional capacity and competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate 
conflicts of interests among government, traditional authorities, and land tenants when 
the discourse of land acquisition is decentred from compulsory land acquisition.  The 
decentring of the discursive institutional structure from the discourse of compulsory 
land acquisition to that of customary land acquisition severed the public land 
bureaucracy from the discursive arena in Boankra until the stage of formalization.  
 
In the process of formalization of customary and transaction, the public land 
bureaucracy inherits the problems in customary land tenureship that have been passed 
on through the informal original agreement. The inherited problems that have now 
received a legal seal from the public land bureaucracy is bound to make future land 
holdings uncertain even in the midst of genuine documentation. The public land 
bureaucracy is only structured as a government instrument of violence for the 
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deconstruction of customary land ownership and not an instrument primarily meant 
for the construction of customary land acquisition. Outside that discourse of violence, 
the public land bureaucracy appears useless to actors involved in the discourse of 
customary land acquisition until the discourse reaches the stage of formalization.  
 
This second narrative confirms the theoretical assumptions of the rational institutional 
political theory that collective action between autonomous rational actors can only be 
realised when institutional obligations are created between autonomous rational actors 
and political agencies or discursive institutions. The institutional obligations created 
by Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants with traditional land 
institutions had provided reasons for rational collective action. Institutional obligation 
created between autonomous rational actors and institutions matters for rational 
collective action.  
 
The outcome of land acquisition in Boankra confirms the lack of an effective public 
property rights institutional regime to deliver customary land to capitalist agents for 
economic development of the state. Even where land is genuinely acquired under 
customary tenure, the investor is still faced with future uncertainties over the 
ownership of his legally acquired property. Indeed, such institutional environment of 
land acquisition is not one that is likely to support the economic development of the 
state with regards to domestic fixed capital investment.  
 
The study turns to the theoretical analysis of the competence of the public land 
bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests among government, traditional authorities, 
and land tenants in the two empirical narratives. The variables that impacted on the 
competence of the public land bureaucracy to effectively mediate in the discourses of 
government land acquisition are further discussed under the theoretical lenses of the 
rational institutional political theory.   
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CHAPTER 9 
  
9.0 INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETENCE 
OF THE PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY IN GOVERNMENT LAND 
ACQUISITION: THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURING, AND BUREAUCRATIC 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
 
From the two case study narratives, the discursive actors, their demanded institutional 
obligations for collective action, and the outcomes from the discursive interactions are 
now known. This chapter therefore theoretically analyzes the competence of the 
public land bureaucracy in mediating conflicts of interests among government, 
traditional authorities, and land tenants in the discourses of government land 
acquisition in Fumesua and Boankra.  
 
Specifically, the theoretical analysis looks that the impact of institutional obligations, 
institutional structuring, and bureaucratic organizational resources as independent 
variables with likely effect on the competence of the public land bureaucracy to 
mediate in discourses of land acquisition among autonomous rational actors. 
  
9.1 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY 
 
The theoretical claim is that the ability of the public land bureaucracy to mediate in 
conflict of interests among autonomous rational actors in discourses of land 
acquisition depends on the institutional obligations that have been imposed on the 
organizational units of the bureaucracy as power status functions.  
 
Secondly, the ability of the organizational units to effectively carry out their power 
status functions as rational collective actors is influenced by their structural 
relationships and resource capacity. All together, institutional obligations, institutional 
structuring, and organizational resource capacity determine the institutional 
competence of the public land bureaucracy to successfully mediate conflict of 
interests among actors in discourses of government land acquisition.  
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Different actors make different obligatory demands and look forward to its fulfilment 
before granting their consent, agreement and recognition to the creation of an 
institutional fact of land acquisition in which they have interest. Traditional 
Authorities have intricate institutional obligations nested within economic, political, 
and socio-cultural issues. The position of land tenants on compensation is also 
independent of whether the land is customarily owned or publicly owned. 
Government also claims ownership over the land within the sovereign frontiers of the 
state. How these subjective positions were discursively articulated and subsequently 
fulfilled in the discourses of government land acquisition determined the discursive 
outcomes in Fumesua and Boankra. 
  
For the empirical analysis of the cases study narratives, the study now uses the 
theoretical formula provided by Searle (1995) to analyze bureaucratic competence in 
securing collective action among the autonomous rational actors in land acquisition. 
Under the rational institutional political theory, the Searlean theoretical formula is 
expressed in the abstract form: (We agree (X count as Y) in context C))).  
 
When Searle’s theoretical formula is contextualized within the study to analyze the 
competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests among the 
discursive actors for collective action, the formula assumes the following form: (We 
(Government) (Traditional Authority) (Land Tenant) Agree (X counts as Land 
Acquisition) C))))). The constitutive variables X, Y, and C are interpreted as follows; 
 
C = Institutional Context of Land Acquisition, where; 
C1= Customary Land Acquisition 
C2= Compulsory Land Acquisition 
C3= Public Land Acquisition 
 
X= Institutional Obligations imposed on the public land bureaucracy that defines its 
obligatory relationship with Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land 
Tenants in discourses of land acquisition. In a discourse of land acquisition, 
when the power status function of a public land organization is recognised by 
an actor as fulfilling his subjective position, then it denotes the creation of an 
obligation between the actor and the institution. This is represented as follows;  
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1 = Autonomous Rational Actor agrees that X counts as Y 
0 = Autonomous Rational Actor does not agree that X counts as Y 
Ø = The Intentionality of the Autonomous Rational Actor is undefined. The 
actor’s   position may be described as ‘floating’ in the discursive process.  
 
Y= Land Acquisition as a discursive outcome from Collective Action; where 
Y = (We Agree (X counts as Y) in   context C))))  
- Y = (We do not agree (X counts as Y) in context C))) 
 
In outcome Y, there is collective agreement among the discursive actors leading to 
collective action in the discourse of land acquisition within a defined context. An 
institutional fact of land acquisition is therefore created and collectively recognized. 
In outcome -Y, there is collective disagreement among the discursive actors leading to 
a lack of collective action in the discourse of land acquisition. No institutional fact of 
land acquisition is collectively created or recognized by the discursive actors.  
 
9.2 REPRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA IN 
DISCOURSES OF GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITIONS  
  
The competence of the public land bureaucracy in mediating conflict of interests 
among Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants to secure their 
collective action over land acquisition for the Inland Port Project in Fumesua and 
Boankra are presented in tables 1 and 2. The two tables represent the discursive arenas 
or the social interaction arenas in the discourses of government land acquisition for 
the inland port project. 
 
The actions of the discursive actors, the differences in outcomes, as well as 
similarities in the dynamics of the discourses in the two cases of government land 
acquisition, are clearly brought out from the two by two (2 x 2) word tables. The 
analytical interpretations from the two tables shall constitute the basis for discussing 
how institutional obligations, institutional structuring, and bureaucratic organizational 
resources impacts on the state’s institutional capacity for government land acquisition.  
TABLE 3: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION IN FUMESUA 
 
  
  
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
 
BUREAUCRATIC COMPETENCE 
PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY 
 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
RATIONAL ACTOR  
 
 
COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
ORGANIZATION INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS (X) GOVERNMENT 
TRADITIONAL 
AUTHORITY LAND TENANT 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT= C3 
LANDS 
COMMISSION 
Compulsory Land 
Acquisition 1 0 1 - Y 
LAND 
VALUATION 
BOARD 
Payment of 
Compensation 1 0 1 - Y 
SURVEY 
DEPARTMENT 
Survey of Acquired 
Land 1 0 Ø - Y 
LAND TITLE 
REGISTRY 
Registration of Land 
Title  1 0 Ø - Y 
 
Outcome from discourse of Public Land Acquisition = (WE (Government) (Traditional Authority) (Land Tenant) DO NOT AGREE (X 
counts as Land Acquisition) C2))))) 
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INTERPRETATION OF TABLE  
 
In the opinion of Government, the compulsory acquisition of the discursive land by 
the state in 1964 under the CPP government, and its legal formalization in 1972 
constituted sufficient grounds to articulate a discourse of public land ownership over 
the discursive land. The legal framework establishing the Land Title Registry, if it 
works, meant that Government had a land title certificate over the land. Surveying of 
the acquired land was a procedural formality. Government was under no obligation to 
fulfil the subjective demands of traditional authorities. No lease agreement was 
created because the institutional context of land acquisition did not require the consent 
of traditional authorities. Government tried to pay what it considered to be “fair and 
adequate compensation” to the affected land tenants. 
 
From the discourse of the Traditional Authority, public land acquisition by the state 
conflicted with their customary institutional obligations for land acquisition. The 
process only re-affirmed the compulsory acquisition of the land to which they 
vehemently opposed. The process deconstructs the institution of customary land 
ownership in a way that was not acceptable to traditional authorities. Traditional 
institutional procedures of land acquisition were sidelined and no customary 
obligations were fulfilled. Thus traditional authorities disagreed that the institutional 
obligations fulfilled in the discourse of public land acquisition.  
 
The Land Tenant articulated the same discourse as Government on the discursive 
fronts of compulsory land acquisition and the payment of compensation. Clearly, the 
position of the land tenants was contrary to that of their chiefs. It was not surprising 
that traditional authorities in Fumesua tried to weld the interests of the farmers into 
their discourse against other traditional authorities who counter-claimed ownership of 
portions of the discursive land. The African colonial legacy of the crisis of subject-
citizen discursive position (MacCaskie, 1984, Mamdani 1996) was manifested.  
 
The social interaction arena shows a lack of collective action among Government, 
Traditional Authority, and Land Tenant on all discursive fronts in the institutional 
context of public land acquisition. The alternative to collective agreement was the 
recourse to violence and legalized aggression leading to the relocation of the project. 
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TABLE 4: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISITION IN BOANKRA 
 
  
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
 
BUREAUCRATIC COMPETENCE 
 
 
PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY 
 
 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
RATIONAL ACTOR 
 
COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
ORGANIZATION INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS (X) GOVERNMENT 
TRADITIONAL 
AUTHORITY LAND TENANT 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT= C1 
 
Legal Consent and 
Concurrence to 
Lease Agreement 
1 1 1 Y 
LAND 
VALUATION 
BOARD  
Payment of 
Compensation 0 0 1 -Y 
SURVEY 
DEPARTMENT 
Survey of Acquired 
Land 1 1 Ø Y 
LAND TITLE 
REGISTRY 
Registration of Land 
Title 1 0 Ø - Y 
 
Outcome from discourse of Customary Land Acquisition = (WE (Government) (Traditional Authority) (Land Tenant) AGREE (X 
counts as Land Acquisition) C2))))) 
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INTERPRETATION OF TABLE  
 
From the table, it can be seen that the discourse of government land acquisition has 
taken a different form. The discourse of compulsory land acquisition was not 
articulated by Government nor was the discourse of public land acquisition. 
Government now articulated the discourse of LESSEE of customary land. Perhaps, 
Government modification of its discourse was due to the experience gained from 
Fumesua where public land acquisition had brought catastrophic outcomes.  
 
The move to customary land acquisition marked a decentring of the institutional 
framework for government land acquisition from the public land bureaucracy to 
customary land institutions. New institutional obligations between Government and 
Traditional Authorities were constructed to supply the symbols and language for the 
creation of an institutional fact of customary land acquisition.  
 
The successful construction of new discursive fronts and the completion of an original 
lease agreement also saw the public land bureaucracy coming into the discourse arena 
with its technical competence to formalize the transactions. Previously, it lacked the 
political competence to mediate conflict of interests that had arisen in Boankra among 
government, traditional authorities, and land tenants in the discourse of customary 
land acquisition. That conflict mediation function had been resolved by the traditional 
institutions in the Ashanti region. However, since the original lease agreement had 
already been cooked for the public land bureaucracy, the Lands Commission also 
swallowed the inherent defects in the original agreement which had been signed by 
both genuine and false claimants to the vacant chieftaincy office in Boankra. 
 
One also sees from the table that the decentring of the discursive structure affected the 
power status functions of the Land Valuation Board. Its functional arm was limited to 
the payment of compensation to land tenants in discourses of compulsory land 
acquisition and not customary land acquisition. Government and Traditional 
Authorities saw no need for the Land Valuation Board. Land Tenants however welded 
a different discourse and had demanded the payment of compensation. The GSC had 
to fulfil the subjective position of the land tenants outside the public land bureaucracy 
for collective action to take place over the acquisition of customary land.  
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9.3 EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENT DISCURSIVE OUTCOMES 
  
It is very interesting that the two empirical cases of land acquisition involved the same 
categories of discursive actors; Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land 
Tenants, but produced different outcomes. The reason for the different discursive 
outcomes is not far fetched from the two tables. The reason is to be found within the 
lines of discourse followed by government in pursuit of land acquisition for the inland 
port project. It can be seen that the context of land acquisition played a very 
significant role in supplying rational reasons that enabled collective agreement or 
disagreement on the institutional obligations that legitimately counted as land 
acquisition; and for that matter fulfils the subjective position of an actor. 
 
Within the social interaction arena in Fumesua, Government articulated a discourse of 
public land acquisition that only re-affirms the violent deconstruction of customary 
land institutions in a prior discourse of compulsory land acquisition. Thus, the modern 
state maker came face to face with the traditional state makers over rival claims of 
land ownership. Basically, the power status functions imposed on the public land 
bureaucracy are those of compulsory land acquisition, public land acquisition, and 
formalization of customary land transactions. Since Government had monopoly 
control over the state institutions of organized violence, it captured the public land 
bureaucracy to articulate its subjective position. 
Traditional state makers have also sworn before their subjects that in all things they 
will protect, preserve, uphold, and defend their ancestral land which they had acquired 
through the toil and blood of their forefathers. Traditional authorities who opposed 
government’s discourse of land ownership captured their subjects and prayed that may 
their ancestral gods help them all in the politics of collective violence that ensued. 
Tilly (2003) emphasized that in the politics of collective violence, groups that are 
bonded together by rituals are the most effective. It was no wonder that the opposing 
organized local communities prevailed over government. Collective violence had 
produced neither collective agreement nor collective action as predicted by the 
rational institutional political theory.  
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Traditional authorities and their subjects found no desire independent reasons within 
the public land bureaucracy to rationally engage government in discourses of land 
acquisition. On the contrary, each actor had pursued his own value informed position. 
By the time government found enough political will to renegotiate the acquisition of 
the discursive land with the traditional state makers, historical problems inherent in 
customary land tenure had gained deeper roots, making it practically impossible for 
rational deliberation. The seeds of mistrust that had already been sowed in the 
discourse of compulsory land acquisition brought forth insulation mechanisms within 
the judicial arm of the state.  
 
The discourse of land acquisition that took place in Boankra therefore took a different 
discursive form. Not only was the discursive structure decentred from the public land 
bureaucracy to traditional land institutions, but also the discourse had led to the 
construction of new discursive frontiers. Government now recognized the discursive 
land as customarily owned by traditional authorities, and thus assumed the new 
position of ‘Lessee’. Farmers also assumed the position of ‘Land Tenants’ with 
economic right to crops compensation.  
 
The construction of new discursive frontiers and the creation of new institutional 
obligations had paved way for collective action among Government, Customary Land 
Owners, and Land Tenants, in the modified discourse of government land acquisition. 
However, the original agreement had to be formally legalized by the public land 
bureaucracy as demanded by government. Thus, the subjective positions articulated 
by Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants were partially met to 
produce collective action.  
 
Gran (2007a) was right in his remark that, in the democratic state, institutional 
obligations, if they work, will typically reflect both the value homogeneity and the 
value conflicts in the larger society; making sure that a political regime cannot 
completely eliminate opposition, and turn the public bureaucracy into unified 
machinery for the implementation of its chosen regulatory policy. In totality, 
however, the fulfilment of institutional obligations for the creation of an institutional 
fact of customary land acquisition was not a homogenous one but divided between 
traditional land institutions and the public land institutions. 
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9.4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The analysis of the outcomes from the two social interaction arenas is pursued under 
the three independent variables that makes up the institutional capacity of the public 
land bureaucracy and determine the competence of the institution to mediate conflict 
of interests in government land acquisition. The variables are institutional obligations 
of the discursive actors with the public land bureaucracy, institutional structuring of 
the bureaucracy, and bureaucratic organizational resources. How these independent 
variables impacted on the competence of the state land bureaucracy to facilitate access 
to land in Fumesua and Boankra are analyzed and discussed at the micro level of 
discursive interactions over government land acquisition. 
 
9.5 INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
We have returned to the famous institutional theoretical problem that has received so 
much interest in political science. What institutional obligations did the autonomous 
actors with conflict of interests in government land acquisition have with the public 
land bureaucracy for them to collectively agree and act in the interest of the state? 
Specifically, what institutional obligations existed among traditional land owners, 
land tenants, and government within the public land bureaucracy for these actors to 
have collectively placed their interests under the institutional mechanisms of land 
acquisition specified in the public land bureaucracy?  
 
The rational institutional political theory makes it clear that the interposition of 
obligations between institutions and autonomous rational actors is the only 
mechanism by which collective action is possible in collective action dilemmas 
(Searle 1995, 2001, Gran 2005a, 2007a, b). It is the institutional obligations that 
supply the language, symbols, and procedural rules for social interaction between the 
discursive actors. How institutional obligations as an independent variable impacted 
on the competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate in the discourses of 
government land acquisition are discussed below. 
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9.5.1 VALUE HETEROGENEITY IN THE DISCOURSE OF COMPULSORY 
GOVERNMENT LAND ACQUISITION 
 
From the social interaction arena in Fumesua, it was clear that the discourse of 
compulsory state land acquisition had lead to the articulation of heterogeneous 
obligations among government, traditional authorities, and land tenants on what 
counts as legitimate acquisition of land. There was no value homogeneity under the 
institutional obligations imposed on the public land bureaucracy that provided 
collective reasons for the three actors to agree and act in the collective interests. No 
provision is made for government to fulfil the customary obligations demanded by 
traditional authorities. The state land institutions and customary land institutions had 
operated from the opposite ends of land acquisition, particularly with regards to the 
institutional procedures that should be followed. Government intentions of 
compulsory land acquisition were carried out unilaterally with violence. The public 
land bureaucracy had been structured as a violent state organization that was captured 
by the political regime to articulate its position on land ownership and acquisition.  
 
The historical path followed by the state in the political process of state making had 
sowed the seeds of a dual system of land ownership and contradictory processes of 
land acquisition within the state. The land institutions within each system of land 
ownership have developed their own institutional obligations that must be fulfilled to 
secure collective agreement in a discourse of land acquisition. In a discourse of public 
land acquisition, Government does not submit itself to the dictates of traditional 
authorities and fulfil their demanded institutional obligations. On the contrary, 
government uses its monopoly over the coercive land institutions to gain access to 
land. The public land bureaucracy, at best, becomes a unilateral institution that serves 
the interest of government in the formalization of land transactions; and at worst, an 
instrument of violence that is captured by a political regime to seize customary land.  
 
The power status functions of the public land bureaucracy in the discourse of public 
land acquisition clearly lay outside the institutional obligations demanded by 
traditional authorities. Government compulsory acquisition of the discursive land in 
Fumesua in 1964 had not fulfilled the payment of customary drink money to land 
owners. There was no lease agreement and no institutional fact of land acquisition had 
 132
been created between traditional land owners and government. Technically, 
government and traditional authorities articulated legitimate but contradictory claims 
over ownership of the land. The basis for future conflict over ownership claims to the 
land had therefore been laid long before the inland port project was conceived.  
 
The institutional relations of power conflict between the public land bureaucracy and 
traditional land institutions seems to confirm one key problem of land administration 
in developing countries identified by scholars (Holstein, 1996, Putzel, 2000). The 
problem is the political challenge of reconciling social legitimacy and legality into 
state institutional structures to ensure collective functional performance for the broad 
masses rather than for particular government interests. Ray (1999) correctly observed 
that the power conflict between government and traditional authorities is epitomic of 
the divided sovereignty of the state over land ownership.  
 
Whatever be the developmental intentions behind the compulsory acquisition of 
customary land by the state; clearly, that approach to fast track the “high-modernist 
ideology” (Scott 1998:4) of governments has some negative inherent features that 
does not reinforce capital production.  On the contrary, it affects the institutional 
capacity of the state to readily provide access to land for capitalist development. 
Unsettled problems that follow compulsory government acquisition of customary land 
pose futuristic constraints to the developmental capacity of the state.  
9.5.2 STATE-TRADITIONAL RIVALRY OVER PUBLIC LAND 
As theoretically predicted, the lack of institutional obligations between rational 
autonomous actors and institutions has the tendency of forcing such autonomous 
actors to create their own institutions for the protection of their interests. The study 
discovered that traditional authorities in Ashanti, specifically the Kumasi Traditional 
Council, have created the Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat which functions as a 
powerful rival institution to protect customary interests in land. Moe (1991) was also 
right in noting that when societal actors are threatened with “unwanted acts of 
legalized aggression by the state” or by their enemies against their properties, they 
will create strategies that insulate their properties from the future control of the state; 
even where the strategies also prevent them from fully enjoying their property.  
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The Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat (popularly called the Asantehene’s Lands Office) 
has been in existence since the colonial era. The office keeps records of land 
transactions such as leases, gifts, and other significant land transfers. Historically, the 
office played a crucial role in the financial administration of the Asante State through 
the collection of rents on customary lands. It was not surprising that the British seized 
all records of the Asantehene Lands Office after defeating the Ashanti state. The land 
records were however returned in 1943 to re-open this traditional land institution. 
 
In 1958, the CPP government had also seized all documents of the Asantehene Lands 
Office on the grounds that traditional authorities in Ashanti were supporting the 
National Liberation Movement (NLM), an opposition political party. It is these 
documents that were used to open the Lands Department, which is now the Lands 
Commission, in Kumasi. Currently, the Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat is in the 
process of reclaiming all its land records from the Ashanti Regional Lands 
Commission to bridge the information gap between historical and modern land 
transfers. The Asantehene Lands Secretariat is reputed to possess the most updated 
information on customary land transfers in the country (Somevi 2001). The existence 
of such a powerful rival land institution in Ashanti has weakened the public land 
bureaucracy to mediate in discourses of customary land acquisition.   
 
Picture 5: The Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat in Kumasi 
 
 
 
(Source: Author, June-August 2006) 
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Lawyers, judges, land intermediaries, private investors, and even some scholars have 
found it more expedient to rely on traditional land institutions for more accurate, 
timely and reliable information for their purposes than to rely on the state land 
bureaucracy (Berry 2001, Brobby 2005, Yeboah 2005). In a research work by Berry, 
she commented that after persistent but futile searches in the public land bureaucracy 
for maps showing “the location and extent of stool lands, or the boundaries between 
them”; the head of the Lands Commission assuredly redirected her research to the 
customary land owners because “chiefs know that boundaries” (Berry 2001:xvii).  
  
Land litigants have also found the traditional justice system less expensive, more 
effective in the enforcement of rulings on customary land conflicts, less acrimonious, 
technologically more innovative, and also more trustworthy than the state courts in the 
adjudication of land cases (Yeboah 2005). Crook (2005:11) had earlier remarked that, 
“in spite of the problems and delays associated with the state courts, there is a strong 
demand for authoritative and enforceable settlements which only the state could 
provide”. The empirical evidence from the final resolution of the conflict between 
Fumesua and Bebre does not seem to support the assertion by Crook that it is only the 
state court that could provide authoritative and enforceable settlement of customary 
land conflicts. Crook’s own statistics shows clearly that the number of new cases of 
customary land conflicts received by the Kumasi High Court had witnessed a 
continuous decline between 2000 and 2002 (Crook 2005:5). 
 
The element of fairness in the adjudication customary land conflicts by traditional 
institutions was seen in the resolution of the Fumesua and Bebre land dispute. 
Traditional land institutions have therefore gained more acceptance and recognition in 
matters of land dispute resolution in Ashanti. The implication is that traditional land 
institutions now enjoy a higher power status-function than state land institutions. 
Gradually, formal power status-functions in customary land acquisition may 
completely decentre from the public land bureaucracy to rival traditional institutions.  
Traditional authorities continue to question the legitimacy and rationale of the 
evolving state institutional configuration for land administration. In their opinion, 
“they are perfectly capable of managing their lands based on their long standing 
customary land laws and procedures” (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001:7).  
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9.6 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURING 
 
Under this variable, the study analyzes how the institutional structuring of the public 
land bureaucracy had impacted on its competence to function as a rational collective 
organizational actor with the political competence to mediate in conflicts of interests 
in a discourse of government land acquisition. 
 
9.6.1 INSTITUTIONAL DISLOCATION OF THE PUBLIC LAND 
BUREAUCRACY IN DISCOURSES OF CUSTOMARY LAND 
ACQUISITION 
 
The discursive arena in Boankra showed that the public land bureaucracy is not well 
structured to mediate in a discourse of customary land acquisition. The decentring of 
the discursive structure from public land acquisition to customary land acquisition 
exposed the public land bureaucracy as a state institution that possesses competence 
in the articulation of violent discourses of land acquisition by governments. 
Momentarily, the public land bureaucracy was structurally cut off from the discourse 
of customary land acquisition. It confirmed that the public land bureaucracy is 
structurally deficient and an ineffective vehicle for the acquisition of customary land. 
 
The catastrophic outcomes in Fumesua that led to the decentring of the discursive 
from the public land bureaucracy to the creation of new obligations in customary land 
institutions showed the irrationality in the proposition that the productive efficiency of 
institutionalized organizations is inconsequential to its legitimacy and survival (Meyer 
and Rowan (1977). Even Government had found no desire independent reason to 
confer any more legitimacy on the public land bureaucracy to mediate in future 
discourses of land acquisition when the productive efficiency of the institution tested 
negative in Fumesua. The public land bureaucracy was dislocated in the future 
discourse of customary land acquisition. Rational actors are as much concerned with 
the productive efficiency of institutionalized organizations. 
 
In Boankra, the public land bureaucracy found out that its formalization functions was 
useless to mediate the conflict of interests in the discourse of customary land 
acquisition until Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants had finished 
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the tortuous process of resolving their differences outside the public land bureaucracy. 
Traditional authorities had not found it desirable to use the Lands Commission to 
mediate in the Boankra chieftaincy conflict in spite of the fact that the Commission 
had a representative from the Regional House of Chiefs. Clearly, institutional 
isomorphism through formal cooptation of organized opposition forces into the 
leadership structure of the Lands Commission did not provide the Commission with 
the legitimacy to mediate in conflict of interests in customary land acquisition.  
 
The Land Valuation Board had also found its power status functions severed because 
the new discursive arena in Boankra provided no grounds for the use of violence by 
Government or the payment of “fair and adequate compensation” to land tenants. The 
Land Valuation Board which hitherto had the power status function of paying 
“adequate and fair compensation” to affected land tenants in discourses of compulsory 
state land acquisition, now found itself taken out from the discourse of customary land 
acquisition. It is interesting to note that the GSC had by-passed the Land Valuation 
Board to employ a private land valuer in the payment of crops compensation to land 
tenants. If public services provided by the Land Valuation Board relating to land 
acquisition could be procured from the market then what justifies its continued 
survival?  
 
The Land Title Registry could also not find its feet at the tail end of the discourse of 
customary land acquisition in Boankra because of chieftaincy conflicts that made it 
impossible to identify the genuine signatories for a land title certificate. At best, the 
Registry can only wait until the traditional land institutions have successfully 
mediated in the chieftaincy dispute. Until the chieftaincy conflict was resolved, the 
baton of formalization remains with the lease department of the Lands Commission. 
Meanwhile the Lands Commission was also depending on the Asante Traditional 
Council to effectively resolve the conflict of interests before it could grant a lease 
over the land. Nothing was heard of the dispute adjudication committee of the Land 
Title Registry. Brobby (2002) had rightly observed that the dispute adjudication 
committee of the Land Title Registry has refused to function.  
 
It appeared that only the Survey Department found its feet in the decentred discursive 
structure. After all, Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants needed to 
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know the size, value, and other geographical characteristics of their object of 
discourse in order to make rational deliberations. The resolution of the Fumesua and 
Bebre/Wurakese land conflict had showed that the traditional land institutions lacked 
the technical competence to mediate in conflict of interests in customary land. 
However, the important thing that emerges from the two discursive arenas is that the 
power status functions of the Survey Department becomes important only in an 
environment devoid of violence where all discursive actors collectively agree on the 
ownership of land and its legal disposition. In Fumesua, where this collective 
agreement was lacking, the power status functions of the Survey Department had 
amounted to nothing. But in Boankra where this collective agreement was available, 
the same power status functions counted towards land acquisition. 
 
The institutional dislocation of the public land bureaucracy in the informal processes 
of customary land acquisition pose more problems for the formalization functions of 
the state bureaucracy. In the Boankra discursive arena, the Ejisumanhene had 
unsuccessfully tried to by-pass traditional institutional leverage structures in 
customary land acquisition. Customary institutional norms required that the 
Ejisumanhene collectively agree with his rival traditional authorities in Boankra in the 
disposition of customary interests in the Boankra Stool land. Such lower level 
leverage structures that powerfully operate within traditional governance institutions 
in discourses of customary land acquisition passes on further delays, red tapes, and 
higher transaction costs to the formalization of customary land transactions by the 
public bureaucracy. At the same time the public land bureaucracy find itself impotent 
in the enforcement of traditional institutional leverage structures when problems of 
enforcements are encountered by traditional authorities.  
The strength of lower level traditional leverage structures on the one hand ensures 
accountability and transparency in customary land acquisition. On the other hand, it 
has become critical power junctures that frustrate the formalization of customary land 
transactions by the public land bureaucracy. If the personal disposition of the 
Ejisumanhene were to be the sole factor determining the outcome of customary land 
acquisition in Boankra, the public land bureaucracy might have no problem at all for 
the formalization power status functions of the public land bureaucracy.  
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Clearly, one sees that the effective institutional capacity of both the public land 
bureaucracy and traditional land institutions depends on their institutional 
cooperation. Functional cooperation and trust relations, however, cannot be assumed 
to exist among autonomous rational actors with conflict of interests in a discursive 
object or issue. Unfortunately, the public land bureaucracy is structurally severed 
from the traditional land institutions. As a consequence of the institutional structural 
disconnect, the public land bureaucracy usually finds its power status functions 
temporarily dislocated in discourses of customary land acquisitions.  
 
9.6.2 STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN THE FULFILMENT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO LAND TENANTS  
The two empirical cases of government land acquisition also seem to confirm the 
observation by Kasanga (2000:6) that the lack of an enabling legislation for the Land 
Valuation Board stifles the effective discharge of its institutional obligations to land 
tenants in a discourse of compulsory government land acquisition. In Fumesua, 
Government and Land Tenants collectively agreed that compulsory state land 
acquisition had taken place. However, both also agreed that compensation for some of 
the affected land tenants had remained unsettled. Even more crucial is the fact that the 
affected land tenants had not been relocated after the state had compulsorily acquired 
their farming and communal land. Thus the land tenants had encroached on the public 
land making its future transfer for capital development very difficult.  
Meanwhile in Boankra, the discourse of customary land acquisition also created 
institutional problems in the payment of compensation to land tenants. Whiles the 
Land Valuation Board found itself incapable of fulfilling that function, traditional 
authorities had also not welded the interest of farmers with their discourse. After all, 
under customary terms of land acquisition, when traditional authorities dispose off 
their customary interest in land to interested agents, the usufructuary right of the 
farmer is extinguished.  
The payment of compensation to affected farmers in a discourse of customary land 
acquisition therefore falls squarely on the shoulders of the agent who is acquiring the 
land. The agent has the onerous task of sorting out opportunists from genuine 
claimants in the muddy waters of customary land acquisition. The payment of 
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compensation became a tug of war between the GSC and land tenants. Public land 
officials and traditional authorities had their priorities elsewhere. The Lands 
Commission and the Land Valuation Board could justify their indifference on the 
grounds that the constitution has structured their power status functions as violent 
instruments articulated in discourses of compulsory land acquisition. The land tenant 
who finds his economic interest in jeopardy must either employ the services of a 
lawyer or take the law into his own hands with whatever insulation mechanism he 
finds appropriate.  
 
It is now understandable why farmers in Boankra had to impose new power status 
functions on the Ejisumanhene, their paramount chief, to represent them in their 
negotiation for compensation. Ironically, it was the same paramount chief whose 
action had rendered the farmers landless. Perhaps, it is time for government to 
officially impose the power status-function of payment of crops compensation on 
traditional land institutions, if the state land institutions lack the power and resources. 
Land tenants might then have to create new lower level leverage structures to ensure 
the accountability of their traditional representatives in the payment of fair and 
adequate compensation for their affected property. 
 
9.6.3 LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION 
 
The discursive arena in Fumesua suggests a lack of inter-organizational coordination 
within the public land bureaucracy. The ability of land litigants from Bebre and 
Fumesua to coordinates different crucial sources of information from the public land 
bureaucracy; to support their contentious claims show a lack of inter-organizational 
coordination in the collective management of crucial information. Collective 
information management by the organizational units of the public land bureaucracy 
might play a key role in making them an effective instrument for the resolution of 
land conflicts. Departmental jealousy and internal organizational conflicts among the 
organizations units Somevi (2001) makes it difficult for the public land bureaucracy 
to counter the strong opposition from their rival traditional land institutions.  
 
The effective resolution of the land ownership conflict between Fumesua and 
Bebre/Wurakese by the Asantehene and his traditional council emphatically proved 
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that the institutional competence of the public land bureaucracy to effectively 
facilitate access to land requires more than just material and human resources. 
Organizationally, it requires effective collaboration, cooperation, and trust relations 
among the public land agencies. While each of the bureaucratic unit possess some 
crucial information that might prove important for overall institutional effectiveness; 
there is little functional cooperation and trust relations among them. Not surprisingly, 
the public land bureaucracy could not resolve the customary land conflict in Fumesua. 
 
The lack of horizontal cooperation among the organizational units of the public land 
bureaucracy is worsened by its vertical institutional rivalry with traditional land 
institutions. Unfortunately, the functional survival of the public land bureaucracy in 
discourses of customary land acquisition depends on the capacity of traditional land 
institutions to mediate in conflict of interests in customary land acquisition. Since 
there are no institutional obligatory relations between the state land institutions and 
traditional land institutions, there is also very little cooperation and trust relations 
between them.  Traditional land institutions seem to be self reliant within their 
traditional political territories because they can acquire technical competence 
possessed by the public land bureaucracy from the market. The public land 
bureaucracy cannot do the same when it comes to the acquisition of political 
competence from the relevant quarters. Even the state courts do not possess such 
social legitimacy in resolving customary land disputes. They rely on the knowledge 
and power of traditional authorities (Brobby 2005). 
 
It is obvious that whiles traditional land institutions like the Asantehene’s Lands 
Secretariat possess reliable information about new developments on the ownership of 
customary land; the public land bureaucracy have no access to such new 
developments. Neither does the public land bureaucracy have the political competence 
possessed by traditional authorities to mediate discourse of conflict of interests in 
customary land. Such authority and local knowledge do not exist outside traditional 
land institutions. The capacity of the public land organizations to formalize customary 
land transactions has come to depend on institutional cooperation with traditional 
authorities. But there is little institutional cooperation between traditional land 
institutions and the state land bureaucracy in discourses of land acquisition. 
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There is no automatic element of causation behind the movement of documents 
between officials of the public land bureaucracy and traditional authorities. Officials 
of the public land bureaucracy thus usually find themselves with outdated information 
on customary land ownership. They are left with no choice than to heavily rely on the 
benevolence of traditional authorities to counter confirm the authenticity of land 
allocation notes presented by agents who have acquired an interest in customary land. 
Since traditional authorities are not public servants on the payroll of the state, the 
agent must pay for the verification services rendered, aside any financial payment 
made to middlemen who liaise between the agent and the sacred traditional authority. 
All associated cost of the shuttling of documents between the two institutions is 
therefore borne by the agent with acquired customary interest.  
 
It is not surprising that the cost of formalization of land transactions has been 
estimated by Antwi (2001) to be 40% of the actual cost of money paid for customary 
lease. Is there any reason for agents with acquired customary interest to formalize 
their customary land transactions if they can operate in the ‘illegal sector’ (De Soto 
2000) of the state? The lack of horizontal and vertical institutional cooperation within 
the overall institutional framework for land acquisition weakens the institutional 
capacity of the state to make land readily available for capital development. 
 
9.7 BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
 
Finally, the impact of bureaucratic organizational capacity as an independent variable 
on the competence of the public land bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests 
among government, traditional authorities, and land tenants in the discourses of land 
acquisition is critically looked at. Do the public land organizations have the technical 
competence in the form of administrative capacity, technology and financial resources 
to perform their power status functions in discourses of government land acquisition? 
Can one attribute the failure of the public land bureaucracy to competently mediate in 
the conflict of interests among government, traditional authorities, and land tenants in 
the two empirical cases to a lack of technical competence? The impact of bureaucratic 
organizational resources on the discursive outcomes in Fumesua and Boankra is taken 
up in the discussions that follow.  
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9.7.1      INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY (?) 
  
If high-calibre, trained and skilled administrators, lawyers, surveyors and other 
supporting staff aside relevant technology had been provided in abundance for the 
state land bureaucracy in the Ashanti region, could public land officials have 
competently mediated in the conflict of interest over government land acquisition in 
Fumesua? A critical analysis of the resolution of the land dispute between 
Bebre/Wurakese and Fumesua by the Kumasi Traditional Council does not suggest 
that the public land bureaucracy lacked technical competence. 
 
The documented evidence from the traditional judicial court of the Asantehene 
showed that the public land bureaucracy in fact possessed adequate administrative 
capacity for their technical competence. The Asantehene’s Court had relied on 
topographical maps from the Survey Department, government approved lay-out, and 
other technical documents produced by the litigants from the public land bureaucracy 
before the Kumasi Traditional Council could resolve the technical aspects of the 
conflicting claims to the same customary land.  
 
The most important finding from the Asantehene lands court is that the capacity of a 
political institution to mediate conflict of interests that involves issues of power 
relations requires more than just technical competence in the form of professional 
expertise and technology. More importantly, it required that the conflict mediator 
possesses legitimacy, authority, and power acquired from the litigants in order to play 
any meaningful role in the resolution of issues embedded in political power. When the 
contradictory oral historical accounts and documented information from the public 
land organizations had produced little progress in the recurring dispute, the Kumasi 
Traditional Council had used its traditionally acquired authority to legitimize the final 
ruling by the Asantehene.  
 
The critical question that emerges is on what authoritative grounds can officials of the 
public land bureaucracy effectively resolve customary land conflict and impose 
sanctions on traditional authorities? Perhaps, the cooptation of representatives from 
the House of Chiefs and other bodies into the leadership structure of the Lands 
Commission was meant to address the lack of political competence in public land 
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bureaucracy to mediate in land conflicts. However, the co-opted members lack real to 
mediate conflict of interests in government land acquisition. Beyond personal 
gratification, one wonders the actual power status functions performed by these co-
opted representatives within the Lands Commission.  
 
Whilst not discounting the importance of strengthening the technical competence of 
the ailing public land bureaucracy, reformers must pay more attention to the 
institutional foundations of public organizations. An institution with a weak or 
divided power status cannot function effectively. From the two empirical cases, one 
can emphatically say that institutional competence goes beyond technical competence. 
 
9.7.2         INADEQUATE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL RESOURCES (?) 
 
From the two empirical cases of government land acquisition, it is difficult to make a 
case for the adequacy or inadequacy of financial resources within the public land 
bureaucracy in the performance of their power status functions. After all, financial 
resources and material organizational support are background resources that enable 
the fulfilment of actual institutional obligations. Arguably, it is only where the context 
of land ownership is clearly defined from any encumbrances that organizational 
resources could effectively be put to use. This is not to say that financial and logistical 
resources play no role in strengthening the institutional capacity of organizations. The 
point is that institutions are first and foremost rules of collective agreement in the 
form of obligations and not physical materials or financial resources per se.  
 
The discursive arena in Fumesua seemed to suggest that the Land Valuation Board 
encountered problems in the payment of compensation to affected land tenants in the 
discourse of compulsory state land acquisition. An official of the Land Valuation 
Board pointed out that the Board does not have enough vehicles to go round and 
evaluate claims of compensation. He stated, “Getting fuel for the only available 
vehicle is sometimes a problem. Unless the claimant provides money for fuel, we 
cannot go to evaluate his claims”19. The fulfilment of the obligations constitutionally 
imposed on the Land Valuation Board seems to have been stifled by financial and 
                                                 
19 Interview with an Official of the Land Valuation Board, Ashanti Regional Office, Kumasi 
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logistical constraints. However, problems encountered by the Board in the 
performance of its power status functions appears to be engendered by the lack of 
mutual agreement over what constitute “fair and adequate” compensation rather than 
the lack of financial resources and logistics. 
  
In fact, there is no point in spending huge financial resources to procure computers, 
survey equipments, and other technological logistics where relevant actors fail to 
recognize the power status functions imposed on an institution. Moreover, public 
bureaucrats cannot perform functions in institutional environment where they are not 
wanted. Scott (2001:58) emphasizes that “Organizations require more than material 
resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social 
environment. They also need social acceptability and credibility”. On both discursive 
fronts in Fumesua and Boankra, the background role played by financial and logistical 
resources in the competence of bureaucrats was clearly demonstrated. Traditional 
authorities, government, and land tenants had to collectively agree on their 
institutional obligations with the mediating political agency before any surveying, 
payment of compensation, and titling functions could be performed. 
 
The organizational effectiveness of public institutions depends first and foremost on 
the possession power status imposed on them by relevant autonomous rational actors 
rather than the creation of organizational structures stuffed with adequate human and 
material resources. Where such public authority is lacking, logistical materials and 
financial resources cannot be put to any effective use by public bureaucrats. The 
survival of political institutions depend on something more than financial resources 
and material logistics which can easily be provided by market forces.  
 
9.8        CONCLUSION 
  
Discourse analysis of the two empirical cases of government land acquisition in 
Fumesua and Boankra makes it emphatic that the institutional capacity of a public 
land bureaucracy to secure collective agreement and action among autonomous 
rational actors with conflict of interests depends on their institutional obligations with 
the public bureaucracy more than anything else. Where there is no This is no 
homogenous institutional value among autonomous rational actors with conflict of 
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interests in a discursive object or issue, there is also no desire independent reason 
among the actors to collective agree in the public interests.   
 
In Ghana, the institutional capacity of the state to readily make land available for 
capital development is hampered by a largely dysfunctional public land bureaucracy 
that lack obligations with traditional land owners and land tenants in discourses of 
land acquisition. The public land bureaucracy can therefore hardly rely on any 
collectively accepted rules and procedures to mediate conflict of interests among 
Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in a discourse of government 
land acquisition. Rather, the public land bureaucracy has historically relied on 
legalized violence which does not release the faculty of rationality of traditional 
authorities and land tenants in a discourse of government land acquisition.  
 
Collective action in discourses of government land acquisition came to depend on 
traditional institutional mechanisms that work outside the public land bureaucracy. In 
effect, there is usually the de-centring of institutional structure of land acquisition 
from the public land bureaucracy to traditional land institutions because traditional 
authorities own about 80% of the available land under customary tenure. But within 
the traditional institutional structures of land acquisition, one finds widespread power 
struggles among the land owners over traditional offices and over land. It therefore 
becomes difficult for a capitalist agent to gain secure access to land for investment. 
 
Although some kind of a tenuous institutional cooperation has emerged between the 
public land bureaucrats and traditional land institutions, it is not engendered by an 
environment of trust relations. The tenuous inter-dependence has been founded on an 
institutional environment filled with distrust, legal pluralism, violence, opportunism, 
uncertainty and the articulation of heterogeneous values. Faced with such serious 
problems of institutional capacity that has very little to do with technical competence, 
it is questionable whether strengthening the material and human resource base of the 
public  land bureaucracy might make any difference at all to their competence to serve 
the broad public. The construction of new institutional obligations with Traditional 
Authorities, Land Tenants, and Government is imperative if the public land 
bureaucracy is to function as a rational collective actor that supply desire independent 
reasons to these actors for rational collective action in discourses of land acquisition.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
10.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
 
The study has been driven by the problem of land acquisition faced by government in 
Ghana. Government, it has been empirically observed, does not only encounter 
difficulties in gaining access to available physical land but also faced insecurity over 
legally acquired public lands. The study sought to (a) define the institutional capacity 
of the state for land acquisition, and (b) to find out the specific problems that affect 
the institutional capacity of the public land bureaucracy to competently mediate 
conflict of interests among Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in 
discourses over government land acquisition.  
 
10.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The institutional capacity of the state for government land acquisition was defined to 
include the Lands Commission, the Land Title Registry, the Survey Department, and 
the Land Valuation Board. Two high profile cases of government land acquisitions for 
an inland port project were also examined to find out the problems that impact on the 
competence of these organizational units to collectively mediate conflict of interests 
among Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in the discourses of 
land acquisition. A theoretical analysis of the discursive interactions over government 
land acquisition provided deep insight into problems that impact on the competence of 
the public land bureaucracy. The problems of institutional capacity cut across 
conflicts of state sovereignty over land ownership, fragmentary institutional 
obligations, weak institutional structuring, and the ineffective use of bureaucratic 
resources. The findings of the study are summarized as follows. 
 
10.1.1 THERE ARE NO INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS AMONG 
GOVERNMENT, TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND LAND 
TENANTS WITHIN THE PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY 
 
The study found that there are no formal institutional obligations among Government, 
Traditional Land Owners, and Land Tenants within the institutional fabric of the 
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public land bureaucracy in discourses of government land acquisition. The study 
found no institutional avenues within the public land bureaucracy for capitalist agents 
with interests in land to fulfil the subjective obligations demanded by traditional 
authorities and land tenants in discourses of public and customary land acquisitions. 
Beyond their subjective positions, these three actors also found no rational reasons 
within the institutional framework of the public land bureaucracy for their collective 
agreement and action in a discourse of land acquisition. 
 
The hollow co-optation of representatives from the House of Chiefs, the Ghana Bar 
Association, the Ghana Institution of Surveyors, the Department of Town and Country 
Planning, the Association of Farmers and Fishermen, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Ministry responsible for Lands and Forestry, into the leadership 
structure of the public land bureaucracy did not in any way lead to the conferment of 
legitimacy and resources on the public land bureaucracy. The public land bureaucracy 
therefore lacked the political competence from these actors to mediate conflict of 
interests in a discourse of government land acquisition.  
 
On the contrary, as predicted by Selznick (1949:16), the character of the co-opted 
elements had shaped the modes of action available to Government and the public land 
bureaucracy in rational discourses. The price of commitment to outside elements 
which government and the public bureaucracy had to pay was to adapt to the 
obligations demanded by chiefs within their customary land institutions.   
 
The emerging hypothesis from the study is that:  
 
A political institution with strong institutionalized obligatory relationships with 
relevant autonomous rational actors is more likely to competently mediate conflict of 
interests in a discursive object or issue, than a political institution that has weak or no 
institutionalized obligations with relevant autonomous rational actors within its 
institutionalized environment. 
 
An institutional fact of land acquisition is more likely to be created through collective 
intentionality, collective agreement, and collective action among relevant autonomous 
rational actors with conflict of interests in a discursive process when the necessary 
 148
subjective obligations demanded by actors have been sutured into the institutional 
fabric of the political agency mediating the discourse.  
 
10.1.2 THE PUBLIC LAND BUREAUCRACY IS INSTITUTIONALLY 
STRUCTURED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF VIOLENCE USED BY 
GOVERNMENT FOR THE DECONSTRUCTION OF CUSTOMARY 
LAND INSTITUTIONS AND NOT STRUCTURED AS A RATIONAL 
COLLECTIVE ACTOR 
 
The study also found out that the public land bureaucracy does not function as a 
rational collective organizational actor in discourses of government land acquisition. 
Even under the democratic dispensation of the state, the public land bureaucracy has 
not shed off its cloth as a one sided instrument of violence used by government for the 
deconstruction of customary land institutions. Consequently, the public land 
bureaucracy lacks the political competence to mediate conflicts of interest among 
Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land Tenants in land acquisition. 
 
One may therefore give credit to Kasanga (2000) for his accurate observation that the 
public land bureaucracy has failed to serve the broad interest of the public. On the 
contrary, the public land bureaucracy has largely functioned as an instrument of 
violence used by government to deconstruct customary land institutions and displace 
poor farmers and local communities from their customary land.  
 
In the absence of collective institutional obligations, the ensuing state-traditional 
institutional rivalry over land ownership has weakened the competence of the public 
land bureaucracy to facilitate access to land held by actors within the boundaries of 
the traditional state. Unfortunately for the public land bureaucracy, their institutional 
rivals own about 80% of the country’s physical land. As a result, the public land 
bureaucracy has largely become helplessly dependent for their functional survival on 
rival traditional institutions. Interestingly, the subjective position of traditional land 
institutions on what legitimately counts as land acquisition does not entail the legal 
formalization of transactions as demanded by the democratic state.  
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Therefore, although the public land bureaucracy have the legal mandate to mediate 
conflict of interest in government land acquisition and facilitate access to land for 
development; this power status function is informally decentring to their institutional 
rivals. Government, local investors, scholars, and other neutral land actors have found 
the authority of traditional land institutions to be more crucial for gaining access to 
customary land than that of the public land bureaucracy.  
 
10.1.3 THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF PUBLIC LAND 
BUREAUCRATS SEEMS TO MAKE LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR 
CAPACITY TO MEDIATE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN 
DISCOURSES OF LAND ACQUISITION 
 
Finally, the study found out that within the public land bureaucracy, the lack of 
institutional obligations among Government, Traditional Authorities, and Land 
Tenants in discourses of government land acquisition has also rendered the technical 
competence possessed by public bureaucrats almost useless. This finding 
emphatically confirms the distinctive characteristic of the field and practice of public 
administration, namely, the acquisition and possession of public authority from 
relevant autonomous rational actors within the state. More than anything else, the 
possession of public authority symbolizes the distinctive competence of the public 
bureaucrat from other fields of administration. Traditional Authorities and Land 
Tenants have little need for the technical competence of public bureaucrats because 
market forces have emerged to fill that need.  
 
Until, the process of land acquisition reaches the final stage of formalization, the 
technical competence of the public land bureaucracy becomes unless. The crucial 
functions of surveying of land, and evaluation for payment of compensation claims 
may be acquired by traditional authorities and land tenants from the market. The legal 
consent and concurrence of the public land bureaucracy to original lease agreements 
prepared within traditional land institutions is imposed on inherent problems 
transmitted from traditional land institutions. This affects the public land bureaucrats 
to effectively make use of their technical competence in the formalization of 
customary land transactions. Reliance on a one legged pillar of legalized violence 
without social legitimacy is inadequate for effective public administration. 
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10.2 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY: SEIZING THE MOMENT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
 
The study is conclusive that the institutional competence of the public land 
bureaucracy to mediate conflict of interests in government land acquisition is largely 
determined by the creation of homogeneous obligatory relationships with land tenants, 
traditional land owners, and government. However, as the findings disclosed, 
institutional obligations demanded by these various actors are fragmented and largely 
lay outside the public land bureaucracy. There is therefore distrust, institutional 
rivalry, insecurity, violence, and uncertainty in discourses of government land 
acquisition that is mediated by the public land bureaucracy.  
 
The genesis of the prevailing weakness in the institutional structure of the public land 
bureaucracy may be traced to the different discursive practices and cultures of land 
ownership that have dominated different political moments of state making in Ghana. 
Claims over land and subjects by traditional authorities were affirmed by the colonial 
state, and also re-affirmed within the constitutional fabric of the modern democratic 
state of Ghana. At the same time, government finds constitutional and legal grounds 
to use its monopoly over the institutions of the public land bureaucracy to violently 
create land space for itself. Herein lays the divided sovereignty of the state over 
claims to land ownership. The interests of land tenants hinges in the balance between 
the legal institutions of state and the traditional institutions that exist below the state.  
 
Attempts by government to deal with the problems of land acquisition has not been 
furthered by the creation of many autonomous land organizations that have become 
more concerned with the protection of their institutional survival rather than 
functional as a collective bureaucratic unit with a homogeneous institutional value. 
Since rational actors are concerned with political power as much as with they are with 
the productive efficiency of institutionalized organizations; the alternative approach 
for government is to pursue meaningful institutional reforms through which the state 
seek to weld together the discursive positions of traditional authorities, land tenants, 
and any other relevant actor into the public land bureaucracy.  
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A comprehensive institutional reform programme called the Land Administration 
Programme (LAP) is being implemented nationwide towards this political objective. 
One can only hope that the state will seize this moment of institutional reform to 
create real and enforceable institutional obligations between Government, Traditional 
Authorities, Land Tenants, other relevant actors with conflict of interests in land 
acquisition, within the overall institutional framework for land administration.  
 
It is through this collectivist approach to institutional reforms that the emergent public 
land bureaucracy would come to possess a homogenous political competence which 
mirrors the underlying conflicts of relevant autonomous rational actors with conflict 
of interests in discourses of government land acquisition. The technical competence of 
the pubic land bureaucracy may then be put into more effective use within 
institutional environment where it is called for. In conclusion, one may ask whether 
the moment of institutional reforms mark the dawn a new democratic Ghanaian state 
where executive, judiciary and legislative political power will be shared among a 
dominant coalition of Chiefs and modern political elites. Or perhaps, it is just an 
institutional reform process that will be contained in the land economy of the state.  
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